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Abstract 
This dissertation examines Peruvian ministries’ implementation of administrative 
decentralization, 2003-2006, and identifies factors shaping their decentralization 
policymaking. In administrative decentralization, implementation involves translating 
broad guidelines into sectoral transfer policies. Sectoral policymakers who execute 
decentralization mandates are, therefore, responsible for relinquishing authority and 
resources to subnational governments. Despite this challenging situation, little is known 
said about factors—political or otherwise—shaping the implementation of administrative 
decentralization. 
The initiation of state decentralization programs throughout Latin America has 
been examined and largely attributed to national political factors, rather than technical 
considerations. However, transferring power is not an assured outcome of national 
politicians’ decisions to decentralize. This study explores a process that continued to be 
shaped by ministries after national political actors ceased to be involved; after a rapid 
 vii
start of top-down reforms, administrative decentralization virtually stalled under their 
control. 
Peruvian policy sectors are very heterogeneous, suggesting a need for distinct 
approaches to reform. Nevertheless, ministries’ collective failure to implement rapidly 
has been attributed to generalized resistance to relinquish authority. This view is 
consistent with a bureaucratic politics-type understanding of public policymaking. 
However, my comparative analysis of decentralization policies reveals that self-
interested resistance is significant but does not coherently explain policymaking or 
variation between policies. Furthermore, while resistance is ubiquitous, there are different 
types of resistance to reform, coming from autonomous offices, top policymakers, or the 
Presidency. 
In contrast, institutionalist lenses identify rules and processes that significantly 
condition possibilities for administrative decentralization. Policymakers face distinct 
challenges and opportunities in each sector; some ministries had deconcentration 
programs underway when national reforms started. 
While institutionalist lenses elucidate distinct conditions for reform, focusing on 
“audacious reformers” highlights the role of individual agency. The exceptional case of 
Health features a complex organization led by a reform-minded minister to the forefront 
of reforms. 
All three approaches to analyzing the implementation of administrative 
decentralization are complementary in providing coherent accounts of sectoral 
policymaking. Different combinations of institutional conditions, sectoral characteristics 
 viii
and individual motivations are ultimately responsible for variation among approaches to 
reform. Administrative decentralization emerges, not as one process, but as a 
constellation of particular paths of reform. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Between 2001 and 2006, the administration of President Alejandro Toledo formulated 
and implemented a comprehensive—and unprecedented—state decentralization program 
in Peru. While there was initially wide political and popular support for such an 
ambitious policy, by the time a new administration took office in mid 2006 there was 
broad consensus regarding the government’s failure to achieve many of the fundamental 
objectives of state decentralization. 
 
In particular, by 2006 there was dissatisfaction throughout the country with the progress 
achieved in administrative decentralization, in terms of the process’ stated objective of 
empowering subnational (regional and local) authorities in various sectors of 
policymaking. Many functions that were to be transferred from central to subnational 
governments remained in the hands of national ministries in 2006 and, furthermore, the 
majority of those transfers that were made effective during this period only implied 
formalizing existing arrangements or, in other cases, transferring responsibilities but no 
new resources. 
 
This study analyzes the absence of significant progress in this crucial dimension of a state 
reform program, one that began in a context of national consensus and political support. 
It examines Peruvian ministries’ implementation of administrative reform during the 
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period 2003-2006, and it identifies theoretically relevant factors shaping these ministries’ 
decentralization policymaking in their respective policy sectors.  
 
A focus on administrative decentralization 
The study focuses on the administrative dimension of state decentralization, which 
involves distributing public sector functions between different levels of government. 
Ironically, the research process leading to this dissertation initially omitted analyzing 
both the implementation stage and the role of ministries and other bureaucratic agencies 
in administrative reform, as it focused on identifying the national political factors that 
determined the early (agenda setting and formulation) stages of the Peruvian reform 
process during 2001-2002. The original objective was to understand how the interests of 
stakeholders at the outset of reform shaped the eventual outcomes of decentralization.  
But by the time preliminary research began in mid 2004, the decentralization process was 
no longer high on the public agenda or prominent in the national media, and it had 
generally lost its early political momentum, in part because the President’s interest in the 
process waned after the ruling party lost dramatically to the main opposition party 
(APRA) in the November 2002 elections of regional and local authorities. Also, Congress 
no longer played the leading pro-reform role it had briefly played in 2001-2002. 
 
It soon became apparent through interviews and secondary-source research, however, that 
the process that was set in motion in 2002 was still moving forward, albeit slowly and 
unclearly. This was true despite the perceived lack of political interest from the most 
 3
visible national political actors. Early interviewees basically agreed that, barring a 
decisive return to reform leadership by the President or the head of the Cabinet, by 2004 
any progress in decentralization depended primarily on decision makers in ministries and, 
to some extent, the central decentralization agency, while subnational governments had 
very little political power in shaping reforms.  
 
This situation strongly suggested to the author that there were dynamics of 
decentralization that needed to be analyzed in order to fully understand how such a 
reform process is shaped, beyond the highly visible, initial political negotiations and 
conflict. Understanding these dynamics of implementation emerged as the more 
challenging and interesting research objective, and yet it became apparent that this stage 
of the process received scant attention in the Peruvian media or even in academic and 
technical publications.1 
 
It was evident that bureaucrats implementing reform in multiple policy sectors were 
having a significant impact on the overall process of state decentralization. Achieving the 
key objectives set at the start of reforms was basically in the hands of these implementers, 
or sectoral decision makers; these officials were not just following guidelines from 
above. However, it was not clear what types of guidelines, motivations or priorities were 
at work. This appeared as an important issue that had yet to be carefully explored in the 
decentralization literature. Thus, by mid 2005 the research process changed course and 
                                                 
1 One notable exception is that of reports published by the independent, Lima-based watchdog organization 
Participa Peru 
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focused on studying the dynamics of the implementation of decentralization in its 
administrative dimension, although without losing sight of the earlier stages of the 
process and their implications. 
 
The nature of the problem 
Formulating and implementing a reform program that empowers policymakers outside 
central government is a challenging goal from the onset of a decentralization process. In 
particular, the role of political and bureaucratic resistance to reforms at the level of 
central government looms as a compelling explanation why decentralization programs 
would not always succeed in increasing the decision-making power of subnational 
governments. After all, reforms require not only the proper design and execution of 
complex reforms, but also—just as importantly—that actors at the center relinquish 
resources and administrative authority.  
 
Thus, because empowering subnational governments along different dimensions also 
involves limiting the power of those at the top, even starting reforms and setting the 
“rules of the game” for decentralization has been shown to be a matter of arduous 
negotiations between conflicting political actors. Politics,2 often to a greater extent than 
technocratic considerations, can indelibly shape the timing and content of 
decentralization, and, ultimately, affect its impact at the subnational level.  
                                                 
2 Understood here in the particular sense of struggle for power between individuals or organizations, i.e. 
“social relations involving intrigue to gain authority or power” as defined in Princeton’s WordNet 
(http://wordnet.princeton.edu) 
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This fundamental importance of politics in initiating and shaping decentralization has 
been recognized for some time in the policy analysis literature as an inevitable reality that 
policymakers must confront. It has also been a driving factor behind a body of scholarly 
literature that seeks to more fully understand the determinants—political and otherwise—
of decentralization processes and how they affect policy outcomes. Recent studies have 
elucidated the motivations of top authorities and the impact of initial determinants on the 
shape and outcome of decentralization processes, focusing their analyses on the national 
political arena at the outset of reforms (Garman, Haggard and Willis, 2001; O’Neill 2003; 
Falleti, 2005; Grindle, 2000; Montero and Samuels, 2004; Eaton, 2004; Rodríguez, 1997; 
Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee, 2004). Such studies have made valuable contributions by 
identifying some of the factors that affect the outcome of decentralization. 
 
In Latin America, the initiation of state decentralization programs throughout the region 
has amounted to a “wave” of reforms in recent decades (Eaton, 2003, 2004; Montero and 
Samuels, 2004), including the Peruvian case. As suggested above, the genesis of 
individual cases of reform within this Latin American “wave” has been largely attributed 
to national political factors, rather than technocratic considerations or regional factors 
(Montero and Samuels, 2004; O’Neill, 2005). Such findings notwithstanding, clearing the 
initial political hurdles and establishing a framework for change is not sufficient to 
guarantee success in transferring decision-making power; the model for reform itself also 
matters, as some crucial policy choices involve choosing between different models of 
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state reform—and sequences of reform in particular—and these do lead to a range of 
distinct outcomes (Falleti, 2005).  
 
As this study will emphasize, after the outset of reform new actors come into play who 
can significantly shape a state program—such as decentralization—and these are often 
different actors from those that prevail at the beginning of reforms (as suggested by 
Thomas and Grindle, 1990). Implementing the administrative dimension of reform 
requires that guidelines set by the highest layer of government be applied to particular 
policy sectors and to a multiplicity of local and regional contexts—a major technical 
challenge. In doing so, a middle layer of implementers at ministries and other agencies—
whose authority and resources are ultimately at stake—have significant discretion in 
translating guidelines from above into concrete policies. 
 
Therefore, decentralizing the state remains a technical and political challenge during the 
implementation of its administrative dimension, as it is still necessary that those holding 
power release valuable authority and resources—a fundamentally political issue. This 
challenging, and significantly unexplored, role of bureaucratic policymakers during the 
implementation of decentralization is the central problem addressed by this study. While 
the impact of bureaucratic actors is often mentioned by technocratic policy reports, recent 
scholarly literature on decentralization in Latin America rarely theorizes about the 
political or other factors driving the implementation stage of a decentralization policy 
process or about its impact on the overall outcome of reform; rather, there is often an 
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implicit direct link between the factors shaping the earliest stages of reform and the 
ultimate results and impact of such reform (Falletti, 2005). 
 
In Peru, a heterogeneous group of ministries has been in charge of shaping this transfer of 
power and authority to subnational levels. The heterogeneity of these ministries, in terms 
of budget size, types of expenditures and institutional characteristics, for example, and, 
on the other hand, of policy areas under their authority may suggest a need for distinct 
approaches to reform. Nevertheless, Peruvian ministries’ collective failure to implement 
rapidly has been most often attributed to generalized resistance to relinquish authority (as 
in Azpur, 2005; SNV/PNUD, 2006).3 In fact, many of those observers contend that 
ministries have purposefully led a process that is decentralization in name only, and such 
a claim would appear to be supported by data on the number of formal transfers that were 
fulfilled and by the nature of these transfers. This view is consistent with a pluralistic, 
bureaucratic politics-type understanding of public policymaking, which is, nevertheless, 
only one of several conceptual lenses through which one can approach a reform process.  
  
General objectives of this dissertation 
This study incorporates the implementation stage and the actions of sectoral 
policymakers into the analysis of the factors that shape a decentralization process and its 
outcomes. It examines sectoral decentralization policies in Peruvian ministries 
                                                 
3 This view was shared by regional and local government officials who were interviewed at the 
Lambayeque regional government and the Independencia (Áncash) local government in 2006. See 
Appendix 1: Key informant interviewees in Peru. 
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comparatively. Such an approach was suggested, first, by perceived gaps in the academic 
literature on Latin American decentralization that are outlined in the literature review in 
Chapter 2. It was also suggested by the particular context and timeline in which this 
research was performed: what initially seemed like a study of the beginning of 
unprecedented changes in 2002 virtually became a study of the perceived failings of 
decentralization as its progress slowed down significantly during implementation.  
 
The general objectives are, first, to describe and analyze key actors and general trends in 
administrative decentralization as well as in sectoral approaches to administrative 
decentralization; and, second, to understand how well alternative theoretical perspectives 
account for these policies. This Peruvian case (2002-2006) stands out because, given the 
rapid disappearance of high-level political leadership for reform, it clearly shows how 
actors—sectoral policymakers in ministries—who are virtually irrelevant at the outset of 
reforms can have significant discretion over the timing and content of administrative 
reform in each policy field undergoing changes. Although the policies that they develop 
for specific sectors (ranging from education and health to transportation and agriculture) 
vary, ministries can be (and have been) seen as collectively re-shaping the reform process 
as, in this particular case, they have generally not produced an expected delegation of 
decision-making powers. 
 
This study seeks to identify determinants of the decentralization policies observed in 
relevant Peruvian ministries by testing three alternate explanations that are drawn from 
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different bodies of literature: “bureaucratic politics,” “institutional constraints,” and 
“audacious reformers,” which are described in Chapter 2. In this implementation 
scenario, the calculated self-interest suggested by a bureaucratic politics approach can 
appear to shape policies substantially: the first striking finding of this research is that 
most agencies have indeed failed to implement reform policies that involve forsaking 
decision-making power in the short-term. However, a closer examination of individual 
cases reveals, in light of policy variation across ministries, evidence of the impact of 
organizational legacies and individual reformers on distinct, yet modest, advances 
towards decentralization. 
 
This dissertation also aims to broaden the scope of analysis reported in the literature on 
the determinants of decentralization, so as to help establish a more direct relevance of the 
findings of academic studies to policymakers and analysts preoccupied with the actual 
outcome of decentralization reforms. A much fuller understanding of the factors that 
shape a long and complex policymaking and political process is made possible when one 
incorporates additional elements to the analysis of state decentralization policy process in 
Latin America—first, the implementation stage of decentralization policymaking; second, 
a focus on the dimension of administrative decentralization (in addition to the political 
and fiscal dimensions of decentralization), and, third, the role of sectoral policymakers 
and other actors in addition to those shaping the outset of reform.  Moreover, because the 
alternative conceptual lenses employed here are grounded in theory and can provide 
complementary accounts of decentralization policymaking, the explanatory factors 
 10
identified here as significant for Peru are expected to be useful in analyzing similar 
reform processes in other countries.  
 
By examining changes across different policy systems and viewing decentralization 
overall as a policy process, this study expands on the scope of previous work on 
decentralization determinants by elaborating on a finding from the (mostly North 
American) public policy literature: implementers of public programs, who generally 
appear as relevant actors after broad guidelines for reform are in place, are also 
policymakers themselves. Implementers do shape policies and influence outcomes, often 
with political motives (Kettl and Fesler, 2006; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Lipsky, 
1980). Thus, it is important to examine the implementation stage of decentralization in 
order to understand the factors that shape the outcome of such a policy process. 
 
The Peruvian case 
Recent reforms in Peru occurred in a context that is conducive to understanding the 
determinants of administrative decentralization: within a relatively short time period, it is 
possible to readily distinguish distinct stages of policymaking, each of which features 
different outcomes and stakeholders. This case provides a suitable context to begin to 
identify the distinct dynamics of an implementation stage. As discussed at greater length 
in Chapter 3, there were major, visible milestones like the announcement of the decision 
to begin decentralization, its fulfillment through regional elections, and the formulation 
of the major aspects of a legal and administrative framework for decentralization, all of 
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which took place within a relatively brief period that culminated with the inauguration of 
elected regional governments in January 2003. This was followed by the formal initiation 
of the implementation of decentralization. 
 
Moreover, the political context and the overarching framework for reform have created a 
leading, and virtually unchallenged, role for sectoral policymakers in central ministries 
and other agencies. Vis-à-vis ministerial policymakers, actors like authorities in 
subnational governments, the national decentralization agency CND, and the president 
and congressmen have been either powerless (the former two) or simply detached from 
the details of administrative decentralization (the latter two). 
  
This limited impact of subnational actors in policymaking across different policy fields is 
not a recent phenomenon. In territorial terms, Peru is the largest unitary state in the 
Western Hemisphere, and the reform of the Peruvian state that is now ostensibly 
occurring has been preceded by a long history of centralized policymaking. Moreover, in 
broader socioeconomic and political terms the country has remained highly centralized 
through nearly two centuries of independent history; political power, wealth and industry 
are still concentrated in Lima, the capital, and generally in the coastal region. Not 
surprisingly, then, decentralizing Peru has long been a rallying cry for political leaders 
offering to resolve the country’s deep regional socioeconomic disparities. However, the 
overall history of decentralization reforms since independence in the early 19th century 
has been largely one of unfulfilled promises (Zas Friz, 2001; Planas, 1998).  
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More recently, significant change seemed possible, as decentralization was a key 
electoral promise of all the main contenders in the 2001 presidential campaign, which 
was held in the context of democratic transition from the decade-long, authoritarian 
regime of Alberto Fujimori. In November 2002, the first direct elections of regional 
presidents, vice-presidents and legislators, and the approval of the Ley Orgánica de 
Gobiernos Regionales (Organic Law of Regional Governments)—followed by the 
inauguration of 25 regional governments in January 2003—effectively marked the 
beginning of the most sweeping and sustained state decentralization process that the 
country has experienced. 
 
Defining key terms 
In a general sense, decentralization involves a basic underlying movement: a shift in 
power or autonomy from the center to the periphery (Rodríguez, 1997). However, 
decentralization as public policy can be undertaken in any of a number of policy fields, 
and along several dimensions (fiscal, administrative, political, territorial, market, and 
more). It can be understood as a means to pursue diverse objectives of policymakers, 
which may be of a political, economic, administrative or other nature. In any particular 
context, some of the objectives being pursued through decentralization may be even 
contradictory, as different proponents of reform hold different expectations of such a 
multi-dimensional process (Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee, 2004).  
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Considering that decentralization is a notoriously ambiguous concept, first it is important 
to clarify that this study will focus on public policies that are part of a process of state 
decentralization, which has been understood in recent literature as the: 
…diffusion of decision-making powers over specific policy areas, and the 
resources to implement those powers, from central to local authorities. (Mitchell, 
2006, p. 176) 
 
As mentioned above, transferring decision-making power from central government to 
subnational levels involves changes along different dimensions of public policymaking. 
Most relevant to state decentralization are the processes of political, fiscal and 
administrative decentralization, which together can be seen as routes to consolidating 
policymaking autonomy. 
 
Political decentralization provides more power in public decision-making to citizens and 
their elected representatives at regional and local levels, and is related to increases in both 
representative and participatory democracy. The most pertinent indicators of political 
decentralization are municipal and regional elections.  According to Schneider (2000), 
fiscal decentralization refers to how much central governments cede fiscal resources and 
authority to non-central government entities. This can be achieved through 
intergovernmental transfers, self-financing of services, increased subnational revenues, or 
subnational borrowing. 
 
The objective of the third dimension, administrative decentralization, is to “redistribute 
authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among 
 14
different levels of government” (Schneider, 2000). Thus, it is at the heart of the effort to 
increase decision-making power. But authority, responsibility and financial resources 
may be redistributed in varying degrees among different levels of government through 
administrative decentralization; a widely used typology, originally proposed by 
Rondinelli (1981), identifies three modes of administrative decentralization: 
deconcentration, delegation and devolution.  
 
According to Bossert (2000), deconcentration is “generally the most common and limited 
form of decentralization, and involves the transfer of functions and/or resources to the 
regional or local field offices of the central government agency in question”; delegation 
“implies the transfer of authority, functions, and/or resources to an autonomous private, 
semi-public, or public institution,” where such institutions remain accountable to central 
government; and devolution is the “cession of sectoral functions and resources to 
autonomous local governments that, in some measure, then take responsibility for service 
delivery, administration, and finance.” Thus, only in devolution do central governments 
forsake authority and resources in a manner that allows for full policymaking autonomy 
at the subnational level. 
 
However, it is important to note that the legal framework for Peruvian decentralization 
does not establish devolution as a final objective: “Defining, directing, regulating and 
administrating national and sectoral policies is an exclusive competence of National 
Government…” (CND, 2005, p. 122; translation by the author). Thus, a full 
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decentralization of sectoral policymaking is not contemplated in the Peruvian case, even 
in the long term. This study will distinguish instances of mere deconcentration within 
central government from those reforms that effectively decentralize and transfer authority 
and resources (through delegation) from central government entities to democratically 
elected subnational authorities. That Peruvian subnational governments are not to benefit 
from a full decentralization of policymaking may even be interpreted as a major reason to 
call this process one of decentralization “in name only” regardless of how it unfolds. 
 
In the case of Peru (which may be typical given the nature of each dimension of reform), 
the most important aspects of fiscal and political decentralization are articulated quite 
clearly and with significant detail in the legal framework; this is described at greater 
length in Chapter 3. The content of administrative decentralization for each policy sector, 
however, remains at a level of generality that leaves much discretion for policymakers in 
the ministries that are in charge of these policy sectors. 
 
Dissertation structure 
This introductory chapter has established the general objectives of the study and the 
nature of the phenomena that are to be explored. Chapter 2 presents the relevant literature 
review in a number of fields that provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the case 
of administrative decentralization in Peru, and states the key research questions that this 
literature review suggests in terms of the problems being examined. Chapter 2 then 
describes the dissertation’s methodological and conceptual frameworks.  
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Subsequently, Chapter 3 begins the exploration of the Peruvian case by analyzing the 
general national context, historical factors and the more recent social, economic and 
political processes that have led to—and helped to shape—decentralization reforms since 
2002. It describes general political, economic, social, and geographic characteristics of 
the country, which set the stage for, and is followed by, an assessment of the current state 
of decentralization in fiscal, political, and administrative terms. 
 
The third chapter also describes the long history of demands for decentralization, which 
mostly have been answered by unfulfilled promises and aborted reforms. In recent 
decades, there has been a constitutional mandate to decentralize the state but, in the 
period from the democratic transition of 1979-80 to the fall of the Fujimori regime 
(2000), there was only partial progress. Elected municipal governments have survived for 
over a quarter of a century, while the regional authorities elected in the short lived, late 
1980s regionalization experiment were ousted when the process was reversed in the early 
1990s. 
  
In the elections that took place during the democratic transition period of 2000-2001, 
decentralization was a top priority in the political agenda of most candidates. This third 
chapter reviews the agenda setting and policy formulation stages by focusing, first, on the 
fulfillment of Toledo’s decision to begin decentralization in the face of pressure from a 
multiple-district congress and the need to legitimize his rule. The ensuing description of 
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policy formulation (2002-2003) looks at the characteristics of the emerging institutional 
framework and at the actors involved. A brief description of the three major laws of the 
decentralization framework emphasizes their implications for the implementation of 
sectoral policies. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 seek to understand the extent to which bureaucratic politics account for 
the overall pattern of administrative decentralization and the differences observed in 
sectoral decentralization policies. Chapter 4 discusses the key actors and stakeholders in 
shaping implementation (2003-2006), and then describes how and why ministries and 
other sectoral agencies cam to have the upper hand in the process. From a bureaucratic 
politics perspective, which focuses on inter-agency conflict and the calculated self-
interest of bureaucrats, these conditions lead us to expect that ministerial policymakers 
would successfully seek to preserve the status quo and avoid a real transfer of decision-
making power. A general description of policies observed in the ministries in charge of 
sectors under decentralization provides evidence to support this: the transfer of unfunded 
mandates, unrealistic accreditation requirements for subnational governments and, often, 
the omission of decentralization in official planning documents. 
  
Chapter 5 begins the analysis of individual cases of sectoral policies formulated by 
ministries by looking at the evidence of calculated self-resistance in three ministries. 
While evidence to support the self-interest perspective of bureaucratic politics is 
pervasive, as shown in the previous chapter, there are also hints that a lack of political 
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will does not tell the whole story. There is not an absolute lack of progress across the 
board, and bureaucratic politics does not seem to explain this observed variation. We 
would expect more resistance where there is a more consolidated sectoral authority and 
more centralized resources and power are at stake, but the variation in sectoral policies 
does not reflect this. Three cases of decentralization policy, with ministries involved in 
very distinct policy fields, are described in greater detail to illustrate how bureaucratic 
politics can tell a good part, though not all, of the story of administrative decentralization 
policies: Ministry of Commerce and Tourism, Ministry of Housing, Construction and 
Sanitation, and the Ministry of Education. 
 
In order to test for alternative perspectives on sectoral policymaking that can provide a 
better account of the pattern of administrative decentralization, Chapter 6 approaches 
sectoral policies from perspectives that do not focus on bureaucratic resistance to 
decentralization, and through which a degree of progress in following the mandate for 
decentralization appears more feasible. It analyzes the different paths taken in different 
cases from perspectives highlighting, first, institutional factors and, second, the role of 
individual reformers. In general terms, this chapter assesses if the impact of institutional 
factors and individual reformers on sectoral decentralization paths can significantly 
explain the variation in policies that a bureaucratic politics approach does not account for. 
 
Thus, this chapter illustrates how decentralization policies can also be explained by 
sector-specific, institutional factors and by the preferences of individual reformers. There 
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is evidence of institutional factors shaping particular policies across types of ministries. 
Several cases illustrate different interaction of institutional and bureaucratic resistance 
factors; one is the industry sector at Ministry of Production. Institutional contexts can 
explain distinct paths towards decentralization: two examples of modest progress in very 
different directions are those of Transportation and Agriculture. 
 
Finally, recent reforms at the Ministry of Health illustrate the interaction of the 
aforementioned bureaucratic politics and institutional factors with a third decisive 
element: individual reformers. Health is one case of an “audacious reformer” leading 
slow progress, after 2002, but with options significantly constrained by previous 
decentralizing experience in the sector and resistance within the ministry’s bureaucracy. 
 
The seventh and final chapter presents the study’s conclusions and some policy 
recommendations. Sectoral policymakers at ministries can be seen as collectively re-
shaping the reform process that was started by national politicians in 2001-2002, as 
they—on the whole—held back on a real delegation of decision-making powers during 
the period under study. As initial findings suggested, bureaucratic politics is an important 
factor behind this general outcome, but there is also variation in sectoral decentralization 
policies that is driven by particular institutional factors and the actions of individual, 
reform-oriented policymakers. Thus, a bureaucratic politics-type approach only has 
limited explanatory power in terms of the determinants of sectoral policymaking, which 
is a much more complex undertaking than such a conceptual lens would suggest. 
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Administrative decentralization is of utmost importance to achieving central objectives of 
decentralization and, within this dimension of reform, institutions and individuals can be 
as significant as self-interested resistance in determining the success or failure of state 
decentralization. 
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Chapter 2 - Explaining administrative decentralization 
 
The introductory chapter has established that the general problem that this study 
addresses is the largely unexplained—yet decisive—role of sectoral policymakers in 
administrative decentralization, which in turn affects the overall state decentralization 
process. This second chapter begins by presenting the relevant literature review in a 
number of fields that provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the determinants of 
administrative decentralization in Peru. In light of the issues explored in the literature 
review, the following section states the study’s key research questions. Finally, this 
chapter describes the dissertation’s methodological framework, which will make possible 
answering the dissertation’s research questions through primarily qualitative methods. 
 
Decentralization theory and practice 
Theories in various disciplines, including economics and political science, have 
suggested the benefits of decentralizing decision-making in the state for many decades. 
The theories of fiscal federalism and democratic participation for state decentralization 
indicate substantial benefits, including more efficient allocation of economic resources, 
improved public services, and more accountable and responsive government, among 
others. 
 
In economics, a favorable outlook on state decentralization can be traced back to 
Tiebout’s influential work on the provision of public goods (1956), where 
decentralization enhances economic efficiency by allocating national income in a more 
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optimal manner. Local governments are found to be in a better position than central 
government to tailor outputs (goods and services) to local preferences, thus raising 
overall efficiency. There are, however, several strong assumptions behind Tiebout’s 
model of local finance. For instance, consumer-voters are willing and able to move 
around to seek out a community (“voting with their feet”) that provides the level of 
outputs (public goods and services, which imply a certain level of taxation) best suited to 
their sets of preferences. 
 
Fiscal federalism theory builds on Tiebout’s foundations by establishing “a general 
normative framework for the assignment of functions to different levels of government 
and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions” (Oates, 1999, p. 
1121), and has been widely influential in favoring decentralization as a policy 
prescription. According to Oates, fiscal federalism establishes that central government is 
responsible for macroeconomic stabilization and for any necessary income redistribution, 
while subnational governments “have their raison d’être in the provision of goods and 
services whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdiction” (Oates, 1999, p. 1122) 
Fiscal federalism embraces a principle of subsidiarity as it assumes that public services 
should be provided by the lowest level of government “encompassing, in a spatial sense, 
the relevant benefits and costs” (Oates, 1999, p. 1122).  
 
In political thought, arguments in favor of political decentralization—in the sense of 
bringing decision-making to a government that is closer and more responsive to citizens 
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than the national government—can be related to seminal discussions about the inherent 
benefits of democracy and participation in local government that go at least as far back as 
De Tocqueville in the 19th century. Insofar as decentralization brings government closer 
to the community level, it can be seen as potentially strengthening participation, 
accountability and democratic values as it provides more opportunities to access local 
policymakers. According to Pateman (1975), such increased citizen participation in the 
making of political decisions was considered a desirable end in itself in the classical 
participatory theory of Rousseau and J.S. Mill. Increased government accountability and 
citizen participation at the local level—an explicit objective of contemporary state 
decentralization programs like Peru’s—were seen as serving to protect private interests 
and, more importantly, as serving an educative function: to develop responsible 
individual, social and political action through the effect of the participatory process. All 
this, in turn, would lead to a stable, self-sustaining participatory democratic system.  
 
Peru’s Basic Law of Decentralization (2002) adopts these economic and political 
assumptions. It establishes as a guiding principle that the activities of “government in all 
its distinct levels reach greatest efficiency, effectiveness and control by the population if 
they are carried out in a decentralized manner.” (CND, 2006, translated by the author) 
 
In practice, however, a favorable view of the decentralization of the state only became 
part of the international development orthodoxy in the 1970s, coinciding with the 
perceived failure of the strong developmental state as the prevailing post-World War II 
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model for rich and developing nations alike (Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee, 2004). 
Furthermore, over time it has become evident that reaping the potential benefits outlined 
above depends on the existence of a number of economic, social and political conditions 
that are not easy to attain in developing countries (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998).  
 
Decentralizing reforms have been initiated in every region of the developing world 
(Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee, 2004). However, the policy evaluation literature, based on a 
wealth of experiences throughout the developing world since the 1970s, has found a 
decidedly mixed range of outcomes (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheeba, 1984, among others). 
In fact, decentralization reforms have sometimes produced unexpected negative effects 
on factors like macroeconomic stability (Prud’homme, 1995). An important lesson 
learned is that simply importing decentralization models from abroad into developing 
nations does not work: the design of reforms should reflect careful technical 
consideration of its pros and cons and of the significant trade-offs in choosing policies in 
specific national contexts (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheeba, 1984; Litvack, Ahmad and 
Bird, 1998). According to the current World Bank (2007) approach, decentralization is a 
complex and multifaceted concept that in turn “embraces a variety of concepts which 
must be carefully analyzed in any particular country before determining if projects or 
programs should support reorganization of financial, administrative, or service delivery 
systems.” 
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In light of the difficulties in achieving the objectives of decentralization in the developing 
world, by the 1990s the policy literature recognized that political processes and 
institutional context are ultimately more important than technical discussions in shaping 
decentralization processes and, therefore, for explaining their outcomes. According to 
Bird and Vaillancourt (1998, p. 34), “what may matter more than the precise nature of the 
technical solutions found in the different countries is the process through which such 
solutions are reached.” 
 
Both policy and political science literatures indicate that, in practice, state 
decentralization is born out of fundamentally political motivations much more often than 
of careful technical discussions aimed at solving perceived problems (Manor, 1999; 
Montero and Samuels, 2004). Yet, because experience has shown that decentralization 
programs must be tailored to the reality of each country, program design is crucial to 
achieving the objectives that each country sets for decentralization. These two ideas 
suggest a fundamental dilemma for those hoping to reap the benefits of decentralization: 
Decentralization can positively affect many policy areas, but it can also bring about 
negative side effects; it is only an instrument and not an infallible solution. 
 
Campbell (2003) provides an influential and more optimistic assessment of the actual 
impact of decentralization reforms since the 1970’s. The author describes the changes 
brought to Latin American cities (in ten countries) by decentralization as a “quiet 
revolution,” where a new model of governance has developed. This emerging model 
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features greater political participation, innovative and motivated leadership and a new 
“fiscal bargain” between authorities and voters. Such improvements have been gradually 
achieved over many years and through a process that has distinct stages.  
 
Studying decentralization in the Latin American context 
For centuries, and even long before achieving independence, a centralist tradition of 
government has characterized Latin American countries (Véliz, 1980). While such 
centralism has been identified as the root of many development problems, and deep 
inequalities in particular, it has survived a long history of calls for reform. Politicians at 
the center have often spoken of the benefits of decentralization, especially during 
electoral periods, but it has been an unfulfilled promise in most countries, including those 
in the Andean region (Zas Friz, 2001). 
 
Thus it is rather surprising that the last three decades, since the 1980s, have witnessed an 
unprecedented wave of reforms aiming at state decentralization, as changes have been 
initiated in virtually every country in the region (O’Neill, 2005). This regional trend can 
be seen as part of the wider adoption of decentralization as development policy in the 
developing world in recent decades, which has been related to democratization and 
economic liberalization processes in the early 1980s, as well as to the changing paradigm 
away from strong developmental states since the 1970s (Oxhorn, Selee and Tulchin, 
2004). 
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In Latin America, the reforms of the last three decades have emerged in various national 
contexts and followed different paths, with state decentralization taking place in unitary 
systems like Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia, among others, as well as in federal systems 
like Brazil and Mexico. In some cases, changes were swift and rather drastic, as in highly 
centralized Bolivia, where almost overnight hundreds of local governments were created 
and given significant resources with the 1994 Ley de Participación Popular. In other 
cases, different policy sectors were decentralized at different times and not immediately 
following the beginning of overall reforms; in Mexico, the general framework for 
decentralization was established in the early 1980’s yet education reform did not begin 
until 1992 (Robles, 2006). 
 
In light of this remarkable wave of decentralization, many have sought to understand the 
determinants and effects of such a regional pattern. Political scientists have been drawn to 
solving the puzzle of why rational politicians would seem willing to give up power, 
contrarily to how politicians are normally expected to behave. Policy analysts, in 
contrast, have focused on the impact of decentralization and have observed that these 
reforms—like others throughout the developing world—still face considerable challenges 
in living up to the expectations of civil society and subnational authorities in Latin 
America (Peterson, 1997). Often, decentralization outcomes have not matched stated 
goals or the high expectations of civil society. 
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Academics seeking to explain state decentralization in Latin America have studied the 
overall logic of such reforms, generally pointing to the decisive impact of “top-down” 
factors (related to the interests of national political actors), rather than “bottom-up” forces 
from civil society or subnational governments. 
 
Many comparative and single-country analyses have focused on the genesis of a reform 
process, often involving the executive, legislative bodies and political parties. Authors 
have identified particular determinants and motivations such as electoral calculations, 
party structure, legitimization of the state, and strategies to consolidate central power 
(Montero and Samuels, 2004; O’Neill, 2003; Willis, Garman and Haggard, 1999; Barr, 
2001; Selee and Tulchin, 2004). Most often, these studies have looked at the political 
forces at work around the moment of decision that led to reforms as explanatory factors 
of eventual outcomes, but they also consider the importance of institutional contexts and 
underlying structural factors such as urbanization and demographic trends: 
…although decentralization focuses attention on the actions of elected national 
and subnational politicians and thus on the micro incentives that such politicians 
face, we believe that path-dependent economic and political legacies are too 
important to ignore (Montero and Samuels, 2004, p. 13)  
 
On the other hand, some analysts postulate that many decentralization processes are 
“audacious reforms,” purposeful efforts by politicians and technocrats to resolve 
fundamental issues of governance rather than the result of political calculations or 
conflict (Grindle, 2000). This problem-solving logic is not qualitatively different from the 
administrative or state efficiency objectives that are often pursued by decentralization, 
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although the latter often appear in conjunction with political objectives (Rodríguez, 1997; 
Serrano, 2004). 
 
Other “top-down” determinants, such as the influence of international financial 
institutions (IFI’s) and their technocratic allies or policy diffusion have generally been 
considered as secondary or not significant vis-à-vis the impact of national elites or 
political actors in general by the scholarly literature (Montero and Samuels, 2004; 
O’Neill, 2003). However, while many studies also minimize the significance of 
neoliberal economic reforms or democratization as determinants of decentralization, 
Selee and Tulchin (in Oxhorn, Selee and Tulchin, 2004) find that democratic transitions 
and economic reform provide important motivations in reforms in countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia.  
 
Both Montero and Samuels (2004) and Wilson, Ward, Rodriguez and Spink (2008) 
consider that decentralization and greater democratization are “not necessarily linked in 
any causal way to each other” (Wilson et al., 2008, p. 4); however, the latter find that in 
cases like those of Brazil and Mexico, democratization that ensures greater participation 
at the subnational level can indeed help to achieve the success of decentralization 
reforms. In general, it can be argued that, even if these do not necessarily bring about 
decentralization, periods of democratic transition can be understood as providing rare 
windows of opportunity for reforms, which political actors may or may not choose to 
exploit; this has been argued for the case of Peru over several decades by Schmidt (1989). 
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Meanwhile, “bottom-up” forces, such as pressure from civil society or subnational 
authorities have been mentioned in most individual case studies and cases within 
comparative studies, but ultimately have been considered less significant insofar as these 
actors tend to lack the channels to influence the policymaking process at the national 
level (Montero and Samuels, 2004; Tanaka, 2002). In fact, some authors consider that 
there is a general lack of popular pressure for decentralization in Latin America (Oxhorn, 
Selee and Tulchin, 2005).  
 
Eaton (2004), on the other hand, incorporates earlier historical periods and looks for path 
dependence and long-term consequences of institutional reform in his analyses of 
decentralization in Latin American countries. He finds evidence of both effective 
“bottom-up” pressures from subnational actors and “top-down” strategic actions by 
national politicians. Moreover, looking at the case of Peru over several decades, Schmidt 
(1989) had previously outlined how different macro-political variables could determine 
different decentralization outcomes, and pointed out how some configurations of these 
variables, as during transitions to democracy, provided “windows of opportunity” for 
pressures from below to affect change. Other studies have shown the role of civil society 
institutions in shaping decentralization in particular sectors (education, for instance, in 
Murillo, 1999) . 
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Many authors have examined the factors shaping more specific dimensions of the recent 
wave of state decentralization in Latin America that are also relevant to the problems 
addressed by this study. Several comparative studies have adopted a sectoral view of 
decentralization, especially focusing on the characteristics of education and health 
reforms, including studies that explore the political determinants of sectoral reform in 
education, such as Kubal (2003) and Gershberg (1999). On the other hand, Tamborini 
(2005) has analyzed the implications of decentralization from a different sectoral 
perspective, focusing on tourism in Peru and Chile. He examines the emerging tourism 
industries of Peru and Chile and the conditions under which sub-national state actors 
facilitate (or not) tourism development; he found that sub-national government units, like 
their central counterparts, require institutional strength to have any kind of success. Such 
strength was found to be lacking at both levels in Peru.  
 
Summing up, where the policy-oriented literature had previously focused on assessing the 
effects of decentralization and on elaborating recommendations for avoiding the observed 
pitfalls of reform, some recent academic literature looks at this phenomenon through 
political lenses to explain why decentralization is undertaken and how these factors shape 
policy outcomes. In doing so it tends to attribute the overall observed patterns of 
decentralization processes to political determinants, as “actors in political society and the 
state have played the primary role in initiating, implementing, and shaping 
decentralization” (Montero and Samuels, 2004, p. 13). While this dissertation seeks to be 
relevant to the interests of policy analysts, it primarily addresses this academic literature 
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on the determinants of state decentralization and contributes to it by incorporating the 
analysis of an additional stage of reform and a set of political actors that also shape 
reform decisively: those in charge of implementation. In order to understand the 
importance of such actors, however, it is necessary to properly approach state 
decentralization as a policy process in which implementation plays a crucial role.   
 
State decentralization as a policy process 
The recent literature on the determinants of decentralization in Latin America has, either 
implicitly or explicitly, assumed that reforms actually transfer power to subnational 
governments once central authorities get them going, as Falleti (2005) has pointed out. 
They have thus focused on the national political arena at the outset of reforms in order to 
explain outcomes; variation in the patterns of decentralization is, according to this 
prevailing view, primarily a function of national-level political factors that were 
influential during a relatively limited period in time. Falleti, a notable exception, focuses 
more closely on policy choice and formulation and identifies the sequence in which the 
different dimensions of reform (political, fiscal and administrative decentralization) are 
subsequently implemented, as a major determinant of decentralization outcomes. This 
sequence of reforms, nevertheless, is also traced back to initial decisions and policy 
formulation at the higher levels of government, rather than to other actors that may 
participate in the latter stages of the process. 
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This dissertation, on the other hand, assumes that the transfer of power to subnational 
authorities should not be taken for granted but as an empirical question. It adds to this, 
moreover, that by generally limiting their analysis to political and technical decisions 
made at the higher levels of government, authors exploring the determinants of 
decentralization (such as those included in Montero and Samuels, 2004 and Oxhorn, 
Selee and Tulchin, 2005) are leaving out important factors that can and do shape the 
outcome of public policies like decentralization. 
 
By directly relating political processes and policymaking at the highest levels 
(determined by the executive, congress, political parties) with outcomes in 
intergovernmental relations, authors are implicitly assuming a politics-administration 
dichotomy. That is, there is an assumption that, once a decision is formalized and the 
enabling legislation is in place, implementation follows as a relatively mechanical 
process of executing laws from higher levels of government. Thus, the factors effectively 
determining the outcome of any decentralization process are to be found at the highest 
policymaking circles rather than in any intermediate policymaking instance in central 
government, such as ministries or other agencies, or in subnational government.  
 
In contrast, this study proposes (following Thomas and Grindle, 1990) that the 
implementation stage of a reform program—understood as a period where directives 
from above are executed but where policies also continue to be shaped—must be closely 
examined. Indeed, this perspective applied to decentralization leads one to suspect that 
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there is an unexplored layer of political actors for whom the question should be asked: 
why would rational bureaucrats choose to limit their decision-making power? 
 
Distinct stages of a policy process. A policy reform like state decentralization can be 
understood as the output of a policymaking process. The process involves a multiplicity 
of actors and agencies interacting over time, not just policymakers in the executive and 
legislative but also an intermediate layer of sectoral authorities in ministries.  
 
Public policy scholars have conceptualized the process of policymaking in terms of 
consecutive, functional stages. While there are many versions of the stages model of 
policy, they generally include a sequence of problem identification and agenda setting, 
policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation, thus suggesting a policy cycle 
(Ripley, 1986). The earlier proponents of an interdisciplinary, problem-oriented policy 
science (beginning with Harold Lasswell in the 1950s) found such an approach valuable 
because it helps to: 
…disaggregate an otherwise seamless web of public policy transactions, as was 
too regularly depicted in political science. They proposed that each segment and 
transition were distinguished by differentiated actions and purposes. (De Leon, 
1999, p. 24) 
 
Utilizing a stages approach as a device to facilitate studying the complex policy process 
does not necessarily mean that these stages are to be understood as sharply differentiated 
or even wholly sequential. Rather, it should be seen as a tool to facilitate analysis while 
considering a variety of actors. 
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Although it has proven valuable in many settings, significant criticisms emerged 
regarding the consequences of improperly employing what Sabatier (1999) calls the 
stages heuristic. More generally, this approach has been criticized because it can imply 
linearity in the policy process, where “decisions are made in a series of sequential 
phases,” and issues are approached rationally and considering all relevant information 
(Sutton, 1999). Thomas and Grindle (1990) found that a linear model of the policy 
process—which focuses on the initial agenda and decision phases to the detriment of 
carefully considering implementation—was implicit in many proposals for institutional 
reform in developing countries. Decisions and policymaking, however, do not end once 
major legislation is passed; policies can be shaped and even aborted at any stage. In 
particular, formulation and implementation stages cannot be sharply divided because 
policies evolve over time and are often reformulated (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). 
 
In reality, then, the process of policymaking is not a tidy, rational sequence of events. It is 
also not solely oriented towards problem solving (Sutton, 1999). Policymaking should be 
understood as a political process as much as a problem solving exercise, where politics 
and administration are closely intertwined. Outcomes are not just defined by decisions of 
national authorities but also by decisions of intermediate-level officials in ministries and 
subnational governments. 
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The conceptualization of the policy process as divided into stages is understood here as a 
valuable device that portrays real events systematically. It is an aide in making sense of a 
complex process that evolves over time but it does not constitute a causal framework for 
explaining its evolution (Sabatier, 1999). In this dissertation, the use of “agenda setting” 
or “implementation” will not imply that the policy process always follows a 
predetermined sequence of events but, rather, that distinct types of functional activities 
and products can be grouped together usefully and realistically, which thus justifies the 
concept of stages (De Leon, 1999). 
 
Implementation as policymaking 
Implementation can, therefore, be understood as a distinct stage of the policy process, and 
of a process of decentralization in particular. The study of policy implementation 
examines how laws are executed (Fessler and Kettl, 2005), while also emphasizing the 
organizational processes that deliver a program (Palumbo and Calista, 1990). Emerging 
from an interest in explaining why public programs often failed to meet their original 
goals, studies on implementation began to gain prominence in the 1970s in the United 
States. They focused on actual federal and state programs, and on the activities of 
bureaucrats in charge of them, rather than on characterizing particular agencies 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1974; Lipsky, 1980).  
 
These studies found that it is difficult to assess policy success or failure based solely on 
stated goals, since legislative objectives are typically unclear, and the political 
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compromises that are often necessary during adoption may lead to contradictory or vague 
goals in the legislation. Thus, implementers are granted a degree of discretion in 
interpreting such ambiguous directives (Fessler and Kettl, 2005). 
 
Moreover, where the traditional linear or stages model can suggest a dichotomy between 
policymaking and implementation, implementation studies have uncovered a dynamic, 
more chaotic and unpredictable process where different forces struggle to shape policies 
even after enabling legislation is approved. In the results of studies on implementation 
there is little support for the traditional dichotomy between politics and administration 
that goes back to Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson’s normative views of the role of the 
bureaucracy (Hart and Rosenthal, 1998). Rather, there is a political nature of 
implementation, and implementers are in a position to modify programs.  
 
Therefore, policy implementation is, in effect, a highly interactive and interdependent 
process that is often turbulent. Policy directives are interpreted and adapted by officials 
because programs must go through bureaucracies to reach their intended beneficiaries. 
Moreover, policy reform initiatives may be reversed or significantly modified at any 
point and any stage. As Thomas and Grindle (1990) point out, agenda and decision 
phases should not be the sole focus of attention when looking for causes of failures in 
reform because: 
…even after the decision to adopt a new policy is made, considerable evidence 
suggests that the real work of turning reform into reality is ahead. (Thomas and 
Grindle, 1990, p. 1165) 
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In other words, the outcome of reforms may be determined by the response of 
bureaucratic agencies and public officials to the changes that are initiated at the center. 
As there are many possible contexts, configured by distinct stakeholders and interests, for 
implementation, there are many possible outcomes of reforms. 
 
Bureaucratic politics 
One approach to understanding public policymaking that captures well the concept of 
implementers as policymakers is bureaucratic politics. While a focus on studying 
implementation processes and the impact of bureaucrats of different levels emerged due 
to discontent with the results of federal and other public programs in the United States, 
some political science studies examined the impact of bureaucratic agencies and their 
leaders on national policymaking processes. These gained prominence in the context of 
foreign policy analysis in the United States (notably, Allison, 1969), and they have 
highlighted the importance of inter-agency conflict and negotiation within the state as 
determinants of policy outputs. Thus, while the research lenses of implementation studies 
help us to explain the pivotal role of this stage of policymaking in determining eventual 
results, bureaucratic politics helps us understand what type of attitudes and decisions top 
bureaucrats would likely assume with respect to other public agencies, in a context of 
national policymaking processes. 
 
The concept of bureaucratic politics, understood by Montgomery (1986) in the most 
basic terms as “efforts to influence the policies or behavior of other organizations,” 
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reflects a pluralist view of the political system, with conflict over interests involving 
rational actors and groups within government (Hart and Rosenthal, 1998; Clifford, 1990; 
Krasner, 1972). According to Hart and Rosenthal, bureaucratic politics “…may occur 
both within and across different levels of government and policy sectors and during every 
stage of the policymaking process.” 
 
Bureaucratic politics focuses on power relations, and it proposes a view of sectoral 
policymakers as political actors driven by calculated self-interest that is determined by 
the positions that they hold in a bureaucratic agency. Thus, bureaucrats are political 
actors who are often engaged in conflictual interaction with other agencies. Each 
agency’s objectives are basically linked to survival and growth of the organization, that 
is, protecting or increasing such things as budget allocation, autonomy, morale and scope 
(Krasner, 1972).  
 
Applying this perspective to the case of administrative decentralization, decision makers 
in ministries would be expected to try to maintain control over policy areas and resources 
if they have the choice not to decentralize. Indeed, policymakers would feel threatened by 
decentralization and exert their power to avoid fulfilling the mandate of forsaking 
discretion, resources.  
 
Among indicators of a resistance to give up decision-making power, while nominally 
decentralizing, we would expect first a lack of effective policies or policies that consist of 
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unfunded mandates and mere formalization of existing arrangements in transfers to 
subnational governments. Also, we would expect to find decentralization not being 
integrated into long- or medium-term official organizational plans and programs. 
 
Institutional factors and state reform 
In any given government agency with authority and resources at stake at the central level, 
a bureaucratic politics perspective would reveal a scenario where transferring decision-
making power willingly is highly improbable. However, we also know that there are 
significant differences between the ministries and sectors to be reformed. It is not entirely 
reasonable to expect the same response from all policymakers in this heterogeneous 
group of organizations. Thus, it is necessary to try a different approach to policymaking 
and political actors that can identify on the consequences of more specific challenges and 
opportunities for decentralization in each case, if they do indeed exist. The emergence of 
distinct paths to decentralization is suggested by the readily measurable heterogeneity of 
policy sectors that policymakers must deal with. These differences can be observed in 
terms of the characteristics of service delivery systems, stakeholders in reform, size of 
budget, and other factors that are illustrated in the Research Methods and Framework 
section in this chapter. 
 
A renewed concern with the role of formal organizations in political life is one important 
aspect of the “new institutionalism” that emerged since the 1970s in disciplines including 
political science, economics and sociology. Distinct types of institutionalism have 
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appeared in these disciplines and, while having evolved in distinct directions, some 
generalizations can be made about the new institutionalism as an approach to political life 
(March and Olson, 1984). 
 
Where a pluralistic, bureaucratic politics approach would reveal the actions of 
policymakers in public agencies as primarily motivated by the calculated self-interest of 
those in a position of power, in the new institutionalism: 
The bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, and the appellate court are 
arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard 
operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests. (March and 
Olson, 1984, p.738) 
 
Thus, institutions matter in the sense that they provide rules of behavior and norms that 
influence the selection of actions by political actors. At the same time, organizations can 
be understood as political actors in the institutional complexity of political systems. 
 
Two distinct schools of institutionalism have developed in political science. Rational 
choice institutionalism focuses on the importance of institutions as features of strategic 
context, imposing constraints on self-interested behavior. Ultimately, however, individual 
political actors are rational maximizers whose preferences are formed outside institutions 
(Steinmo and Thelen, 1992); as in the pluralist outlook of bureaucratic politics, calculated 
self-interest of individuals is ultimately at the core (Weldes, 1998). 
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In historical institutionalism, on the other hand, institutions can be seen as playing a 
greater role in shaping politics and political history, and not just defining strategies of 
individual actors with pre-established preferences. In historical institutionalism, actors 
are seen as following rules set within institutions. In fact, this approach emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s as an attempt to overcome the perceived limitations of such 
predominant approaches to theory building in the social sciences as structural-
functionalism and pluralism. It has, nevertheless, not discarded some of these 
approaches’ insights, such as of pluralism’s consideration of power relations and struggle 
among groups. 
 
According to Hall & Taylor (1996), institutions are defined by historical institutionalists 
as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of society.” Historical institutionalism emphasizes processes; its 
analytical focus shifted away from individuals, groups and their functions in 
organizations and society to study institutions in a historical manner. The historical 
institutionalists have reclaimed the approach of an earlier tradition that considered 
institutions, political institutions in particular, to have a degree of autonomy and to affect 
outcomes as autonomous actors. In this sense, the state as an institution regained a central 
position in political analysis, and the political arena is emphasized as often evolving with 
relative independence from socioeconomic conditions.  
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An institutionalist perspective (and, more relevantly as an alternative to bureaucratic 
politics, a historical institutionalist perspective) on decentralization reforms would see 
recent sectoral policies as the result of particular institutional processes and rules and not 
just as an outcome of negotiations or conflict in a given conjuncture. In the context of this 
study, ministries are formal organizations that have distinct objectives and internal rules, 
evolve over time and follow certain observable paths that are not easy to modify. 
Therefore, the implementation of decentralization guidelines from higher levels of 
government clearly cannot be readily understood as an automatic, mechanical process; 
even if they are willing to comply with the spirit of a mandate for decentralization, 
individual decision-makers (sectoral authorities) have to adapt such guidelines to what is 
appropriate in the context in which they act.  
 
Rapid change, then, does not seem the most likely outcome when ministries are seen as 
the institutional actors in charge of decentralization. Rather, progress towards the transfer 
of authority and resources would tend to occur in each ministry’s own terms, and to the 
extent that each system can accommodate such changes. Such institutional considerations 
in the context of decentralization in Peru have been suggested by Tamborini’s (2005) 
comparative analysis of the tourism sector in Peru and Chile, who indicates suggests that 
an institutionally weak central government agency appears less likely to allow the 
decentralization of power and autonomy to local authorities.  Some indicators of progress 
in decentralization within institutional constraints would include the modification or 
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expansion of previously existing sectoral processes of dispersion of power, and 
decentralization-like processes integrated into long-term plans or programs. 
 
The role of individual reformers 
Sectoral decentralization policies can alternatively be explained on the basis of, first, the 
calculated self-interest of policymakers thinking in terms of agency survival or growth 
and, second, particular factors (rules, paths) within each institution, as discussed in 
previous sections. A third approach to understanding policymaking has sought to explain 
the origin of reforms in Latin America and focuses on the objectives of individual leaders 
who formulate policies with a technical, problem-solving perspective. 
 
In explaining decentralizing reforms in three Latin American countries, Grindle (2000) 
sought to answer the question of why politicians at the higher levels of government 
would promote reforms that limit their power. She finds that neither rational choice nor 
institutionalist explanations appropriately account for the actions of politicians who 
behave as “audacious reformers” in these cases. Rather, reforms are best explained as: 
…the result of elite projects in which the elites were called together… to make 
recommendations about how best to respond to problems of governance (Grindle, 
2000, p. 202). 
 
In contrast to explanations that would be suggested by bureaucratic politics-type 
approaches or institutionalism for sectoral decentralization, a self-conscious, problem-
solving motivation is what would put reform in the agenda of politicians in some cases. 
Thus, in a broader sense, personal beliefs, experience and perceptions can become crucial 
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elements in agenda setting, taking precedence over power politics, electoral calculations 
and pressure from interest groups, political parties or legislators. 
  
Previously, this crucial importance of individual reformers and their ideas, strategies and 
preferences had been implicit in literature on institutional reform in Latin America, 
focusing more on the intermediate, bureaucratic level of government, as well as on 
subnational government. Several works have outlined the challenges faced by 
technocratic reformers seeking to solve important public sector problems in 
contemporary Latin America. Graham et al. (1999) and Nelson (1999), for example, 
illustrate the difficulties of reforming service delivery systems. They provide some 
guidelines for reform strategies in social sectors to consider institutional structure, 
political and economic context and interest group activity, in order to succeed.  
 
This literature on institutional reform in Latin America and its determinants should, in 
turn, be understood in the context of the waves of unprecedented reform that have swept 
Latin America in the past three decades. Naím  (1994) provides a characterization of the 
waves of market-oriented reforms in Latin American countries since the 1980’s, drawing 
the distinction between Stage 1 and Stage 2 reforms, where Stage 1 consisted of “decree-
driven, hard-to-decide but simple-to-execute macroeconomic shocks,” aimed at 
stabilizing the economy. Meanwhile, Stage 2 consists of a more difficult period of 
“institutional creation and rehabilitation” in areas as diverse as tax collection, social 
security, delivery of social services, and many others. 
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Latin American technocrats and international financial institutions (IFI) like the World 
Bank have, especially since the 1990s, advocated institutional reforms in specific policy 
sectors (particularly education and health) as necessary in order to achieve a broad range 
of social development and poverty alleviation objectives. The ostensible aim of such 
reforms has been to overcome a diagnosis of inefficiency, inequity and poor quality of 
social services traced back to cumbersome, highly centralized bureaucratic institutions. 
There has been some success in implementing these reforms, yet it has proven an arduous 
task at times, not least because no easily applied blueprints or benchmarks exist for this 
type of institutional change and because of the challenges of dealing with political 
resistance (Nelson, 1999).  
 
For cases of reform in Peru, Ortiz de Zevallos et al (1999) analyzed the factors that made 
feasible or frustrated reforms in education, health and the pension system during the 
1990s. This study drew lessons from the difficulties faced by successful reforms in health 
and pensions and from the failure in decentralizing education. Moreover, the study 
focuses on the strategies and preferences of reform teams in each sector, and the general 
lesson for successful reform that the Ortiz de Zevallos et al. study draws is related to the 
need for consideration of political context by a politically neutral reform team, thus 
recognizing the importance of both technical and political criteria. 
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An individual, or audacious, reformer perspective on administrative decentralization 
would examine sectoral policies in terms of the strategies of pro-decentralization 
reformers and how they fared in the face of expected resistance. Audacious reformers are 
individuals that are driven by technical, reform-oriented criteria, rather than calculated 
self-interest, organizational paths or pressure within an institution. Moreover, policies 
would involve ceding power where normally rational political actors would not be 
expected to do so. Such reform leaders must deal with the complexity of changing 
institutions and must formulate strategies to overcome resistance to reform; they must 
often look for slow, gradual success (Nelson, 1999). In addition to concrete transfers of 
authority and resources, indicators of an audacious reform unfolding as a response to a 
broader decentralization mandate would include changes in existing sectoral 
decentralization-related strategies introduced after 2002, and the identification of an 
active pro-decentralization reform leader or team. 
 
Research questions and hypotheses 
Two closely linked research questions emerge from the literature review and preliminary 
research on the Peruvian case. After providing evidence of implementers in Peruvian 
ministries having a leading role in defining administrative decentralization—as the North 
American implementation literature would have predicted—this study further assesses 
the relevance of such implementation literature and begins to explain the dynamics of the 
implementation of decentralization: 
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1) Why were Peruvian ministries, rather than other national and subnational 
stakeholders, able to become the predominant actors shaping the 
implementation of administrative decentralization between 2003 and 2006?  
 
Thereafter, the study focuses on describing and explaining the variation observed in these 
ministries’ sectoral policies, which ultimately casts doubt on a bureaucratic politics-type 
approach to the motivations of implementers. Having demonstrated and explained the 
decisive role of ministries, the dissertation employs different conceptual lenses to analyze 
a selection of ministry cases and to explain what factors shape their policies: 
2a) Are the challenges to a more significant administrative decentralization 
uniquely the result of expected political resistance to reform at the ministry level 
(as the bureaucratic politics literature would suggest)?  
2b) And  do other explanations of policy outcomes provide a more robust 
understanding of the dynamics of reform and the variation among sectoral 
policies, including institutional factors and individual reformers? 
 
In terms of these research questions, the hypotheses put forward by this study were: 
H1: After high-level elected officials in the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government defined the broad guidelines for state decentralization, they had few 
incentives and lacked the know-how to become involved in defining the details of 
sectoral implementation or supervising the process. Ministries and other 
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bureaucratic agencies (rather than politically weaker stakeholders) were able to 
assume a leading role in shaping administrative transfers. 
 
H2: Although ministries are perceived as having resisted the implementation of 
administrative decentralization, their reform policies were only partially 
determined by self-interested resistance to change, which itself has distinct 
manifestations. Distinct institutional characteristics and the actions of individual 
reformers also shaped policies decisively. 
 
Thus, it is expected that variation in decentralization policies will depend on several 
factors. By focusing on ministries’ sectoral policies, we are able to compare a range of 
policy outcomes and analyze them in terms of three alternative explanatory approaches. 
Therefore, in order to answer these research questions and test these hypotheses, a 
comparative analysis of decentralization policies across policy areas is carried out, 
systematically viewing policies through alternative theoretical lenses.  
 
Specifically, Peruvian national ministries are the public agencies in charge of formulating 
these policies, and therefore the policies produced by these ministries in 2003-2006 are 
the main objects of analysis. As will be shown, even though there has been little or no 
substantial transfer of decision-making power to subnational governments, there is a 
variation in sectoral approaches to decentralization that needs to be explained. 
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In addition to providing a comparative analysis of ministerial policies during 
implementation, this dissertation provides a case study of the broader policy process of 
state decentralization in Peru, from agenda setting and formulation (Chapter 3) to 
implementation. As such, it assesses the causal processes behind the observed shape of 
reforms on the basis of competing explanations outlined in the decentralization and 
implementation literatures.  
 
By answering the study’s research questions, this dissertation it will illustrate why, and 
how, decentralization policymaking unfolds differently in each ministry, despite some 
overall similarities in the relative lack of significant progress. Thus, this study explains 
variation in sectoral decentralization policies, as ministries formulate them, and these 
policies are the dissertation’s main object of analysis. For our purposes, decentralization 
policies for each policy sector consist of ministry activities ostensibly aimed at the goal 
of transferring decision-making power to subnational authorities—whether they are 
officially announced or not—in light of the mandate for administrative decentralization 
since late 2002. This includes the formal transfers that were initiated or concluded in 
2003-2006, the annual and multi-annual transfer plans that were made public during 
2003-2006, activities and projects related to decentralization (in all its modes) that are 
outlined in broader strategic and operational plans for each ministry for this same period, 
and other activities initiated by ministries that were related to the decentralization process 
but are not formally announced, including meetings with subnational authorities, 
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capacity-building campaigns, actions and statements of top policymakers, and other 
instances of planning or consensus-building towards decentralization. 
 
The general expectation, on the basis of initial findings and the literature review, was that 
sectoral policymakers—having significant discretion in determining the timing and depth 
of decentralization—would generally resist any pressure for substantial changes to their 
authority over public functions and resources. This would be achieved principally by 
delaying reforms, by formulating sectoral policies that only involve the formalization of 
existing arrangements or by transferring responsibilities without transferring the 
necessary resources for assuming them effectively. This type of resistance is generally 
what would be predicted by an approach that assumes that bureaucratic policymakers are 
political actors motivated by calculated self-interest. However, the heterogeneity of 
policy sectors and of the processes previously underway in the ministries in charge of 
them—together with evidence of the impact of reform-oriented individuals in other 
contexts throughout Latin America—justified an additional expectation of finding 
sectoral policies that deviate from a prevalent outcome of no substantial delegation of 
power (either effectively or underway). 
 
Research methods 
The data collection for this examination of the process of state decentralization and, more 
specifically, of sectoral policies is fundamentally based on key-informant interviews and 
the analysis of secondary-source documents. Interviewees include stakeholders and 
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experts in three distinct groups: officials in central government and ministries, officials in 
subnational governments (administrative decentralization’s intended beneficiaries), and 
experts and stakeholders in civil society—including research centers, NGOs and 
academia. Through interviews with actors with distinct and often opposing interests, a 
more coherent description of the nature and impact of sectoral approaches to 
decentralization has been achieved than would have been possible only approaching 
those directly involved in policymaking. 
 
Focusing on administrative decentralization policies requires examining both the overall 
results of the decentralization process and the actions of each ministry in a heterogeneous 
set. Moreover, the objective of identifying the determinants of such policies requires 
attention on the policy process within each ministry rather than on concrete policy 
outputs that may be readily quantifiable. Because of this focus on the actors and 
motivations involved in various policy processes that ostensibly aim at the same 
objective—and in order to understand how they can determine different paths to 
decentralization—this study utilizes qualitative research that seeks to learn about 
similarities and differences between sectoral policymaking units. In a nutshell, an 
emphasis on qualitative research and analysis is justified by the focus on process—which 
requires employing subjective information—rather than outputs, by the expected 
complexity of studying different sectors at once and by the need for flexibility in 
exploring different explanatory approaches that are not well established for this area of 
study.  
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Having achieved a coherent description of sectoral policies, different theoretical lenses, 
suggested by the literature review, will be employed in the chapters that examine the 
cases of individual ministries (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), and each alternative approach 
emphasizes distinct explanatory factors. First, bureaucratic politics suggests looking for 
calculated self-interest as primary motivation behind policies across all sectors, where 
policymakers make decisions in terms of their position at a government agency while 
aiming at protecting or increasing their authority and resources.  An institutionalist 
perspective, for its part, suggests looking at ministries and policy sectors as distinct 
organizational actors that evolve over time along particular paths. Finally, a focus on 
policymakers as potential reformers leads us to view policies as the result of purposeful 
efforts to resolve sectoral problems or improve performance.  
 
The data on the overall policy process and on the processes within ministries was 
collected through key-informant interviews and the analysis of secondary source 
documentation regarding sectoral decentralization and broader aspects of reforms. This 
latter category has included budget data from the Ministry of Finance, public and internal 
official documentation on transfers from ministries and the decentralization agency 
(CND), and (more clearly constituting secondary sources of information) general reports 
by CND and ministries, official sectoral and ministerial strategies and plans, and reports 
on decentralization by civil society watchdog organizations (particularly the Participa 
Peru group) and international agencies. 
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Key-informant interviews were semi-structured interviews of persons that have been 
directly involved in, or have witnessed first-hand, policymaking related to 
decentralization in ministries and other central government agencies—such sources of 
information are cited throughout (a list of interviewees is provided in Appendix 1). To 
complement these perspectives, officials have also been interviewed in selected 
subnational governments, in order to see how the administrative decentralization process 
has affected them and what degree of influence, if any, such policymakers can have in the 
process. Some additional interviews were carried out with civil society and academic 
experts on decentralization in Peru that could provide additional insights on the overall 
process and on specific sectoral issues. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as a principal methodology, rather than more 
structured questionnaires with detailed questions, in order to allow for additional 
questions and topics (often difficult to anticipate) to be discussed that may be of 
particular relevance in only one or a few ministries or sectors. While a standard 
questionnaire was maintained as a framework for reference (with some modifications 
given different types of interviewees) a significant number of questions emerged during 
the interview, allowing the flexibility to probe for additional details or to discuss 
unforeseen yet relevant issues. Such a format provides the opportunity for learning, as it 
can allow the researcher the freedom to probe deeper into unexpected answers, based on 
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the context for the interview, or, in the case of answers that may be relatively predictable, 
to get closer to the reasons or motivations for such answers. 
 
Thirty-five key informant interviews were carried out and subsequently analyzed by the 
author in Peru in the period between June 2004 and August 2006, including central 
government and ministry officials, subnational government officials, and experts from 
academia, research centers and the NGO sector (see Appendix 1). As mentioned, the goal 
was not only to evaluate the administrative decentralization process on the basis of a top-
down perspective but also to incorporate the perspective of stakeholders in subnational 
governments and civil society, as well as knowledgeable independent observers. Some of 
the interviews also sought to shed light on the earlier part of the decentralization policy 
process, which set the general rules of the game for implementation. 
 
Indeed, in this research, interviewing through semi-structured questionnaires has helped 
to gain insight into processes within ministries and other agencies that were not well 
known or discussed publicly. Gaining access to officials in ministries was not easy, and it 
has thus been important to have enough flexibility to take advantage of opportunities to 
speak to individuals willing to discuss what have sometimes been regarded as sensitive 
issues. 
 
Case selection. The legal framework established that the formal transfers to regional and 
local governments up to 2006 would include competences within the authority of twelve 
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ministries, nine of which are ministries that should delegate policymaking authority in 
their fundamental areas of decision-making (see Table 2-A). Of the twelve ministries 
listed in annual transfer plans, there are three cases that are not considered by this study. 
In two ministries, the mandate of administrative decentralization does not apply to their 
main areas of policymaking, and thus there is no reason to expect coherent sectoral 
decentralization policies but, rather, only specific plans for transferring out individual 
projects or offices.  
 
In the cases of Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF, whose key administrative, 
regulatory, budgeting and planning competences are not subject to deconcentration or 
delegation) and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM, basically, an inter-
ministerial coordination entity led by the head of the Cabinet), the transfers included in 
annual plans are of areas that are only marginally related to their primary policy 
responsibilities. These include the regional administration of public lands, in the first 
case, and disaster prevention, humanitarian assistance and some functions for defining 
territorial delimitation and some environmental standards, in the second case. A third 
ministry, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano (MIMDES), was, during the 
Toledo administration, basically a loose conglomeration of well-established social 
programs like the social fund FONCODES and the food assistance program PRONAA. 
The nature of the transfer of these individual programs was defined and elaborated at the 
central level, so this is a case where the discretion of sectoral policymakers is quite 
restricted; moreover, in dealing with transfers to subnational governments there was very 
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limited or no coordination between the programs making up this ministry,4 so that it is 
difficult even to depict this as a single, coherent policymaking agency in the field of 
decentralization. 
 
Table 2-A 
Ministries under administrative decentralization (2002-2006) considered for this 
study 
 
Ministry and official 
acronym 
Key policy sectors Type of ministry 
activities 
Production 
(PRODUCE) 
Industry, Fishing Promotional and 
regulatory 
Commerce and 
Tourism 
(MINCETUR) 
Foreign trade, 
Domestic trade, 
Tourism, Artisan 
industries 
Promotional and 
regulatory 
Energy and Mines 
(MEM) 
Energy, Mining Promotional and 
regulatory / 
Infrastructure 
Labor and 
Employment 
Promotion 
(MINTRA) 
Labor, Employment 
programs 
Promotional and 
regulatory / social 
Housing, 
Construction, and 
Sanitation 
(VIVIENDA) 
Housing, Construction 
and Sanitation 
Infrastructure 
Agriculture (MINAG) Agriculture Infrastructure 
Transportation and 
Communications 
(MTC) 
Transportation, 
Communications 
Infrastructure 
Health (MINSA) Health Social 
Education (MINEDU) Education, Culture, 
Sports 
Social 
 
Additionally, interviews of subnational actors sought to verify the general perception in 
media and among independent observers that administrative decentralization has done 
                                                 
4 Eduardo Sáenz interview, 2006. 
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little in terms of transferring what is in the center to the periphery. These were completed 
in 2006 in the context of two quite different subnational governments: the regional 
government of Lambayeque and the district-level municipal government of 
Independencia. These two governments, in particular, have been well known for 
outstanding performance in Peru and were selected precisely because of that reason: they 
were clearly eager to assume new responsibilities and receive new resources, while in 
other cases it was possible that local authorities were not interested in the decentralization 
process.  
 
Lambayeque was the only regional government to be accredited for 100% of 
administrative transfers slated for 2003-2006 and was consistently at the top of good 
government rankings by the Public Ombudsman’s office, as well as being highly 
regarded by private sector actors for its openness to dialogue and public-private 
collaboration. Its president, Yehude Simon, is well known as a pro-decentralization figure 
with influence on the national political stage. The district of Independencia, on the other 
hand, received awards in 2005 and 2006 from the Lima NGO Ciudadanos al Día for 
innovative government practices, and its recycling and other programs have been the 
object of many fact finding visits by fellow subnational actors.  
 
 
This chapter thus concludes with the description of the dissertation’s methodological 
framework, which seeks to address the study’s key research questions in the most 
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pertinent manner. These research questions and their corresponding hypotheses have, in 
turn, emerged from a literature review section that explored bodies of work in a number 
of fields. The variables and key issues discussed in these bodies of work have been 
articulated to provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the case of administrative 
decentralization in Peru. 
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Chapter 3 - The road to decentralization and the outset of reforms 
 
This chapter offers an analysis of the broad historical context and trends that paved the 
way for decentralization in 21st century Peru. It seeks to uncover long-term forces that 
ultimately had a significant impact on the administrative decentralization reforms begun 
in 2003, and it also analyzes the more recent political factors that immediately shaped the 
beginning of decentralization and the framework for sectoral administrative reforms. 
Thus, it examines the initiation of Peruvian decentralization as a policymaking and 
political process—looking at the agenda setting and formulation stages in 2001-2002 as 
well as longer-term factors like the impact of previous, unsuccessful reform efforts that 
shaped the options available for the current reform model. It first describes the broader 
national context for reforms and, then, reviews progress so far towards political, fiscal 
and administrative decentralization.  
 
The discussion subsequently focuses on relevant political trends and reforms—since the 
1978-1980 democratic transition—that have influenced the current decentralization 
model, leading to an analysis of the determinants of the agenda setting and policy 
formulation stages of the decentralization policy process.  
 
The Peruvian context 
In terms of territory, Peru is the largest unitary republic in the Western Hemisphere. It 
also has the fourth largest territory and fifth largest population in Latin America, and has 
three distinct geographical regions of contrasting climate, terrain and economy: a narrow 
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desert plain in the western Pacific coast (costa) that is home the capital, Lima; the Andes 
highlands in the center (sierra); and the sparsely populated Amazon jungle in the east 
(selva). The country’s estimated 2006 population of over 28 million has increasingly 
concentrated in the coastal region, particularly in the capital of Lima, which is home to 
nearly a third of the country’s inhabitants.  
 
The mostly urban coast concentrates a disproportionate amount of the nation’s wealth, 
industry and services.  Besides being the population center, Lima has also concentrated 
political and economic power; it accounts for about one half of Peru’s GDP (Consejo 
Nacional de Descentralizacion, 2006b).  Meanwhile, about one half of Peruvians live 
under the poverty line and, while the greatest concentration of the poor (in absolute 
terms) occurs in the capital, extreme poverty is far more prevalent in relative terms in the 
Andean highlands and in rural areas in general. Indicators of education, health and 
nutrition underscore Peru’s relatively low human development, disproportionate to its 
status as a middle-income country.  Moreover, economic stability since the early 1990s 
and sustained economic growth in this decade have not translated into significantly 
improved living conditions for the majority of Peruvians. During this period, poverty 
indices have barely decreased in rural areas, where over 60% of the population is still 
poor.  
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Table 3-A 
Geographic dimension of poverty in Peru, 2007 
(% of population under poverty line) 
 
 Urban (all 
regions) 
Rural (all 
regions) 
Costa Sierra Selva 
% poor 25.7 64.6 22.6 60.1 48.4 
Source: INEI –Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Anual (2004 -2007) 
Peru is a unitary, constitutional republic that, under the current 1993 Constitution, has a 
presidential political system in which general elections are held every five years. The 
national government has a constitutionally strong executive branch, a unicameral, 
multiple-district congress and a formally independent judiciary.  
 
Even in recent decades, however, democratic have been constantly disrupted and 
tampered with. During the 1970s Peru was under military rule, which was initially 
imposed by left-leaning, nationalistic Gen. Juan Alvarado in 1968. By the time free 
elections were brought back in 1980, the population confronted serious problems that 
were not present in the late 1960’s: sharp economic crisis characterized by rising 
inflation, on one hand, and the threat of a fanatical Maoist guerrilla group, the Shining 
Path. Political, social and economic conditions worsened progressively during the two 
democratic administrations of the 1980s—those of Fernando Belaúnde and Alan García-. 
By 1990, there was an unprecedented economic instability and a virtual collapse of state 
institutions and public services, as insurgents dominated large rural areas and threatened 
the capital. In that year, political outsider Alberto Fujimori was elected president. He was 
effective in defeating inflation and the Shining Path within a few years, but this was done 
with an iron fist; he staged a self-coup in 1992 and widely questioned elections in 1995 
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and 2000, and eventually co-opted most major news and entertainment media. He fled 
Peru in late 2000 after major corruption was unveiled.  
 
With an improved economy but with political institutions lacking legitimacy after a 
decade of authoritarian rule, a new democratic transition took place beginning with a 
provisional government, and culminated with the election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001. 
Under Toledo, a widely expected decentralization process began in late 2002. Indeed, 
decentralization was again high on the public agenda after 2000, not least because of the 
virtual disappearance of the Shining Path threat, which had virtually paralyzed normal 
political activities during the 1980s and 1990s, especially in the rural highlands and the 
jungle. 
 
Since the election of regional governments in 2002, there are three levels of directly 
elected, formally autonomous subnational government: at the regional level and at the 
municipal level in provinces and, below them, districts. These municipal and regional 
authorities are democratically elected for four-year periods, with the possibility of 
reelection. Thus, there are four tiers of elected government, which give Peru one of the 
most complex governance systems in Latin America: the country’s former 24 
departments and one constitutional province (Callao) are now referred to as regions, 
which are, in turn, composed of a total of 194 provinces (except Callao), themselves 
broken into 1828 districts. In each of the last two elections (2002 and 2006), voters 
decided on a total of over 12,000 elected offices at the regional, province and district 
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levels (ONPE, 2003). Lima itself has a special status, as its metropolitan government is 
technically a municipal government that also has the rank and general attributions of a 
regional government. 
 
Table 3-B 
Levels of elected government in Peru 
Before 2002 2002-2008 
Central Central 
- Regional (25, in former 
departments) 
Province (194) Province (194) 
District (1828) District (1828) 
  
Subnational governments in Peru are quite heterogeneous in terms of capacities, available 
resources and needs, and this is particularly true in the case of municipal governments. 
Indeed, many activists feel that current legislation that affects the decentralization process 
does not adequately address the distinct needs of different types of municipalities, 
especially small, poor and rural ones.5 Torero and Valdivia (2002) studied, characterized 
and classified into groups the majority of Peruvian municipalities, in terms of social 
indicators and infrastructure needs, and of municipal financial and management 
capacities. Their analysis classified 1567 district-level municipal governments into six 
distinct groups, yet 830 (53%) of these local governments fit into the most problematic 
“high poverty, small scale, and low management capacity” group VI category. In the case 
of province-level governments, the situation is similar: 106 (57%) of 187 municipalities 
fall into the same group VI category. Given this challenging reality of Peruvian 
                                                 
5 Rodolfo Alva interview, 2005. 
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municipalities, the authors recommended that any decentralization process should be 
based on pilot programs rather than global rules for all governments, and that 
decentralization be understood as a gradual process that could not move at the same 
speed in all regions (Torero and Valdivia, 2002). 
 
Progress towards decentralized governance 
The Peruvian state has always been quite centralized and until the 1960s was relatively 
small compared to the current one. The military regime of 1968-1980 greatly expanded 
state activity and participation in the economy and, while its role in the economy has 
decreased significantly after structural reforms in the 1990s, the public sector has not 
shrunk back to the minimalist state of the early 1960s; central government employees 
deceased in the 1990’s but this was nearly made up by an increase in the payrolls of 
deconcentrated regional instances. Decision-making has remained highly centralized 
through the subsequent democratic and authoritarian regimes. According to the 
independent watchdog organization Participa Peru, central government still accounted 
for 90% of public revenues and 80% of expenditures in 2004. 
 
Since independence in 1821, some of the nation’s most notable and influential politicians 
and intellectuals, including the socialist thinker Mariátegui, the founder of the populist, 
reform-oriented APRA party Haya de la Torre and the more conservative historian 
Basadre, have identified centralism as a key to understanding the country’s problems. 
Peruvians have long seen state decentralization as a major step towards providing better 
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development opportunities to the country’s impoverished interior. In fact, many 
decentralization processes were offered by politicians in the 19th and 20th centuries, and 
even became constitutional mandates, but were never fully carried through (Dammert, 
2003; Planas, 1998; Zas Friz, 2004). More details on previous decentralization efforts are 
presented in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
Since 2002, however, decentralization is constitutionally defined as a permanent and 
obligatory policy of the Peruvian state and some unprecedented steps have been taken in 
this direction: administrative, fiscal and political decentralization are being implemented 
concurrently. While the current framework for reform does not contemplate outright 
devolution of government, since it maintains the design and supervision of national 
sectoral policies in central government, it does indicate that subnational governments are 
to become the principal agents of development in the regional and local spheres, 
engaging private and civil society actors. Indeed, political decentralization has already set 
the stage for moving towards more autonomous decision-making and accountability to 
subnational development that was not possible in deconcentrated instances. Nevertheless, 
in order to fulfill their new roles, subnational governments still need the authority and the 
resources to formulate and implement policies in fields that have so far been the 
exclusive domain of central government, in fields ranging from education and health to 
tourism and transportation. 
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Political decentralization. Although most of Peru’s twelve constitutions since 
independence, including the first one, have mentioned decentralization as state policy in 
one way or another, central authorities have generally failed to carry out these 
constitutional mandates (Dammert, 2003). Still, there have been some important 
advances towards changing the territorial distribution of power in Peru in recent decades. 
Progress in political decentralization began in the 1960s, when the first nationwide 
elections for local governments (in provinces and districts) were held under President 
Fernando Belaúnde. In 1980, after twelve years of military rule and as economic 
instability and social unrest were on the rise, democracy returned. Belaúnde was again 
elected, this time by a significantly expanded electorate that had previously excluded 
illiterates and those under 23 years of age (Revesz, 1996). Local democratic elections 
were reinstated and they have continued ever since, even under the authoritarian Fujimori 
regime (1990-2000) that systematically weakened provincial municipalities (Dickovick, 
2003; Tanaka, 2004).  
 
Thus, the political decentralization process has continued through starts and stops in the 
last quarter century, with local electoral competition flourishing in hundreds of provinces 
and districts. Indeed, this uninterrupted election of local governments constitutes the most 
significant continuity in decentralization in recent Peruvian history. Regional 
governments, on the other hand, were directly elected throughout the country for the first 
time in 2002, at the outset of current reforms, and new elections were held in late 2006. 
In January 2003, the new autonomous regional governments were inaugurated and they 
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formally received all assets and liabilities of the previous transitional CTAR 
deconcentrated regional authorities.  
 
There now appear to be unique political dynamics emerging in regional electoral 
competition, often independently of national processes and actors (Meléndez, 2006). At 
this intermediate level of government, the most important precedent for the current 
reforms was the regionalization process of 1989-1992, started in the first administration 
of President Alan Garcia. In a context of unprecedented economic, social and political 
crisis (Pastor and Wise, 1992; Graham, 1990), twelve regions were designed in a top-
down fashion and their executive branches were elected via regional legislative 
assemblies. Regional voters only elected one-third of assembly members. President 
Alberto Fujimori dissolved the elected regional governments in the context of his April 
1992 self-coup, after which these became deconcentrated administrative entities, first at 
the new regional level and then at the department level.  
 
Within the current framework for reform, political decentralization at the regional level 
on the basis of departments was initially meant to be a transitional phase in the formation 
of larger, truly regional subnational governments, similar in scope to those that were 
imposed from above in the late 1980s (CND, 2006b). This evolution was initially 
conceived as a key condition for fiscal and administrative reforms to begin, although 
there were some contradictions in the legal framework in this regard. However, the first 
round of national referenda for approving five of the macro-regiones in 16 departments 
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was held in late 2005 and results were spectacularly unsuccessful: all multi-department 
proposals were defeated, and a “Yes” vote only prevailed in one department (Arequipa). 
This was generally understood as a general public refutation of Toledo’s decentralization 
process, near the end of his administration. Several factors contributed to this outcome, 
including the lack of an effective information strategy by the decentralization authority 
(CND) and the Ministry of Finance’s reluctance in 2005 to make available the expected 
fiscal incentives for the conformation of larger regions—which involved being granted 
substantially greater fiscal autonomy and a number of tax incentives, in effect the start of 
real fiscal decentral6ization. 
 
In addition to electing their local and regional representatives, Peruvian citizens are 
gradually becoming able to participate in subnational decision-making as participative 
budgets become mandatory at all subnational levels (regional, province and district) and 
as similar processes are implemented for the formulation of subnational development 
plans and other purposes. The decentralization framework institutionalizes civil society 
participation in subnational policymaking, as it establishes coordinative civil-society 
assemblies in both regional and local government. For example, each regional 
government has an executive branch composed by a president and vice president, an 
elected legislative body (Consejo Regional) whose representatives are elected by popular 
vote, and a consultative body called the Consejo de Coordinación Regional (CCR) that 
has a say in planning and budgeting and that includes representatives from civil society 
                                                 
6 Luis Thais interview, 2006. 
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organizations and from municipalities within the region. Under the presidency are four 
gerencias regionales, which function as regional ministries devoted to social 
development, economic development, natural resources and the environment, and 
planning and budgeting, respectively. 
  
Fiscal decentralization. Peru traditionally has had a highly centralized system of 
intergovernmental finances, yet in recent years the expenditures of subnational 
governments have increased in absolute terms (see figure 3-A) and as percentages of total 
expenditures. Expenditures by subnational governments accounted for over 27% of 
public sector expenditures in 2005 (Vega Castro, 2006). However, this growth is not a 
result of policies successfully implemented at the subnational level nor is it necessarily an 
indicator of increased fiscal autonomy: these governments cannot create new taxes or 
modify existing ones without approval from central government and congress, and their 
borrowing capacity is tightly regulated at the central level (Ahmad and Garcia-Escribano, 
2006; CND, 2006b). Moreover, while municipal governments can count on a substantial 
amount of local revenues—around 43% of expenditures in 2005—regional governments 
still do not have, nor do they have the power to create, any significant sources of revenue 
at their level of government.  
 
Two factors explain an enlargement of subnational budgets that is not closely linked to 
increased decision-making power. First, a large proportion of the annual budget of 
regional governments consists of significant funds that are earmarked for salaries and 
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pensions of public employees who actually belong to sectors that have not been devolved 
yet, like health and education. Thus, these payrolls appear as part of regional budgets of 
autonomous regional governments only because that is where payments are formally 
made, rather than policy decisions. In the impoverished Andean region of Apurímac, for 
instance, 160 million soles, of a total of 178 million spent on salaries and worker benefits, 
in the 2006 budget were for the health and education sectors (Ministerio de Economía y 
Finanzas, 2007). Similarly, in the case of municipalities, entire social programs like the 
social fund FONCODES have been accounted for as part of local expenditures since 
2003, even though transfer only effectively began in 2005 and then only a fraction of the 
country’s municipalities had been accredited for assuming new responsibilities. 
 
Figure 3-A: Transfers from central government to subnational governments, 1999-2006 
(Constant 1999 soles) 
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Data Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2007; Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2008. 
 
Second, both regional and, especially, municipal governments receive financial transfers 
from various sources of shared revenues that are not closely related to the 
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decentralization process, and the value of these transfers has shot up in a context of 
economic growth and rising prices for Peru’s primary export goods since around 2001. 
These include, among others, income tax collected from firms extracting natural 
resources within local or regional jurisdictions (canon), mining royalties, and a municipal 
fund (FONCOMUN) that was created in the 1990s and draws from collected value added 
and personal income taxes. Central government establishes rules on the acceptable uses 
of these funds, and they must generally be oriented towards investment projects. In some 
poorer areas, these transfers from central government account for over 85% of local 
municipal budgets (Rabanal and Melgarejo, 2006). 
 
Thus, subnational governments continue to be highly dependent on transfers from central 
government and on conditions for their use that come from the capital. The more 
significant sources, moreover, do not provide sustainable levels of funding as they 
depend on international commodity prices—which can fluctuate substantially—or 
national economic growth rather than subnational factors. According to the Ministry of 
Energy and Mining, mining provides over 50% of Peruvian exports. In addition, the 
recent surge in financial resources for subnational governments was not preceded or 
accompanied by extensive capacity building in the policy areas for which new resources 
could be used (mainly, public infrastructure projects). Because there is often a lack of 
technical capacity of subnational governments for formulating and implementing such 
projects, especially within a short time after funds are made available, that could be 
approved by national investment standards, large amounts of these transfers have in fact 
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reverted to central government in recent years, and placed in funds for possible future 
use. In 2005, over one fourth of funds budgeted for regional government investments 
were not executed (Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, 2006). 
 
According to the Constitution, decentralization is supposed to give subnational 
governments a leading role in sustainable regional and local development yet, despite 
apparently impressive changes, fiscal trends up to 2006 were not supporting this so far. 
New sources of funding appear to be empowering subnational authorities in the short-
term and within a limited scope of action in subnational infrastructure investment (tightly 
controlled by MEF, the Finance Ministry), not in the most important, permanent areas of 
public policy. Finally, there is some uncertainty as to the future of fiscal decentralization: 
the formation of larger regions was supposed to be the key condition for broader fiscal 
autonomy, but when the time came to make those incentives effective prior to regional 
referenda, MEF did not make them available. 
 
Administrative decentralization. Even before the 1980s, several Peruvian ministries, 
including education, health, transportation and agriculture, among others, had started to 
deconcentrate functions and resources to field offices, mostly at the department (now 
regional) level, which are known as the ministries’ direcciones regionales. In contrast, 
there is less experience with deconcentration from the center to local level offices. It 
should be noted that a number of functions were rapidly delegated to formally 
autonomous regional governments during 1989-1992, but the new responsibilities were 
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not clearly defined and did not come hand in hand with new resources; these regional 
governments did not survive long enough to effectively receive or exercise their new 
policymaking powers. 
 
In the 1990s, the transitional regional administrations (CTAR) established by Fujimori in 
each department came to group together the direcciones regionales of various ministries, 
and CTAR’s in turn were grouped under the Ministerio de la Presidencia (MIPRES), a 
unique, multi-purpose institution that the president kept under tight control and that grew 
substantially in the 1990s (Mauceri, 1997). Thus, these deconcentrated instances of 
ministries were directly accountable to their respective line ministry but were also part of 
MIPRES, which was a very politically sensitive agency. Currently, within the ongoing 
decentralization process, direcciones regionales are technically accountable to 
ministries—which remain responsible for national policies—and to the managerial units 
of regional governments, to whom various sectoral functions are to be delegated along 
with specific projects and programs.  This situation of “double dependency” has caused 
significant confusion and some tension, as has been evident in interviews in ministries 
and in regional government.7 However, these are not the only type of deconcentrated 
ministerial office that existed at the subnational level when the current process began; 
health and education, for example, each have their own complex system of service 
delivery with local and regional level instances that administrate school districts and local 
                                                 
7 Interviews with senior Lambayeque regional government officials  Eduardo Sáenz and Miguel González, 
2006. 
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health centers, sometimes with significant participation of civil society actors but not 
necessarily with the participation of subnational governments. 
 
Administrative decentralization has been officially underway since January 2003, even 
though at first the legal framework did not contemplate starting the process until political 
decentralization was consolidated in the form of new, larger regional units. At the outset 
of the current decentralization process, technocrats working closely with Congress came 
up with a list of 185 central government competences, functions, social programs and 
projects (out of an unspecified total, since no extensive mapping out of central 
government functions has been carried out) in the hands of twelve ministries that were 
slated for transfer to regional governments. This constitutes a rather heterogeneous set of 
transfers; many involve control over specific projects or infrastructure (such as large 
irrigation projects in the northern coast) rather than authority over permanent areas of 
policy (such as responsibility for promoting tourism within a region), while others 
involve control over social programs that had not been under the policymaking authority 
of a specific ministry. The latter is the case of the social fund FONCODES and the food 
assistance program PRONAA, which were closely controlled by the presidency during 
the 1990s. Altogether, nine ministries were programmed for decentralization of some of 
their basic sectoral policymaking functions: Agriculture; International Trade and 
Tourism; Education; Energy and Mines; Production; Health; Labor; Transportation and 
Communications; and Housing, Sanitation and Construction.  
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Three annual sectoral transfer plans (2003, 2004, and 2005) that included both (1) 
redistributing sectoral functions of ministries, on one hand, and (2) funds, transferring 
specific programs and projects, on the other, were executed during the Toledo 
administration, with the 2006 plan being mostly implemented after the end of this period. 
For its part, the 2003 plan exclusively concentrated on funds, projects and programs—
although some of these were under the effective control of particular ministries—while 
the next three annual plans included both types of transfers. The content of annual and 
longer-term plans is based on the proposals of ministries—technically, subnational 
governments can request specific functions or competences but there is no mechanism to 
ensure that these are taken into consideration—and is approved by the agency in charge 
of decentralization since 2002, Consejo Nacional de Descentralización (CND). In 
practice, municipal governments were largely excluded from the transfer of sectoral 
functions and competences in 2003-2006, but did receive some control over projects of 
social programs formerly under MIPRES and over rural roads maintenance and 
supervision programs (CND, 2006). 
 
All subnational instances to benefit from these transfers must be accredited by CND as fit 
to assume new responsibilities in each sector for which competences and functions are to 
be delegated. While there are no existing mechanisms for ensuring subnational 
accountability after transfers are made, CND did establish general requirements (in terms 
of human resources, technical capacities, equipment and physical infrastructure) for 
subnational governments to be certified as ready to assume new sectoral authorities. At 
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the same time, each sector’s ministry also determines specific requirements by policy 
area, which include setting minimum standards in human resources, material resources 
and legal instrumentation that subnational governments must accredit. About 122 of these 
competences and functions (66% of what had been programmed) were formally 
transferred by 2006, although the annual transfer plans since 2004 were executed with 
significant delays (CND, 2006b). At the same time, not all subnational governments have 
actually received these new authorities, as not all have been accredited for every relevant 
transfers; in fact, only one of 25 regional governments (Lambayeque) was accredited for 
100% of transfers scheduled in the 2004 and 2005 annual plans. Still, all regions (except 
Metropolitan Lima, whose “mixed” status has been problematic) have been accredited for 
the majority of transfers (CND, 2006b).  
 
As will be further explained in following chapters, much of what is actually transferred 
only amounts to formalities on paper. According to official CND documents, until May 
2006 the transfer process had provided subnational governments with a substantial 
amount of over 13,000 million soles (3.2 soles were equivalent to one U.S. dollar in 
2006) in assets formerly controlled at the central level and almost 900 million soles in 
additional annual budget resources related to these. However, this is all related to the 
transfer of specific funds, projects and programs that benefit subnational governments 
rather inequitably, and they were mostly selected centrally at the outset of reform rather 
than by sectoral policymakers. Most importantly, there is no report of financial resources 
being given up by ministerial budgets in favor of subnational governments as a result of 
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the transfer of sectoral functions, even though these are clearly at the heart of the 
constitutional objective of empowering all subnational governments as agents of regional 
and local development through increased decision-making autonomy. In addition, the 
most valuable of the projects transferred until 2006 have benefited only selected regional 
governments: of 13,384 million soles in physical assets received, 13,168 million (98%) 
correspond to large irrigation projects in only nine coastal regions (CND, 2006b).  
 
Authority over projects and local activities of a number of social programs like the social 
fund FONCODES, which involve thousands of local social and productive infrastructure 
projects and were centrally controlled through MIPRES during the Fujimori years, began 
to be transferred to municipal governments between 2003 and 2005; this process is 
moving ahead but is still at a relatively early stage, and it is subject to verification 
mechanisms (accreditation requirements similar to those of regular sectoral transfers). On 
the other hand, transfers of some of the important infrastructure projects beginning in 
2003 have been made effective and some have already allowed regional governments to 
have a visible positive impact on regional development: for example, the large irrigation 
project Olmos-Tinajones that had been unconcluded for decades was finished when the 
regional government of Lambayeque assumed control and involved the private sector 
through project concession.8  Many regional governments have also received a substantial 
amount of physical assets, including buildings and machinery that were previously held 
                                                 
8 Yehude Simon interview, 2006. 
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by ministries’ deconcentrated regional offices, including those related to agriculture and 
transportation. 
 
The road to reform, 1980-1990 
Overview. In Peru, a long history of demands for decentralization has been generally 
answered by unfulfilled promises and aborted reforms (Azpur, 2005; Zas Friz, 2001; 
Planas, 1998). Nevertheless, although sustained progress in decentralizing the state had 
not been achieved before the current decade, the changes now underway were clearly not 
designed on a blank slate; nor were the motivations of relevant decision-makers purely of 
a technical nature. As this section will illustrate, the advances and setbacks of 
decentralization in its different dimensions since the 1980s, together with some features 
of Peru’s political evolution like the collapse of political party system (Revesz, 1997; 
Levitsky and Cameron, 2003), have had an impact on the current framework for reform, 
shaping the preferences of key actors and available policy options. More immediately, the 
2000-2001 context of democratic transition in which Alejandro Toledo—the president 
initiating reforms—came to power was crucial in re-shaping the national policy agenda 
and the decision to promptly initiate reforms. 
 
Some current characteristics can be traced back to developments in previous decades that 
are intimately linked to a particular institutional actor, the APRA party, and to its leader, 
Alan Garcia. The roots of the current emphasis on empowering regional government can 
be found in the mandate of the 1979 constitution—itself strongly influenced by the 
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APRA party’s ideas and political aspirations—as well as in the short-lived 
regionalization process of the late 1980s and the return to politics of former president 
Alan García (and APRA) in 2001. In particular, García used his credentials as a 
champion of decentralization-as-regionalization as a major selling point in his campaign; 
in a context of democratic transition and pro-decentralization consensus, his rhetoric and 
campaign promises were seen by eventual winner Alejandro Toledo as offers to the 
electorate that needed to be matched (Tanaka, 2002).  
  
On the other hand, the municipal foothold of political decentralization since 1980 has 
allowed local political competition to produce important independent, pro-
decentralization political actors who gained national prominence in the late 1990s 
(Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). Many of these new actors, as legislators in a multiple-
district congress, proved decisive in bringing about reforms within a democratic 
transition context in 2001-2002. Of course, this is closely tied to the decline of the 
political party system since the early 1990s: candidate based “disposable parties” with 
little subnational bases actively recruited these independents. Many entered national 
politics and were elected to Congress in 2001 as “invitees” who were not necessarily 
brought together because of ideological affinities. This key factor made possible a short-
lived, pro-decentralization legislative front in 2001-2002 that crossed party lines and 
made sure that the president kept his electoral promise of prompt regional elections.   
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Influential trends in 1980-1990. Beginning in 1979 there was a clear constitutional 
mandate to decentralize the state that focused on establishing autonomous regional 
governments and reinstating local autonomies to existing municipalities, and there was 
some progress in decentralization—and notable setbacks—in the period from the 1979-80 
democratic transition to the fall of the Fujimori regime (2000).  
 
However, in the decade after democracy was reintroduced in 1980, political and 
policymaking power continued to be concentrated in Lima and, more specifically, in the 
Executive and the presidency. Democratically-elected presidents in the 1980’s frequently 
ruled by decree, thus bypassing legislative control in a way that was, nevertheless, 
contemplated by the “presidentialist” 1979 Constitution (Crabtree, 1985; Mauceri, 1997).  
According to Sanborn and Moron (2004), while the Peruvian policymaking process has 
varied depending on such factors as regime type, electoral outcomes and the Executive’s 
position in Congress, in the last quarter century it can be broadly described as volatile, 
arbitrary and heavily dependent on the Executive. In fact, the Fujimori years saw an 
unprecedented centralization of decision-making, as democratic institutions were 
weakened, political opposition was ineffective and the president explicitly advocated 
“direct democracy” without political intermediation; for this, he relied heavily on the 
advice of top technocrats and loyal personalistic networks (Durand, 1996; Mauceri, 1997; 
Levitsky and Cameron, 2003).  
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Not surprisingly given the lack of continuity of democratic administrations during the 
20th century, the Peruvian political party system has been traditionally weak. According 
to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Peru had the most inchoate or weakly institutionalized 
party system in the region as of the 1990s, and the situation has not shown noticeable 
improvements since then. Nevertheless, beginning with the 1978 constitutional assembly 
election, Peruvian elections were dominated for over a decade by a relatively balanced 
three-way division of political forces of the left, center and right (Revesz, 1996). Three 
parties in particular (APRA—the oldest mass-based, reformist party and a long-time 
champion of decentralization—, the center-right AP and the more conservative Christian 
Democratic PPC) and a leftist alliance of (Izquierda Unida) were prominent during that 
decade.  Of these, the left-of-center APRA was the oldest, most institutionalized and the 
one with the deepest roots in society at a national level. 
 
During the 1970s, some partial administrative decentralization efforts had been 
implemented under authoritarian rule, including departmental development authorities 
(ORDES) headed by appointed military heads (Azpur, 2005). The military government of 
Francisco Morales-Bermudez (1975-1980) set the stage for a transition back to 
democracy beginning in 1977. In a context of increasing debt-payment problems, falling 
living standards, and mobilization by regional movements and major strikes (Crabtree, 
1985), the constitutional assembly dominated by APRA began work on a new 
constitution to replace the previous 1933 document. The document that was drafted and 
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approved in 1979 clearly established that decentralization was to be implemented, with a 
focus on regionalization of the country. 
 
Thus, the second administration of AP’s Belaunde (1980-1985)—while facing 
stagflation, a disastrously severe El Niño current in 1983, and especially the growing 
threat of the Sendero Luminoso insurgency—led the return to democracy with a 
constitutional mandate to implement regionalization. Department–level public 
corporations called CORDES—with assemblies that included mayors from within the 
department—were implemented throughout Peru to administrate a number of regional 
projects and programs; they handled a significant percentage of public investment but had 
very little decision-making autonomy even as deconcentrated instances of government. 
 
Even though the ruling party and its allies controlled Congress, the expected sequence of 
reforms towards decentralization did not occur, as the transition to increased regional 
autonomies under Belaúnde did not follow the reestablishment of local elections. Some 
authors have cited the struggle for control of policymaking between factions in AP as a 
reason for Belaúnde’s lack of decisive action in this respect (Kim, 1992), while it should 
also be mentioned that in each year of his administration the country’s governance 
became increasingly difficult, with orthodox economic policies failing to curb growing 
inflation and a strengthening insurgency in the countryside that began to threaten major 
cities. Moreover, local elections in 1983 were not favorable to the ruling party, and the 
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left made significant gains; this may have discouraged any further moves towards 
regionalization that could have benefited opposition parties. 
 
After nearly six decades of being excluded from power, APRA finally reached the 
presidency in 1985 through the landslide victory of young and charismatic leader Alan 
Garcia, who reached office with promises of substantial change and renewal. Between 
1985 and 1987, however, APRA hardly lived up to its tradition of decentralization 
rhetoric, as the legal framework for decentralization was only slowly and gradually 
approved. Garcia, securely in control of Congress, did not seem in a hurry to implement 
decentralization. He did strengthen CORDES somewhat in his first years in office, 
however, but kept them firmly under central control (Kim, 1992).  
 
Having experienced two years of economic growth in a context of populist rhetoric, 
heterodox reform and moratorium of debt payments, the new economic model seemed to 
reach its limits by mid-1987 (Graham, 1990), and the financial and political situation of 
the country began to deteriorate to unprecedented levels in 1988. Garcia adopted a more 
confrontational position against political opposition and announced his decision to 
nationalize the banking system in July 1987; it met with fierce resistance from the right, 
which was revitalized in opposition to this reform and, almost until elections in 1990, 
seemed poised to assume office in 1990 through prominent novelist Mario Vargas 
Llosa’s FREDEMO coalition.  
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It was only in the middle of a period of hyperinflation, increasing attacks on the capital 
by subversive movements, rapid loss of popularity and signs of a virtual collapse of the 
state that Garcia finally pushed for regionalization. Regional governments were elected 
by regional assemblies between 1989 and 1990 and they took office in twelve regions 
that were created by the Executive’s planning bureau Instituto Nacional de Planificación 
(INP)—combining existing departments without input from civil society.  
 
It may seem rather paradoxical that, only after his long honeymoon period was over and 
facing more pressing issues, Garcia would officially designate 1988 as the year of 
regionalization and put it at the top of his policy agenda. February 1988’s Modified Law 
of Regionalization reflected Garcia and APRA’s decision to give a new political 
momentum to regionalization, with legislative support from the IU leftist coalition. 
Among other things, it provided for significantly greater regional autonomy than had 
been planned by the INP technocracy or legislation approved in Congress. The 
government proceeded to push through the creation of the twelve regions, a process that 
was finalized in April 1989. 
 
Far from being an “audacious reform” or a response to pressures from below, undertaking 
a complex state reform like decentralization in this time of severe crisis appears in 
hindsight as a strategic (albeit, increasingly desperate) political decision on the part of 
Garcia and APRA, with support from the left.  
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Two intimately linked motivating factors have been discerned behind this unusual 
decision (Kim, 1992; Tanaka, 2002). Conscious of the worsening situation of the country 
and unwilling to take drastic economic measures, yet convinced of APRA’s solid 
regional support bases by recent results, the president was at once consolidating a new 
political space for APRA and laying the groundwork for substantial party presence in the 
opposition until 1995, when he could run again for office. And, indeed, APRA and IU 
captured most regional presidencies. Thus, medium-term electoral calculation and the 
intention of consolidating the ruling party’s (APRA’s) power at the regional level at a 
time of crisis were two factors at stake. A third factor that must be considered is that, by 
rapidly implementing regional governments with greater power than previously planned, 
he could conceivably shift to the regions (at least in the public’s view) some of the 
responsibilities that central government was rapidly proving itself incapable of carrying. 
Still, all these strategic political objectives could be hidden behind the pretext of fulfilling 
an undeniable constitutional mandate to decentralize, which also gave the ruler some 
democratic legitimacy. Years later, knowing that other political and economic areas of his 
administration could hardly be shown in a positive light, Garcia as presidential candidate 
would hold this regionalization experience as his key credential as a champion of 
democracy in the post-Fujimori era. 
 
The road to reform, 1990-2000 
Analysts of different political orientations now perceive the regional governments of 
Garcia’s first administration as a particularly chaotic and ill-timed experiment, although 
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one that attempted to move the country in the right direction of decentralization. The 
design of regional governments, in particular, was not a factor that guaranteed their 
sustainability (Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, 2003, 2006); their legislative branches, or 
regional assemblies, in particular were scenes of political gridlock (“asambleísmo”), and 
were a key reason why regional governments became virtually ungovernable during their 
brief existence (1989-1992). However, the mistakes in design—for instance, hasty 
implementation, the top-down imposition of regions and the unrepresentative regional 
assemblies—became lessons that were clearly on the mind of those involved in the 
current process, especially at the regional level (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2003; Alejos, 
2005).  
 
By the end of the Garcia administration in 1990—and after experiencing successive 
democratic administrations that failed with both heterodox and orthodox development 
approaches—voters appeared to have lost all confidence in the existing political system 
in a context of hyperinflation, terrorism and perceived corruption and incapacity of 
traditional politicians. Indeed, two political outsiders disputed the 1990 elections, 
although one of them (the renowned novelist Mario Vargas Llosa) became closely allied 
with traditional actors from the right, to his eventual disadvantage.  
 
Fast-rising outsider Alberto Fujimori surprised the political establishment by reaching 
office in 1990 with anti-establishment rhetoric and as head of a makeshift political 
alliance of newcomers to politics, Cambio 90. In his first year, he implemented 
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remarkably harsh structural adjustment policies to stabilize the economy and embarked 
on a more decisive, and often ruthless, war against subversion (Weyland, 2000, 2002). By 
late 1991 he began to publicly denounce the opposition-controlled Congress as 
obstructing important measures for the country’s recovery. By early 1992, his bold 
decisions were showing successful results and he was able to gain broad public support 
for his April self-coup, where the constitution was suspended and Congress (viewed 
widely as corrupt and obstructive) and elected regional governments were dissolved, 
among many other drastic measures. Regional governments were dissolved and replaced 
by the nominally transitional CTARs, deconcentrated administrative entities (first at the 
level of regions and then back ay the traditional department level) that were grouped 
under Ministerio de la Presidencia (MIPRES). An increasingly autocratic, centralizing 
rule was implemented even as a semblance of democracy was restored in 1993 through a 
popularly elected constitutional and legislative assembly (CCD) that eventually replaced 
the 1979 document.  
 
Fujimori’s anti-establishment, anti-politician stance had wide support after the failures of 
the democratic administrations of the 1980s, and his regime’s legitimacy for a majority of 
Peruvians was consolidated as economic growth and social spending resumed in 1993. 
The 1990s saw the virtual disappearance of traditional political parties, as evidenced in 
electoral results after 1992, and the rise of independents leading candidate-driven, ad hoc 
electoral coalitions without “mobilizing roots in society” (Levistky and Cameron, 2003). 
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After shaping a new constitution in 1993 that further strengthened presidential authority 
and paid lip service to decentralization but made a real transfer of power to subnational 
governments impossible, Fujimori was reelected by a wide margin in 1995. In his second 
full term in office (1995-2000), however, Fujimori’s policies were far less bold 
(Weyland, 2002), as no further structural reforms were implemented and the centralizing 
tendencies continued, characterized by growing targeted (and politically oriented) social 
spending through MIPRES. The last years of his regime took place in a context of 
recession, increasing accusations of gross corruption, and visible co-optation of large 
sectors of the opposition, the press and other media. 
 
Relying on a highly personalized style of government, Fujimori was very reluctant to let 
new political figures emerge that could conceivably challenge his personalized leadership 
(Weyland, 2002; Tanaka, 2002), even blocking the consolidation of his own political 
organizations beyond election periods. Thus, it is not surprising that, while he did not 
attempt to stop democratic elections at the local level, he did weaken provincial mayors 
and their municipalities—especially metropolitan Lima—through a number of revenue 
slashing measures during the decade. Indeed, in the late 1990s the mayor of Lima, 
Alberto Andrade, and provincial mayors like Federico Salas of Huancavelica emerged as 
independents and potential presidential candidates. By the late 1990s, Fujimori’s 
municipal allies had basically captured the national mayors association AMPE, a 
potential focus for opposition (“Mar de fondo: Maquinaria en Marcha,” 1999), but many 
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mayors and former mayors at its margins continued to be vocal opponents of the regime’s 
excesses. 
 
Democratic transition and agenda setting, 2000-2001 
Although the constitution prohibited it, Fujimori ran for a third presidential term in 2000. 
He maintained strong backing from Peru’s poorest (Datum, 2000), located particularly in 
Lima’s marginal areas and the rural interior, but he faced growing and increasingly 
visible opposition from middle and lower-middle sectors. This was most evident in the 
demonstrations of regional organizations, in response to a diversity of issues, throughout 
the country in the late 1990s. In the absence of political parties with credibility among the 
population, regional fronts—associated with urban areas in the interior, regional elites, 
workers groups, professional associations and, particularly, politically ambitious 
provincial mayors—were loudly demanding changes in the government’s social and 
economic policies. In opposing Fujimori era policies, a heterogeneous group of actors 
started to converge on a burgeoning “decentralization movement” or “critical consensus 
on decentralization” (Azpur, 2005) throughout the country, involving regional fronts, 
local development coordination forums (mesas de concertación), and some regional 
private sector organizations (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2003). 
 
Leading independents that loomed as potential contenders for Fujimori, like Andrade, 
however, were not closely tied to these or other movements that opposed the Fujimori 
regime. Decentralization came to the top of the policy agenda of candidates in the races 
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of 2000 and 2001; defining this public agenda was not necessarily a top-down process. 
Meanwhile, regional fronts had expressed discontent with the evolution of policies since 
the late 1990s, and there were concrete reasons for discontent with the centralist status 
quo in the provinces: structural adjustment that had wiped out industry in regional centers 
like Arequipa (Peru’s second largest city), recession in 1998-2000 that hit regional 
centers hardest, a lack of progress in regionalization and sectoral reforms, and the 
perceived ineffectiveness in dealing with consequences of El Niño disruptions in 1997-
1998, among others. It is also important to note that, with the end of the Sendero 
Luminoso threat, the polarizing influence of the war was gradually giving way to a 
rediscovery of regional and local development agendas, beyond the “us vs. them” view of 
the previous two decades. 
 
As the April 2000 elections approached, the legitimacy of the Fujimori regime and a 
possible third term was widely questioned in Peru and abroad. In fact, by the turn of the 
century the nation was facing not just a crisis of legitimacy of the current administration 
but of the state in general (Azpur, 2005). Fujimori had helped to continue discrediting 
Congress in particular, he had neutralized institutions that like the Constitutional Tribunal 
and the electoral authorities that could check on his power, as well as traditional political 
parties; now, in the context of great corruption and electoral fraud scandals being 
unveiled, the presidency itself, along with much of the media and business establishment, 
were being severely questioned by large sections of the population. 
 
 92
Despite calls for a united front, the opposition was not able to present a single candidacy 
against Fujimori in April 2000. The incumbent won the first round of presidential 
elections, amidst allegations of fraud and the long-standing use of state resources to 
bolster his candidacy while undermining independent opposition leaders. However, 
Fujimori did not reach the required 50% and was forced into a run-off against Alejandro 
Toledo, head of the small, candidate-driven Peru Posible (PP) party and widely perceived 
as an independent. Toledo had unsuccessfully run for president in 1995 (receiving 3% of 
the vote) but very rapidly gained popularity in the three months prior to the 2000 
elections, as other independent opposition leaders lost support. He denounced 
irregularities and lack of transparency in the first round, and international observers such 
as the Organization of American States backed many of his claims. Toledo soon 
announced that he would not run against Fujimori in the second round if the government 
did not postpone it because there were allegedly no guarantees of a clean election. He 
called for voters to refrain from voting or to cast invalid ballots and yet, in spite of 
domestic and international pressures, the election was held on time and Fujimori came 
out winning. 
  
In the weeks between electoral rounds in 2000, Toledo effectively became the leader of 
the opposition and other losing candidates finally offered their support in order to oppose 
Fujimori. Lacking a solid party structure (a fact soon underscored by almost a third of 
elected PP legislators defecting from its ranks in the weeks after the legislature began) 
and himself facing significant disapproval in large sectors of the electorate (Datum, 
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2000), he traveled throughout the country to rally the support of prominent regional 
allies, especially those associated with combative anti-Fujimori regional fronts in 
departments like Loreto, in the Amazon jungle, and Arequipa, in the south, that had been 
centers of opposition since the mid-1990s. Although such fronts were not sufficiently 
institutionalized to sustain their influence over time, or to effectively influence 
policymaking circles under normal circumstances (Tanaka, 2002), in this conjuncture of 
rapid change, politicians without traditional party bases sought their support, paid close 
attention to their discourse and pledged to attend their demands. During this time, Toledo 
made many trips outside Lima in order to engage regional leaders. While these fronts 
were not broadly representative institutions, mass demonstrations led by them suggested 
that their demands reflected the preoccupations of large parts of the population.  
 
Fujimori was sworn in for his third term in office in July 2000, against the backdrop of 
massive protest marches of which Toledo and regional actors were the visible heads. The 
government faced international isolation and only lasted until November 2000, when 
Fujimori fled the country and resigned as major corruption scandals erupted in the media. 
Congress elected AP representative Valentin Paniagua, who had just become president of 
congress, as the country’s interim president, in order to lead the nation to clean elections 
in 2001.  
 
The transition government. The 2000-2001 transition period under President Paniagua 
was an atypical one in that politicians of different orientations, and the nation’s opinion 
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leaders in general, openly sought spaces for dialogue in order to confront a crisis situation 
following the fall of Fujimori. Moreover, Paniagua’s cabinet included many prominent 
members of academia and civil society that had actively opposed Fujimori’s 
authoritarianism. Many saw this as a period of high expectations for a renewed 
development model in the context of enhanced democratic governance (Grupo Propuesta 
Ciudadana, 2003). It was also a period of institutional change in Congress, whose 
members had been involved in corruption scandals at the end of the Fujimori era, and 
where multiple district representation was reintroduced as part of an effort to begin 
reversing the centralizing tendencies of the 1990’s. 
 
The state reached out to civil society during this period. An important experience that 
began here was that of the Mesas de Concertacion de Lucha contra la Pobreza, state-
civil society coordination committees that were often backed by local policymakers and 
international cooperation. These entities were not only a key for beginning national 
dialogue regarding social policy guidelines and local development plans, but they were 
the “laboratories” and building blocks for participatory budgeting and other processes 
that were institutionalized in the decentralization framework.9 Moreover, they functioned 
as temporary participatory instances for subnational governments in 2002-2003, while 
permanent assemblies were being implemented, and were vital in resolving tensions and 
potential conflicts in a context where political parties lacked legitimacy and had very 
little subnational presence. Additionally, they were a key precedent for the Acuerdo 
                                                 
9 Javier Abugattás interview, 2005. 
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Nacional, a high-level forum that involved politicians and other public and private actors 
in defining development priorities for the country at the beginning of the Toledo 
administration; there, decentralization was defined as a top and urgent priority. 
 
Political competition, of course, did not stop during this period, especially as elections 
approached. Although at first the presidential race seemed to be a race between two—
Toledo and center-right candidate Lourdes Flores of Unidad Nacional (UN)—the 
remarkable return of former president Alan Garcia in January 2001 signaled the rebirth of 
APRA in the political scene and a changed campaign dynamic. Garcia’s popularity 
quickly rose and he became one of the front-runners in a matter of weeks; he surprised 
many by narrowly defeating Flores in the first round of elections in April, entering the 
June 2001 run-off facing front-runner Toledo. The front-runner, for his part, not only 
headed PP but was also supported by a number of parties that had presented candidates in 
the 2000 elections, such as AP and Somos Peru. These now included among their 
candidates for Congress a large number of recent mayors from the provinces who had 
supported decentralization in the 1990s and would now enter Congress representing 
specific regions. Among them was the former mayor of the Andean city of Cajamarca 
and president of association of municipalities (AMPE) during 1996-1998, Luis Guerrero, 
who would become the influential president of the Decentralization Committee in 
Congress in 2001; his successor in 2002, Walter Alejos, was a PP representative from 
Ayacucho who had presided a regional civic movement in one of Peru’s poorest 
departments. 
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The disastrous shape of the country and alleged corruption at the end of Garcia’s first 
presidency, together with the numerous personal scandals in which Toledo’s involvement 
had been alleged by the media and politicians, configured a race in which the two leading 
candidates enjoyed little credibility among large sectors of the population. During this 
campaign, decentralization was undoubtedly a top issue in the electoral agendas, in large 
part because of the perceived need of candidates to distance themselves from the ills of 
the previous regime in the post-Fujimori transition context: all parties explicitly offered 
such reform, especially to crowds outside Lima. In the run-off, in particular, there was a 
competition to gain credibility as the champion of decentralization (Tanaka, 2002). 
Garcia effectively drew attention to the regionalization reforms of his regime as evidence 
of commitment to decentralization and promised swift changes, though without much 
detail. Toledo, for his part, kept up by making constant promises of prompt 
regionalization despite not having a plan for carrying out such reforms.10 In an 
increasingly tight race, both candidates were desperately trying to reach out to an 
enormous sector of the electorate that saw neither one as an acceptable alternative; in 
mid-May, polls by the most respected firms showed that close to a third of voters planned 
to cast a blank or invalid ballot (Apoyo, 2001; Datum, 2001). An obvious political 
objective of becoming credible as a champion of decentralization was to win over the 
strongholds of anti-Fujimori, anti-authoritarian sentiment in cities of the interior. 
  
                                                 
10 Interview with Rudecindo Vega, 2006. 
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The decision to decentralize and the dynamics of policy formulation 
Despite Garcia’s spectacular rise in the polls, Toledo still won the 2001 election and, in 
the context of his otherwise unspectacular inauguration speech in July of that year, made 
a bold announcement that surprised many: the election of regional governments in 
November 2002, only 16 months later. No announcements were made then, or promptly 
afterwards, regarding the details of the decision. Another early announcement that had 
been offered during the campaign was the dismantling, within a year, of Ministerio de la 
Presidencia (MIPRE), the all-purpose ministry that had served to concentrate Fujimori’s 
politically oriented social spending programs and which, significantly, was in charge of 
the transitional CTAR regional authorities. 
 
Toledo fulfilled his inaugural promise to hold regional elections before the end of 2002. 
However, getting to that point required the formulation and approval of a legal 
framework to define the general model for decentralization, intergovernmental relations 
and how regional governments would be structured, what they could do and could not do, 
and how they would relate to central and local government. The 16 months between 
inauguration and the elections were not ample time for such a task, especially considering 
it would involve, first of all, amending the 1993 constitution and setting up the 
foundations for the entire institutional framework.  
 
Behind Toledo’s general offerings during his campaign and beyond there was no 
particular model of decentralization to speak of; all officials interviewed, including 
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former CND head Luis Thais and former MIPRES policymaker and Housing Minister 
Rudecindo Vega, basically shared this perspective. The model to be implemented was yet 
to be designed, although the political imperative of holding regional elections at the 
department-level within a short time certainly provided a basic constraint for any 
technical design team or political negotiations thereafter.11 
 
With the entry of over 30 new legislators that had previously been mayors and now 
responded to regional constituencies, there was undoubtedly a new force in Congress 
with high expectations regarding decentralization, and they wanted to move rapidly.12 As 
witnessed firsthand by a senior member of the Ministry of Finance’s negotiating team in 
Congress, even as late as mid-2002, regional priorities appeared less important than party 
affiliation among the large contingent of new legislators representing department-level 
congressional districts.13 There was an unprecedented consensus in Congress regarding 
decentralization even before legislators in the Decentralization Committee (headed by 
Luis Guerrero in 2001-2002) had a counterpart in the Executive (Alejos and Zas Friz, 
2005; interview with Vega 2006). 
 
In the first month after inauguration, the combative mayor of Arequipa, Juan Guillén, 
delayed accepting the president’s public invitation to head the decentralization 
commission.14 In spite of this, Toledo did not make a clear delegation of the 
                                                 
11 Johnny Zas Friz interview, 2004. 
12 Interview with Rudecindo Vega, 2006 
13 Interview with Hillman Farfan, 2005. 
14 R. Vega interview. 
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responsibility to lead the process in the following months. This lack of strong leadership 
and guiding vision for the process on the part of Toledo was reflected in the existence of 
two, and briefly three, teams in the executive working on the design of a decentralization 
model in relative isolation between 2001-2002. 
 
With international technocrat Roberto Dañino as Prime Minister in Toledo’s first cabinet, 
a team was established in the Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (PCM) to oversee 
state reform and decentralization matters. This team, some of whose members had been 
technocrats during the Fujimori regime, had the support of the Inter American 
Development Bank and other international financial institutions but was relatively 
inactive during 2001. However, from the start theirs was a vision that potentially clashed 
with the implications of Toledo’s inaugural promise and with the aspirations of many 
subnational actors. The PCM team envisioned a very gradual and carefully controlled 
process, one with a careful balance between the regional and local powers, and with 
elections for regional governments to come only after larger regions were conformed out 
of existing departments and their capacities were adequately strengthened.15 The 
technocratic PCM team would become much more active in 2002 as the discussion of the 
legal framework for decentralization became imminent; they were closely allied with the 
powerful Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) in their negotiations with Congress. 
MEF, which in practice acts not only as a finance ministry but also as a state planning 
                                                 
15 Zas Friz interview, 2004 
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and budgeting authority, effectively pushed for very tight fiscal and spending safeguards 
for regional governments in the legislation. 
 
In the meantime, the Ministerio de la Presidencia (MIPRES), which was still in charge of 
the existing regional authorities (CTAR), was scheduled to be dismantled by July 2002. 
Carlos Bruce, the minister in charge, was a prominent member of Toledo’s party and had 
the mandate of overseeing this process in preparation for the regional elections. Shortly 
after taking office, Bruce called upon a personal friend of himself and Toledo, widely 
respected decentralization expert, Pedro Planas, to set up a team (Secretaría Técnica para 
la Descentralización) to design a plan for decentralization. This team was formally 
constituted in August 2001 and had a different vision of decentralization from the PCM 
team, which considered the MIPRE team “politicized” (Casas, 2004). They came to work 
closely with the members of the decentralization committee in Congress, sharing their 
vision of somewhat quicker, more decisive change in line with Toledo´s announcements. 
According to Rudecindo Vega, who was part of the MIPRES team and later Minister of 
Housing, the team headed by Planas and later by Vega himself had “great chemistry” 
with the pro-decentralization legislators and helped to translate their ideas into legislative 
proposals. Many of these proposals were published by MIPRES and substantial parts of 
them would be reflected in the approved legislation. 
 
During this period, Toledo’s popularity began to fall soon after the beginning of his term 
and dropped below 30% approval by the end of 2001 (Apoyo, 2005). Although, in 
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September, MIPRES’s Planas had convinced Arequipa’s Guillén to head the 
decentralization commission, by the time he arrived this commission was placed firmly in 
the PCM under Prime Minister Dañino and his team, not directly under Toledo, so it 
constituted a short-lived third decentralization team that had little chance of influencing 
policymaking; he soon resigned.  
 
Tragedy (Planas died of a heart attack in October 2001) and Toledo’s inaugural 
commitments to dissolving MIPRES by mid-2002 dictated that, after late 2001, the 
neoliberal-leaning PCM team, in tandem with MEF, would gradually assume the 
Executive’s lead role in negotiating the decentralization framework with Congress. PCM 
and MEF’s vision would be reflected in several aspects of the framework for 
decentralization, including the general nature of the entity that would lead the process 
(Consejo Nacional de Descentralización, CND), the tight fiscal safeguards, and the initial 
transfer of social programs to municipalities. 
 
Toledo’s lack of leadership of the process did not change in the following months, and 
neither did his continued decrease in approval ratings. Moreover, by early 2002 APRA 
(the principal opposition force) appeared set to become the big winner in Toledo’s 
regional elections. In March 2002, regional elections were formally announced and the 
1993 constitution was officially amended to make possible the beginning of the process.  
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After March 2002, executive-legislative negotiations and congressional debate began 
regarding the Basic Law of Decentralization, which established a general sequence of 
reforms and, in broad terms, the new architecture of intergovernmental relations. This 
fundamental legislation was discussed and approved in the midst of a general pro-
decentralization consensus in Congress, which made possible its relative technical 
soundness (Alejos and Zas Friz, 2005).16 By this point, even though Toledo was not 
actively involved in leading the process of policy formulation, he showed no intentions of 
going back on his promise of November elections; in fact, he reaffirmed his commitment 
in his second July 28 address to the nation. 
 
However, as the regional elections came closer, political party interests began to 
predominate in discussions in Congress (Alejos and Zas Friz, 2005) and, as political 
tensions rose, it became far more difficult to maintain technical coherence in the 
framework, to the point that the law that defined the nature of regional governments, Ley 
Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales was arduously debated until early November and 
only approved by the president on the day before the election. It contained several 
guidelines that contradicted the Basic Law of Decentralization, including key issues like 
the overall sequence of reforms and the participation of civil society in regional 
governments, which APRA now opposed (Alejos and Zas Friz, 2005; interview with 
Abugattás 2005).  In the regional elections, as expected, APRA was the big winner as it 
                                                 
16 Also discussed in Zas Friz and Farfán interviews. 
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captured nearly half of the regional presidencies, while the ruling party only won one 
(Callao) and many regions were won by independents. 
 
The determinants of Toledo’s decision and of the reform model. Although the president 
announced decentralization, and the promise of regional elections was fulfilled, the 
model of reform now in place was not principally shaped by the preferences of Toledo or 
his closest advisors. Nor was the president a key force behind getting the process 
underway promptly. The course of events following the announcement of Toledo’s 
decision to begin decentralization reforms does not provide evidence of a coherent 
strategy unfolding. Beyond establishing a timeframe for elections, the president did not 
provide any substantial guidelines for successfully reaching his stated objectives. And he 
did not endeavor to put together a design team to work on making regionalization a 
viable, coherent process.  Neither did he attempt to shield the early policy formulation 
process from political negotiations, a strategy that has been successfully employed in 
introducing particular decentralization models elsewhere, like in neighboring Bolivia 
(Gray-Molina et al, 1999).  
 
Actually, the implementation, during the transition government of 2000-2001, of a 
multiple-district, single-chamber legislative was one crucial factor that made possible the 
fulfillment of electoral promises about decentralization this time around. This gave 
unprecedented leverage to incoming representatives from outside the capital: until the 
1992 self-coup, Peru had had a bicameral national congress in which only the lower 
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house was multiple-district, while after the 1993 Constitutional Assembly there was a 
single-chamber, single-district body in place. This reform can be seen as the first 
significant, “top-down” step taken during the democratic transition that responded to 
perceived demands from below, as ordinary citizens and subnational politicians loudly 
insisted that centralizing tendencies of the 1990s had to be reversed. 
 
The relation between the president with uncertain political bases and political allies in 
Congress is a key to understanding why a democratically elected president would commit 
himself to decentralization during campaign, proceed to establish a tight timeframe for 
holding elections at a level of government that was still to be created, but then basically 
stay away from the policymaking process. In fact, Toledo did not even take advantage of 
his first weeks and months in office, the so-called “honeymoon period” of popular 
approval and relative political calm, to push through a particular model of 
decentralization.  
 
The explanation put forward here is that, once elected, decentralization was no longer a 
politically attractive policy option for Toledo but he could not go back on his 
commitments because of pressure from a pro-reform front in the multiple-district 
congress. The early defection of a third of PP legislators in 2000 probably served as a 
stark reminder of his fragile support base. Thus, the process—which was put high on the 
public agenda by the democratic transition context and made more viable by relative 
economic and political stability (compared to the late 1980s)—was primarily shaped by 
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the preferences of reform-minded legislators and by policy design teams within the 
Executive that interacted with legislators.  
 
All that was clear from the president’s discourse, by implication, was that the emphasis in 
policy formulation would have to be on regional government, because of the imminent 
elections. The lack of any guidelines put forth for reform, and the lack of leadership of 
the early policy formulation process that was necessary to deliver on his inaugural 
promise, clearly suggest that the president was no audacious reformer (Grindle, 2000) 
seeking to resolve fundamental governance problems of the country, or any more specific 
administrative or technical issues. Toledo could be seen as initially seeking to legitimize 
the fragile political system, and his role in power vis-à-vis a pro-decentralization 
electorate, by reaffirming his commitment in his inaugural speech. However, from this 
perspective he had no reason to hurry things before there was even a reform model or a 
solid framework for reform that could support such an ambitious process, as he did by 
establishing such a tight schedule for elections. 
 
It was political calculation in the electoral campaign context that had put decentralization 
at the top of Toledo’s agenda: the fast-rising candidate of 2000 became the de facto 
leader of the opposition and, lacking a solid national party base of support, he sought to 
align himself with regional forces that clamored for decentralization. With 
decentralization as a key and well-documented demand in the Peruvian population 
(Trivelli, 2002), he needed to be seen as representing change from the status quo, and he 
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particularly needed to establish himself as a credible descentralista in the race against the 
eloquent Garcia, who banked on his allegedly proven regionalization record.  
 
However, from a perspective of electoral calculation, once in office Toledo had no clear 
incentives to push for a particular decentralization model or even to deliver on his 
promise; his possibilities of extracting a positive outcome from regional elections were 
unclear at best. He had no reason to believe that his weak party structure, or his loose 
coalition of regional allies, could serve as a coherent platform for effectively challenging 
a revitalized APRA in regional elections.  If anything, APRA’s decades old regional and 
local bases were being reactivated in anticipation for the 2006 elections, were Garcia was 
expected to be the front-runner.  
 
Thus, Toledo’s adoption of the decentralization issue as a priority in his policy agenda 
was rather opportunistic and only beneficial to his political interests for a very brief 
period; after that, however, he was not able to let it go because an undeniable impetus for 
rapidly initiating decentralization was coming from political actors that he could not 
ignore. It appears that the general logic behind the decision to decentralize and the 
shaping of key characteristics of reform in Peru bears some resemblance to the party 
structure determinants explanation proposed by Willis, Garman and Haggard (1999), 
where: 
The greater the political sensitivity of central level politicians to subnational 
outcomes, the more decentralized the system is likely to be. (p. 9) 
 
 107
According to these authors, the sensitivity to subnational outcomes in Latin America is 
determined by political party structures, and the bargaining processes mediated through 
parties determine whether national or subnational interests prevail during reform. A 
strong president with a centralized party would therefore have little incentive to initiate 
reforms that provide greater authority and resources to subnational authorities. 
 
In Peru, however, political competition is now generally dominated not by political 
parties but by personalistic, “disposable” organizations put together for strictly electoral 
purposes. President Toledo had come to power in 2001 with the help of subnational 
actors with whom he was loosely allied; many of these, however, shared a common 
agenda in that they were pro-decentralization individuals who successfully ran for 
Congress and were now, for the first time, accountable to regional constituencies. Perú 
Posible, on the other hand, lacked a clear policy agenda in its history of less than a 
decade. Thus, once in office there was a multi-party, legislative front (Azpur, 2005) that 
was ready to hold Toledo accountable for his electoral promises: he had little choice but 
to be sensitive to subnational outcomes. 
 
Indeed, of the 44 elected Peru Posible representatives (out of 120 representatives in 
Congress), 30 represented regions other than Lima and Callao, and of these 22 were 
newcomers to Congress, most of them with backgrounds in subnational government and 
not party members but individuals of different backgrounds invited to run on the PP 
ticket. Additionally, PP allies AP and Somos Peru brought in six new representatives 
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from outside Lima and Callao. A new force in Congress, in charge of the 
Decentralization and Regionalization Commission, came in with high expectations 
regarding decentralization, and they made it clear to public opinion and the executive that 
they wanted to move rapidly (Castillo, 2002).17  
 
In terms of policy formulation, the cross-party consensus in Congress facilitated smooth 
legislative debate sessions in June 2002, when elections were still somewhat distant. 
There were unusually high votes in favor of the Basic Law of Decentralization (BLD) 
and amendments to particular articles; no more than two votes against and two 
abstentions were registered in any particular session on record (Congress of Peru, 2007). 
Moreover, there were no significant calls for postponing regional elections in the BLD 
debates. Although an APRA representative voiced the party’s opposition to limiting 
regional governments’ ability to borrow without central government approval, this did 
not translate into APRA blocking the legislation. 
 
This cross-party front even had an impact on other areas of reform in 2002, as legislators 
from the interior successfully banded together to oppose aspects of the Law of Political 
Parties that would have subjected regional movements to similarly restrictive rules as 
national political parties (Vergara, 2007). Curiously, a visible leader of this front was 
Walter Alejos, who represented a national party, the ruling Peru Posible. In the broader 
national context, too, regional agendas and demonstrations gained great visibility during 
                                                 
17 Interview with Rudecindo Vega, 2006. 
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2002 and were also seen as exerting much stronger political pressure on the public 
agenda than political parties (Caretas, 2002) 
 
In terms of the general characteristics of the model for decentralization, the experience of 
Garcia’s failed regionalization in the late 1980s was important during this formulation 
stage in facilitating a general consensus about aspects of the Toledo process, without 
which political negotiations would have likely been more arduous. Many lawmakers and 
technocrats involved in the design of the newer decentralization model had witnessed 
firsthand, at the regional level, the difficulties that arose in the previous experience that 
attempted rapid change. While new legislators and regional actors wanted reforms to 
begin as soon as possible (in contrast to the PCM-MEF team), it is clear that they were 
willing to consider a gradual, careful road to decentralization once it was underway, 
rather than an overnight devolution of authority (Castillo, 2002; Alejos y Zas Friz, 2005); 
this helped to harmonize the perspectives of legislators and the relatively neo-liberal 
leaning and fiscally prudent technocrats at PCM and MEF. Moreover, there was virtually 
no discussion of predetermining larger regions on the basis of existing departments as 
was done in the late 1980’s; decentralization went ahead on the basis of departments that 
would join larger units in the medium term, a decision that is also politically 
advantageous for representatives elected by department-level constituencies with whom 
they are likely familiar.  
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Thus, incorporating some of the policy preferences of PCM and, especially, MEF into the 
decentralization framework was not overly problematic as the Basic Law of 
Decentralization was designed, paving the way for a more conservative model than one 
might have expected in a context where Congress had the upper hand in shaping reforms.  
The “conservative” characteristics include tight fiscal control of subnational 
governments, administrative decentralization only after political decentralization was 
consolidated, and a weak agency in charge of leading decentralization, among other 
characteristics. Where the PCM-MEF view could not get across, however, was on the 
issue of greater relative balance between local and regional empowerment. The timing of 
regional elections itself, the preferences of legislators with regional constituencies, and 
the interest of the powerful APRA inclined the balance towards regional government in 
the overall framework. Still, the current process aims at a more equitable relation 
between local and regional bodies than the 1989-1992 process. 
  
This legislative consensus, however, had disappeared by the time of the turbulent debate 
on the next crucial piece of legislation, the Law of Regional Governments (LRG), which 
more specifically defined the role, structure and functions of regional governments and 
thus had to be formulated and approved rather quickly as the November elections 
approached.18 APRA lawmakers, in particular, now began to act according to party 
priorities; seeing that they were set to win a significant number of regional governments, 
they sought to strengthen this level of government and blocked efforts to include 
                                                 
18 Zas Friz interview, 2004. 
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substantial civil society participation in regional governments (Alejos and Zas Friz, 
2005). Even though this flatly contradicted the BLD, and even the constitution, aspects of 
the law regarding the participation of civil society through a regional coordination 
committee (CCR) were not part of the original law when elections were held, and were 
only approved in January 2003, together with other important aspects that could not be 
resolved in the original debate before the elections.  
 
In addition to initial omissions that were filled within a few months, the LRG also 
definitively modified the careful sequence of reforms established in the BLD in a way 
that would tend to empower department-based regions: administrative decentralization 
would take place in all sectors at once (rather than leaving education and health for last) 
effectively beginning sectoral transfers in January 2004, and it would not have to wait 
until larger regions were consolidated through referenda. 
 
Finally, when the third major law in the framework, the Law of Municipal Governments, 
was approved in May 2003, there was little interest in Congress to substantially 
strengthen this level of government. Neither the Executive nor the main opposition, 
APRA, pushed for any significant departures in the new law from the previous, Fujimori-
era document that it sought to replace. Most crucially at this stage, there was little clarity 
regarding the functions that province and district-level municipalities were to be 
transferred, especially as the distinction in roles between these two levels was ambiguous. 
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Thus, the institutional framework that guides the implementation of the process—the 
implications of which are described in the following chapters—was produced through an 
increasingly arduous political and policymaking debate between the Executive and 
Congress, and the electoral backdrop of this debate explains some of the framework’s 
contradictions and ambiguities. Moreover, other determinants of this imperfect and 
relatively ambiguous decentralization model can be found not only in the short-term 
motivations of the president that decided the start of reforms but also in the larger context 
of democratic transition, in the dynamics of the preceding presidential elections, in the 
demands for decentralization of regional actors, in Peru’s fragile party system, in the 
preferences of technocrats, and, not least, in the decentralization experiences of the 
previous decades. 
 
Conclusion 
This third chapter identified and analyzed key trends in recent decades that paved the way 
for the model of decentralization designed and implemented in 21st century Peru, as well 
as having described and identified the determinants of the early (agenda setting and 
formulation) stages of the decentralization policymaking process since 2000. Among the 
long and medium-term factors that ultimately had a significant impact on the 
characteristics of administrative decentralization reforms begun in 2003 was the sequence 
of frustrated or aborted reforms since 1980, which defined the range of options that were 
politically feasible when policies were debated and designed. It also analyzed the more 
recent political factors (since the 2000-2001 democratic transition) that immediately 
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shaped the timing of decentralization and the framework for sectoral administrative 
reforms; the determinants of the beginning of reform were, as in other Latin American 
countries, largely political, but the range of actors involved was quite particular. In terms 
of the analysis of the implementation of administrative decentralization that is the central 
object of this study, this chapter has shown that, while implementation later brought with 
it particular context for policymaking and a new set of predominant actors,   
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Chapter 4 - Implementation, resistance and the predominant role of 
ministries 
 
This chapter addresses one of this study’s principal research questions by identifying the 
key actors and stakeholders in shaping implementation (2003-2006), and by describing 
how and why ministries and other sectoral agencies came to have the upper hand in the 
process. Having previously identified key factors that shaped the agenda setting and 
formulation stages of decentralization in Peru (Chapter 3), this chapter begins to examine 
the relevance of different approaches to the unfolding of implementation. Furthermore, it 
establishes the relevance of focusing on ministerial policymakers as the principal actors 
shaping administrative reforms in state decentralization. 
 
From a bureaucratic politics perspective—which focuses on inter-agency conflict and the 
calculated self-interest of bureaucrats (see Chapter 2)—the observed predominance of 
ministries leads one to the expectation that ministerial policymakers would successfully 
seek to preserve the status quo and avoid a real transfer of decision-making power. 
Indeed, a general description of overall results and of policies observed in the ministries 
in charge of decentralizing policy sectors provides important evidence to support a 
pluralist, bureaucratic politics view of implementation, including: (a) the transfer of 
unfunded mandates, (b) unrealistic accreditation requirements for subnational 
governments and, often, (c) the omission of decentralization in official planning 
documents. However, as the exploration uncovers the particularities of policymaking in 
different ministries, self-interest loses its power as an overarching, explanatory factor and 
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it becomes evident that there is room for other explanations to account for observed 
results coherently. 
 
The transfer of central authorities and resources to subnational levels formally began as 
elected regional governments were inaugurated in January 2003. However, as will be 
shown in this chapter, little was transferred until the end of the Toledo administration 
(2006) that can be understood as involving real decision-making power—i.e., 
policymaking authority and necessary resources to implement decisions—in previously 
centralized policy fields.  
 
In light of the mandate for administrative delegation that is found in Peru’s constitution 
and the key decentralization laws, discussed in Chapter 3, ministries have enjoyed almost 
complete discretion to design and implement sectoral decentralization policies. In the 
words of a Peruvian decentralization expert evaluating at the process from civil society, 
in practice this has meant that each sector in the Executive “defines and negotiates 
transfers from its own particular point of view and interest” (Azpur, 2005, p. 6).  
 
Under these conditions, is it unreasonable to expect that agencies holding decision-
making power would willingly implement policies that aim at limiting their power in 
favor of autonomous actors? A bureaucratic politics approach would indeed lead us to 
consider this an unreasonable expectation, and the broad assessments of administrative 
decentralization by Peruvian watchdog organizations would generally be in line with this 
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(Participa Peru, 2006). Thus, after reviewing the “rules of the game,” key actors in reform 
and the context as implementation began, this chapter sets out to interpret sectoral 
policies as a whole through an analytical lens that sees self-interest as the fundamental 
explanatory factor of observed policies. It thus begins to test the explanatory power of a 
bureaucratic politics approach to the observed outcomes (sectoral policies) in 
administrative decentralization until 2006.   
 
In other words, this chapter and the following seek to understand how well a pluralist, 
bureaucratic politics-type theoretical lens that focuses on self-interest as an independent 
variable can account for the overall pattern of administration decentralization. The 
following chapter, moreover, will allow us to evaluate the strength of such an approach in 
accounting for differences observed between sectoral decentralization policies–which, as 
we will see in this chapter, are largely controlled by a heterogeneous group of mid-level 
actors such as ministries. To achieve this, the discussions look first, in this chapter, at the 
set of transfers by ministries as a whole and then, in the following chapter, focuses on 
some individual cases of ministries that began to formally transfer functions in the period 
2003-2006. 
 
Implementation begins 
In early 2003, 25 elected regional governments were inaugurated, initially assuming the 
assets and general responsibilities of the previous deconcentrated regional authorities 
(CTAR). The implementation of administrative decentralization began at this point, 
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though not with sectoral transfers proposed by ministries but, rather, with the centrally-
planned first steps in the transfer of national social programs that had been controlled by 
the Ministry of the Presidency during the Fujimori era, generally benefiting local 
governments. Initial measures also included the transfer of infrastructure projects, 
particularly rural roads (going to regional and local governments) and large irrigation 
projects in the coast (going to regional governments). Sectoral transfers from ministries 
to subnational governments would, nevertheless, be the focus of transfers in the following 
years of the Toledo administration. 
 
Two of the three major pieces of the current legal framework for decentralization (the 
Basic Law of Decentralization and the Law of Regional Governments) were in place by 
January 1st, 2003. A third major component, the new Law of Municipal Governments, 
was approved in May 2003. However, there was—and continued to be, until four years 
later—a missing element: the Basic Law of Decentralization (BLD) had also considered a 
new Law of Executive Power (LEP) as a necessary part of the framework that would, 
among other things, further clarify what functions were currently at the central level that 
could be decentralized. Various drafts of this law have been discussed since, and only in 
late 2007 (long after the end of the Toledo administration) did Congress approve the 
LEP. 
 
Another piece of legislation that was substantially delayed, and only marginally less 
important for the decentralization process than those outlined above, is the Law of the 
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Accreditation System that is necessary for regional and local governments to be certified 
by Consejo Nacional de Descentralización (CND) as recipients of new sectoral resources 
and functions. Due to delays in Congress and the Executive, it was only approved a year 
and a half after the administrative decentralization process officially began, in July 2004. 
Thus, the early transfers of projects and programs could only be made fully effective at 
least one year after the official start of implementation. 
 
After the turbulent policymaking period leading to regional and municipal elections and 
the inauguration of regional governments, interest in the subsequent steps towards 
decentralization appeared to diminish in Congress—whose members had shown a 
preference for regionalization as a model for decentralization. The legislative debate of 
the Law of Municipal Governments (LMG), approved in May 2003, was “closed and 
hardly transparent” and it did not take into account the valuable lessons of the previous 
decades of autonomous municipal experience; as in the case of the LRG in November 
2002, the LMG was initially approved without a civil society participation component, 
which was reintroduced only after the Executive returned the law for changes before 
approval (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2006). Some political reasons for a changed attitude of 
lawmakers towards the decentralization process by early 2003 are evident: for the Toledo 
government and its allies, the regional elections were so far the key test of its 
decentralization policies and the results had been a dismal political failure for the ruling 
party; its success in local elections throughout the country was also unremarkable, 
winning only 11 of 194 provincial races (ONPE, 2003). Meanwhile, for the main 
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opposition party (APRA) the regional elections were a great success (winning 12 of 25 
regional races). There was also some significant, although far less impressive, APRA 
success in local races, as it captured 17% of provincial governments (Propuesta 
Ciudadana, 2003). Thus, little effort was put into making the Law of Municipal 
Governments (LMG) a significant improvement of the law it replaced, in terms of 
strengthening or clarifying the role of municipalities. This basically confirmed the bias 
towards decentralization to the regional level that existed among legislators, as central 
government technocrats perceived it. 
 
Not surprisingly after the APRA domination of regional elections, President Toledo did 
not assume an active leadership of decentralization after regional governments were in 
place, or any time afterwards until the end of his term in July 2006. The administrative 
decentralization process may have formally continued in many policy sectors but—
especially after the defeat of five multi-department initiatives to create larger regions in 
late 2005—top government officials appeared to have given up on any new 
decentralization initiatives, and it was generally considered in the media that the 
overwhelming “No” vote represented a popular rejection of the government’s 
management of the issue (Palestra, 2006). In fact, even as early as mid-2004, public 
opinion was significantly disapproving of the government’s decentralization policies 
(Apoyo, 2004). If anything, the role of the Executive towards the end of the Toledo 
administration can be seen as one of delaying even formal transfers in some politically 
sensitive sectors (education and health), because in 2005 CND—whose transfer plans 
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must be approved by the cabinet—acted in contrast to its normal compliance with 
ministry requirements by cutting back on early health transfers (which under the 2005 
plan effectively began late in that year) and delaying the beginning of transfers in 
education until after the next administration would be in office. 
 
The official “rules of the game” for implementation: The legal framework 
Overall, as illustrated in the previous chapter, the legal framework for reform—and the 
institutional framework for reform that it has put in place—was the result of a tough and 
evolving political debate as much as it is the reflection of a coherent vision of 
decentralization. Despite its flaws, it sets the overarching institutional framework for 
reform and some of the key “rules of the game” for implementation, while other, 
unwritten rules have been dictated along the way by some of the important actors in 
decentralization. These actors and rules are outlined in this section and the next. 
 
A brief comparative review of the three key components of the framework reveals 
important contradictions and ambiguities that directly affect the conditions under which 
implementation of administrative transfers take place. First, on the basis of the 
amendment to the 1993 constitution that made possible an autonomous level of regional 
government, the Basic Law of Decentralization laid out a process that is gradual, quite 
conservative and must move forward through well-defined, consecutive stages, namely: 
(a) formulation and approval of the legal framework; (b) consolidation of larger regions, 
consisting of two or more of the current departments; (c) transfer of resources and 
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responsibilities in all sectors except education and health; and, finally, (d) transfer of 
resources and responsibilities in education and health. It sets a number of “safety 
mechanisms” to ensure fiscal stability, limiting the capacity of regional and local 
governments to acquire debt and to create new taxes; these depend on the Executive and 
Congress. Also, BLD created the institution that was to lead, coordinate and monitor the 
decentralization process (Consejo Nacional de Descentralización, CND) as a relatively 
weak government agency.  
 
Significantly, the BLD outlines a number of exclusive and shared “competences and 
functions” (where “competences” are the legal attributions necessary for actual functions 
to be performed) in several policy sectors for each level of government, as well as some 
competences and functions that may be optionally delegated by central government. 
However, the BLD also states that the organic law for each level of government should 
more concretely define how these would be carried out. Thus, it outlines a new structure 
of intergovernmental administrative relations but without providing much detail, and it 
does not provide clear guidelines as to how to coordinate between levels of government 
in the cases of shared competences and functions beyond establishing the role of a 
coordinating agency to handle such issues (CND). Although the laws for regional and 
municipal governments were approved within a year of the BLD, a key to clarifying the 
new shape of intergovernmental relation, the Law of the Executive Power, was never 
approved. Finally, the BLD establishes general criteria for carrying out the assignment 
and transfer of functions and competences, indicating that for administrative 
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decentralization CND must consider the capacities of subnational governments to assume 
new authorities and that all transfers must be accompanied by the necessary financial, 
technical material and human resources to ensure the continued provision of services in 
an efficient manner. 
 
Debated on the eve of elections, the Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales or Law of 
Regional Governments (LRG, November 2002) was generally compatible with the shape 
of intergovernmental relations set in the BLD, and provided greater detail on the 
exclusive and shared functions and competences of regional governments, defining some 
general areas to be transferred by policy sector. Nevertheless, these functions are not 
carefully categorized; they vary in their level of specificity within any single area, from 
the extremely concrete to very broad responsibilities of regional development.  However, 
in the context of increasingly polarized debate and with little time remaining before 
elections, the LRG initially left out some important sections on citizen participation in 
regional government, fiscal sustainability and the sectoral policymaking prerogatives of 
central government ministries. These problems were solved through additional norms in 
early 2003, yet some aspects that contradicted, and in practice altered, the model in the 
BLD stayed for good in the LRG and beyond: the transfer of responsibilities to 
subnational governments was not only to proceed before larger regions were 
consolidated, but education and health (which had been left as the last stage of reform 
because of their perceived complexity and political sensitiveness) were to be transferred 
along with other sectors from the very start of the process. 
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Finally, the Law of Municipal Governments (May 2003) has been judged to be rather 
conservative in terms of the powers assigned to local government, not at all innovative 
with regards to previous legislation on local government, and reinforcing the upper hand 
of regional governments in the implementation of the decentralization process,19 as well 
as not being fully compatible with laws governing regional governments (Azpur, 2003). 
One of the most debilitating characteristics of this law is that it does not clearly draw 
lines between the policy functions and responsibilities of district and province-level 
municipalities, or of these local governments vis-à-vis central and regional government. 
Although this law does improve on previous norms by incorporating into municipal 
governments a new civil society consultative assembly (CCL) that parallels that found in 
regional governments, in most aspects this piece of legislation is considered an “essential 
continuity” of the previous law of municipalities that was in effect during the Fujimori 
years (Zas Friz, 2005). 
 
Zas Friz (2005) lists several additional important shortcomings of the LMG, including its 
very vague description of the role of municipal governments as recipients of new 
administrative functions and resources, and its significant restrictions on civil society 
participation. From the standpoint of civil society and local governments, an important 
objection is that the LMG has not adequately distinguished between the needs of very 
different types of municipalities in Peru in the context of decentralization, especially 
                                                 
19 Rodolfo Alva interview, 2005; Johnny Zas Friz interview, 2004 
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considering the distinct challenges of a majority of small and poor rural ones that are 
highly dependent on financial transfers (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2006).20 
 
The fact that the legal framework provides few details for implementation certainly 
appears as a challenge for sectoral policymakers, but it should not necessarily be taken as 
a hindrance for the transfer of decision-making from the center. It can be argued that, in a 
policy formulation stage hastened by political timetables, it would have been pointless to 
establish specifics of administrative decentralization when there was no time to make 
extensive technical consultation within particular policy sectors. Nevertheless, the 
ambiguities in the framework give much discretion to ministries in deciding how and 
when to transfer authority and resources. This makes it necessary, then, to have some 
supervisory agency to oversee the process to make sure that the mandates of the legal 
framework are followed and that the interests of subnational governments are served. 
 
Key actors during implementation and some other “rules of the game” 
According to the legal framework, since 2003 each year a formal sequence of 
administrative decentralization activities under CND supervision begins with the 
approval of sectoral transfer plans in April and leads to the effective transfer of 
competences and functions in January of the following year (CND, 2006). Under the 
coordination of CND, administrative decentralization should thus lead to a situation 
where different levels of government coordinate their roles in a number of public policy 
                                                 
20 Rodolfo Alva interview, 2005. 
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sectors. The general guidelines for what areas are to be shared and which remain 
centralized can be found in the legal framework, but the details are left to be determined 
in each sector, again under the coordination of CND and the broad supervision of 
Congress and the Council of Ministers (the cabinet). In reality the yearly sequence of 
transfers has been significantly delayed each time, often due to delays in ministries and in 
Congress (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2006).  
 
In September 2002, the Consejo Nacional de Descentralización (CND) began to operate 
as an autonomous, inter-governmental agency leading the decentralization process and 
looking after the interests of all levels of government involved, according to the BLD. 
However, it had serious limitations in playing this role from the outset. Although the 
CND was ostensibly leading the decentralization process, it was an agency of inferior 
rank to ministries and it therefore could not effectively enforce the fulfillment of formal 
procedures and timeframes of administrative decentralization. The process of defining 
what is to be transferred is left fundamentally as a ministry initiative (Azpur, 2005) and 
there is no formal channel for subnational governments to effectively demand or press for 
particular authorities or resources, although they are encouraged to present a list of 
required functions each year. The obvious forum for such inter-government dialogue was 
CND but, in addition to its weak position vis-à-vis ministries and other factors outlined 
below, it has some other significant shortcomings; most basically, its governing board 
had greater weight of central government agencies than subnational governments (five 
versus four). 
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CND also had rather limited financial resources to fulfill its duties as a vital link between 
levels of government and to attend to the demands and various needs of over two 
thousand subnational governments; in 2005, when it was overseeing administrative 
decentralization and referenda for the creation of regions, its total annual budget was 
about nine million dollars and the resources it actually received were about one third less 
(MEF, 2007). Secondly, although its head had the rank of a minister, he only had voice 
(no voting privileges) in cabinet meetings and only began to participate in these in 
February 2004. This is very important because the Council of Ministers approves transfer 
plans and also because, even though CND was formally a decentralized agency within the 
Prime Minister’s office (PCM), the relations between the two agencies have been very 
problematic because of clashing policy approaches, and none of the prime ministers 
during the Toledo administration assumed an active role in leading the decentralization 
process.21  
 
Finally, according to its head between 2002 and 2006, the often embattled Luis Thais, 
CND had difficult relations with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), which 
openly opposed several decentralization efforts and made difficult obtaining resources for 
various important tasks because of the contrasting approaches of these agencies (Thais 
interview, 2006). One area in which CND was formally supposed to be active, but could 
not operate because of a lack of resources, was evaluation: monitoring the impact of 
                                                 
21 Luis Pacheco interview, 2004. 
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transfers and the way in which regional and local governments assumed new 
policymaking functions. Until 2006, no government agency was clearly responsible for 
this important policy activity, although since 2004 the national Public Ombudsman’s 
Office has a section devoted to governance and decentralization issues that provides some 
support to subnational governments in specific issue areas, generally aiming at improving 
government practices. 
 
In addition to the significant limitations under which it operated, the policy approach of 
CND to the decentralization process was itself questioned. Many considered it to have a 
distinctly top-down, “outdated” state-planning outlook on reforms that put it at odds with 
subnational governments, with the central government technocrats that had participated 
in the design of decentralization, and even with IFI’s that were looking to financially 
support the reform process; the CND head, Luis Thais, had previously been an official in 
the government planning agency, INP, that had designed much of the late 1980s 
regionalization experiment. Additionally, there were tensions within the institution as 
many top positions were occupied by members of the ruling party, PP, who were often at 
odds with people appointed by the agency’s head and with people from the PCM team 
that briefly worked here in 2003.22 Finally, people in Lima and in the interior hold that 
CND’s limited efforts at capacity building and dialogue were focused on regional 
governments and not municipalities; moreover, its communications strategies towards 
subnational governments and ordinary citizens have been considered highly ineffective 
                                                 
22 Luis Pacheco interview, 2004. 
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(as expressed in Pacheco interview, 2004; Alva interview, 2005; Zas Friz interview, 
2004). 
 
While in early stages CND basically implemented ministries’ proposals, in mid 2005, 
near the end of the Toledo administration, CND actually acted—presumably under 
pressure from above—to hold back on the transfers in education and health that each 
ministry had proposed for 2005 and 2006. It approved multi-annual (2005-2009 and 
2006-2010) transfer plans that delayed the start of proposed education transfers for 2006 
(effectively, after the end of the Toledo administration), and, around August 2005, 
belatedly approved the 2005 annual plan with only 13 of the 15 health transfers that the 
ministry had proposed (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2005; Vigila Peru, 2006). 
 
The BLD states that Congress’ Decentralization and Regionalization Commission is to be 
informed of progress in decentralization by CND annually. This commission formally 
plays a high-level monitoring role and could conceivably intervene to change the rules of 
the process but did not do so in the 2003-2006 period. After the short-lived pro-
decentralization front pushed for the start of reforms, Congress has ceased to be a leading 
actor in decentralization, as evidenced by its handling of the LMG debate and 
formulation. 
 
On the other hand, while on paper it is not defined as a key actor in decentralization, the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) plays a pivotal role during implementation in 
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reality (as it did in aspects of policy formulation), ultimately being able to veto or modify 
aspects of reforms that it disapproves. Especially after the structural adjustment reforms 
of the early 1990s, MEF has had great power over other Peruvian ministries as it strictly 
supervises and controls planning, budgeting and the execution of public financial 
resources. Regional government and ministry officials alike are of the opinion that MEF 
decisions are key to moving forward with decentralization and, when leadership has been 
lacking elsewhere, it often appeared as though MEF was leading the process by default as 
it has the final word on making budget transfers effective or releasing funds for important 
activities in capacity building. On the other hand, it does not play a significant role in 
directly defining or influencing sectoral policies; rather, MEF is a strict enforcer of 
budget and administrative rules (including standards for investment project approval 
through the SNIP system) that is often seen as unreasonably inflexible. 
 
It could be argued that MEF has actually played a significant and relatively independent 
role in shaping decentralization even before the inauguration of regional governments, as 
it carried out some pilot programs on local participative budgeting based on experiences 
in the 2000-2001 transition government, as well as capacity-building activities in related 
issues. Most tellingly, MEF has proven powerful enough to unilaterally block fiscal 
decentralization, as it did in the eve of regional referenda in 2005: it did not make 
available the fiscal incentives (i.e., steps towards real fiscal autonomy) that under law 
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should have been offered to the larger regions that were to be formed (Propuesta 
Ciudadana, 2006).23  
 
As mentioned, the Consejo de Ministros (Council of Ministers, or the cabinet led by the 
Prime Minister) can itself be considered an actor in decentralization implementation as it 
plays an important role as it approves the annual sectoral transfer plans of individual 
ministries, which were coordinated by CND. Therefore, between 2003 and 2006 the 
annual transfers and accreditation requirements have been initially determined by each 
ministry, then put together by CND and finally have required the approval of the cabinet. 
However, no Prime Minister assumed the leadership of decentralization during the 
Toledo administration. 
 
Regional governments have been very critical of the role of CND from the outset, and as 
a result of early conferences in 2003 there were several joint proposals of regional 
presidents to bypass CND altogether and directly negotiate the terms of decentralization 
in a new forum involving the national president (Pacheco interview, 2004; Propuesta 
Ciudadana, 2003). At an early stage, regional presidents appeared to emerge as a 
powerful new political force. However, their unity and legitimacy as a political force has 
been weakened by corruption scandals. Even in 2003, several regional presidents were 
accused of corruption, and APRA member Freddy Ghilardi of the Áncash region was the 
first one to be removed from office—during his first year in power (Caretas, 2003). 
                                                 
23 Luis Thais interview, 2006. 
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Moreover, the early part of their administrations were busy times as regional officials had 
to adapt the organizational structure and resources of dependent regional authorities 
(CTAR), on the basis of which they were created, to the new legal requirements for 
regional governments, initially receiving budgets that were not significantly higher (only 
a 6% increase on the whole) than those of CTAR (Propuesta Ciudadana, 2003).  
 
Local governments have had similar problems in having their views heard and considered 
in the decentralization process, but with challenges accentuated by the inherent 
difficulties in a heterogeneous group—in terms of their status as province or district 
jurisdiction, size and needs of population served, financial and human resources, among 
other factors—acting as a united front, and by CND’s and ministries’ greater attention to 
regional government issues. The 2004 and 2005 annual transfer plans contemplated no 
transfers for municipal governments and, on the whole, administrative decentralization 
has had very little impact, even on a formal level, on local governments. For example, the 
mayor and the municipal general manager of the local government of Independencia (in 
the sierra region of Áncash), which has been nationally recognized awarded for its good 
government practices, considered that administrative decentralization has not been felt at 
all in their district of 70,000 people, and they had never been approached with regards to 
the decentralization of social programs.24 
 
                                                 
24 Alfredo Vera interview, 2006; Eduardo Mauricio interview, 2006. 
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Two other sets of actors have played important roles in decentralization: civil society 
organizations (especially “watchdog” groups) and development cooperation agencies. 
Indeed, civil society organizations like Grupo Participa Perú (a national network of 
research centers and NGOs) have played a role in analyzing and informing about the 
progress of reforms and their impact that has not only complemented official versions 
but, given the weaknesses of CND, in fact have played a needed role in monitoring and 
evaluation that the state has neglected. International financial institutions, most notably 
the Inter American Development Bank, have provided the government some financial 
assistance for decentralization, while bilateral agencies like USAID (through the 
PRODES initiative) and the Netherlands’ SNV have been active in fostering dialogue 
about reforms and in assisting capacity-building activities in subnational governments. 
However, there has been little or no presence of international cooperation for 
decentralization in the ministries implementing reforms in specific policy areas. 
 
Peruvian ministries at a glance 
While, as seen above, there are several important actors in the process, the rules for 
implementation suggest that, in practice, the most influential actors in shaping the content 
of administrative decentralization in Peru are the ministries themselves—the very 
organizations that are to eventually relinquish authority and resources. As directed by 
national decentralization laws and by CND norms, the formal transfers (actual or 
planned) to regional and local governments so far have included competences within the 
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authority of 12 ministries, nine of which are ministries that should delegate policymaking 
authority in their fundamental areas of decision-making.  
 
Of the 12 ministries listed in annual transfer plans, three cases are not considered by this 
study. In two ministries, the mandate of administrative decentralization does not apply to 
their main areas of policymaking, and thus there is no reason to expect coherent sectoral 
decentralization policies but, rather, only specific plans for transferring out individual 
projects or offices. In the cases of MEF (whose key administrative, regulatory, budgeting 
and planning competences are not subject to deconcentration or delegation) and the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers (basically, an inter-ministerial coordination 
entity), the transfers included in annual plans are of areas that are only marginally related 
to their primary policy responsibilities. These include the regional administration of 
public lands, in the first case, and disaster prevention, humanitarian assistance and some 
functions for defining territorial delimitation and some environmental standards, in the 
second case.  
 
A third ministry, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano (MIMDES), was, during 
the Toledo administration, basically a loose conglomeration of well-established social 
programs like the social fund FONCODES and the food assistance program PRONAA. 
The transfer of these individual programs to local governments was fundamentally 
defined at the central level even before implementation effectively began, so the 
discretion of sectoral policymakers was quite restricted. Moreover, in implementing 
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transfers to subnational governments there was very limited or no coordination between 
the programs that formally belong to this ministry,25 so that it is difficult even to depict 
this as a single, coherent policymaking agency in the field of decentralization. 
 
Peruvian ministries are administrative units, based in Lima, in charge of national 
policymaking in one or more public policy fields, and their head is a minister who sits in 
the cabinet or Council of Ministers, which in turn is headed by the Prime Minister 
(Presidente del Consejo de Ministros). Vice ministers are second in rank to ministers, 
vary in number by ministries, and usually are in charge of sub sectors or specific policy 
sectors within ministries; below vice ministries there are such levels as Direcciones 
Nacionales, which are generally more involved in the day-to-day operation of sub-
sectoral processes. Ministries also have Direcciones Regionales, which, as previously 
mentioned, are deconcentrated instances in each region and which are accountable (since 
2003) to both the ministerial hierarchy and to regional government officials. Thus, the 
organizational structure of ministries has some broad similarities across cases, but there 
are also many exceptional or unique arrangements within ministries, such as special 
agencies (such as Organismos Públicos Descentralizados, OPD), projects or programs 
that do not fit neatly into standard hierarchies. As mentioned earlier, until late 2007 there 
was no current legal framework defining organizations in central government in a way 
that is compatible with the ongoing decentralization process or other reforms. The most 
                                                 
25 Eduardo Sáenz interview, 2006 
 135
recent relevant reference for the 2003-2006 period is a law from 1990 that reflected a 
very different context, including the regionalization program of 1989-1992. 
 
The authorities and resources that ministries hold vary significantly in policy sectors; this 
variation is not only related to the character of each policy area, but also to previous 
reforms of the public sector that affected the roles of some ministries in particular. For 
example, after structural adjustment and a “first wave” of neoliberal reform in the early 
1990s, the active role of the state in productive activities was virtually terminated, and 
policymaking in such sectors as fishing, mining and industry, among others, became 
restricted to regulatory, advisory and supervisory roles. Thus, for instance, what was 
formerly the Ministry of Industry became a small Vice-ministry of Industry within a 
small multi-sector ministry (Ministry of Production). 
 
At the start of the Toledo administration, there were some technocratic proposals for 
relatively substantial state reform, involving significant modifications of ministries, but 
this proved to be politically unviable.26 Instead, there were far less profound changes in 
the line-up of ministries that basically sought to put together more similar sectors under 
the same administrative unit and in some cases return to how policy sectors were 
arranged before the Fujimori years. This involved shifting some entire vice-ministries 
from one ministry to another, rather than any substantial changes to existing hierarchies 
or any attempt at “reengineering” the state. Thus, housing and construction sectors were 
                                                 
26 Rudecindo Vega interview, 2006 
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separated from transportation and communications and became their own ministry; 
foreign trade and tourism were separated from industry to become MINCETUR; and 
industry was matched with fishing within a new Ministry of Production. In the case of 
social programs at the former Ministry of the Presidency, they were grouped under the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Social Development (MIMDES).  
 
Ministries, then, compose a heterogeneous group. This study analyzes reforms on the 
basis of policies observed in nine ministries in charge of sectoral policymaking. What are 
the key differences between them? A relatively widespread, though not quite “official,” 
classification divides Peruvian ministries into three categories related to the policy fields 
they attend: social, infrastructure and productive ministries. In this study, this type of 
classification is taken as an initial reference and modified on the basis of some major 
indicators, which roughly do justify grouping ministries in accordance to the policy fields 
they attend. The comparative data is shown on Table 4-A, and it considers total budgets, 
capital investments (generally higher in fields where the state still provides basic 
infrastructure) and expenditures in salaries and worker benefits (higher in social sector 
ministries with large service delivery sectors and correspondingly large payrolls) 
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Table 4-A: Comparative indicators of ministries in charge of sectoral decentralization 
Budget data from 2006, in millions of nuevos soles 
(3.2 nuevos soles=US$ 1) 
 
Ministry Total 
expenditures 
Capital 
investments 
Salaries and 
worker benefits 
Production 119 3.4 29 
Commerce & 
Tourism 171 25 7.3 
Energy and Mines 222 109 59 
Labor and 
Employment 
Promotion 
244 186* 17 
Housing, Const. & 
Sanitation 468 371 22 
Agriculture 842 423 66 
Transportation & 
Comm. 1299 828 87 
Health 2530 105 1054 
Education 3314 69 1700 
* Most of this amount is actually directed to temporary employment programs. 
Source: Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera (SIAF) data base at the Ministerio de Economía y 
Finanzas website (http://www.mef.gob.pe) 
 
A first group corresponds to the ministries in charge of sectors where the state chiefly 
plays a promotional role (the former “productive” sectors of the state). This includes 
sectors that were affected by neoliberal, privatizing reforms in the early 1990s; some of 
their activities were also deconcentrated through regionalization in the late 1980s. In the 
two most characteristic promotional sector ministries, the state plays a mostly regulatory 
and advisory role vis-à-vis the private sector, and these agencies have small 
bureaucracies, small investments, and small budgets. These are the Ministry of 
Production (PRODUCE, which comprises the Industry and the Fishing vice-ministries), 
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR, which includes the Trade 
and the Tourism vice-ministries). 
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Two other ministries also fall in the promotional category, though less clearly. The 
Ministry of Energy and Mining, shares fundamental characteristics of these: on the 
mining side, it is a fundamentally regulatory entity, but on the energy side it is in charge 
of a significant infrastructure program of rural electrification. However, the ministry’s 
overall size and its infrastructure component are significantly smaller than ministries of 
agriculture, housing or transportation (see description below). A fourth promotional 
agency, the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion (MTPE), is also somewhat of 
a hybrid, of the social (see description below) and, more predominantly, the promotional 
ministry categories. On one hand, the bulk of the organization is chiefly concerned to 
regulatory and promotional issues in labor practices, small and micro-enterprises, and 
employment generation. However, MTPE has a significant budget component that falls 
under the “capital investment” category but is actually constituted by temporary 
employment programs that directly benefit thousands of people. 
 
A second group of agencies includes what can be called the infrastructure sector 
ministries, where the state tends to make significant investments (over half of their annual 
budgets) in public infrastructure but without a service delivery sector that directly serves 
communities. Three ministries are thus characterized by relatively large budgets and 
medium to small bureaucracy: Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications (MTC), and the Ministry of Housing, Construction 
and Sanitation (VIVIENDA). As mentioned above, the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
shares some characteristics of ministries in this group. 
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Finally, a third group consists of the ministries in charge of the social sectors. In 
providing education and health the state runs large, intricate service delivery systems that 
directly attend beneficiaries throughout the country. Large budgets and a large 
bureaucracy, yet relatively small investments, characterize the ministries in charge of 
these sectors. Beyond the technical complexity of implementing reforms in education and 
health, reforms in these two sectors face important political challenges, as worker unions 
are relatively powerful stakeholders even at the subnational levels.  
 
Bureaucratic politics and the stalling of administrative transfers 
The transfer process as a whole has been subject to some critical assessments (Azpur, 
2004; SNV/PNUD, 2006; Propuesta Ciudadana, 2004), although administrative 
decentralization in particular sectors has not been the focus of analyses of progress in 
Peruvian state decentralization. There is a prevailing negative view of the outcome of the 
overall transfer process until 2006, where: 
… gradualness has become a virtual stalling, not only because of the absence of 
political will but also because of the lack of a strategic project of the decentralized 
state that would be constructed. (Azpur, 2005, p. 6, author’s translation) 
  
In 2006, three years after administrative decentralization began, subnational governments 
had seen some formal changes but still did not possess the authority and resources to 
implement development policies within their territories. Especially after 2003, regional 
governments have been the main beneficiaries of administrative transfers (a total of 122 
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new “functions”), and yet they still do not have additional means to design and 
implement sectoral policies at the regional level. 
 
The case for calculated self-interest of bureaucrats determining decentralization policies 
is quite strong if one looks at the aggregate of all transfers (and their real impact) as the 
outcome to be explained. Looking, first, at the predominant role of ministries in defining 
sectoral policies since 2003 and, second, at the lack of meaningful sectoral transfers in 
the period 2003-2006 as a whole, it is difficult not to point at a lack of political will to 
give up power of sectoral policymakers as a fundamental determinant of this outcome.  
 
First, however, it is important to note that there is good reason to assume that those that 
have a stake in the delegation of authority and functions (rather than, for instance, 
external technocrats) can, indeed, influence the design of sectoral policies. In each 
ministry, there is by law a decentralization committee, Comisión de Transferencias, 
which defines competences and functions to be transferred and is presided by a vice-
minister and generally includes various heads of direcciones nacionales and autonomous 
programs within a ministry. Thus, sectoral policies presented to CND can consistently 
reflect interests of policymakers that are part of a ministry’s permanent decision-making 
hierarchy, and who are therefore real stakeholders in any structural reform of an 
organization; in other words, these are decision-makers who stand to “lose” power.  
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According to a bureaucratic politics perspective (see Chapter 2), bureaucrats are political 
actors who are often engaged in conflictual interaction with other agencies. Each 
agency’s objectives are basically linked to survival and growth of the organization, in 
terms of such things as budget allocation and autonomy. In this case, central government 
agencies (ministries) are required by law to initiate the decentralization of the sectors 
under their authority, which (in the case of a real transfer of decision-making power) 
would indeed entail threats to ministries’ budgets and autonomy. However, no significant 
conflict with other agencies outside ministries has ensued as a result of resistance to 
reform, because ministries have been left with virtually free rein in deciding how to 
decentralize their functions. The agency leading the process (CND) is not in a position to 
pressure ministries into making more significant changes, and neither are subnational 
governments, who have no other institutional channels to negotiate or press for particular 
resources. 
 
Some of the main evidence that supports this view has already been briefly mentioned 
when describing the beginning of implementation. First, while thousands of millions have 
been transferred in relation to specific programs and projects, there have been no 
significant budget transfers, in any of these nine ministries, that are directly linked to the 
annual sectoral transfers between 2004-2006 (CND, 2006; Propuesta Ciudadana, 2006). 
This lack of resources transferred in order to help subnational governments effectively 
execute their new functional responsibilities will be substantiated in the individual 
analyses of sectoral policies in the following chapters. 
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How do ministry officials justify not transferring additional financial resources? During 
interviews in PRODUCE and MINCETUR ministries—both of which had completed all 
or most planned transfers by 2006—officials stated that they could only make sure that 
authorities are formally transferred, but any financial resource transfers should be 
negotiated between subnational governments and the finance ministry, MEF.27 Two 
general views shared by interviewees on this issue could be boiled down to: “It is hard 
enough for us to negotiate budgets on a regular basis with MEF” and “Regional 
governments have had an unreasonable expectation that new functions would come hand 
in hand with new resources.” 
 
However, in many cases the competences transferred do suggest a need for additional 
resources at the regional level while, at the same time, real decision-making power is 
absent28 (Azpur, 2006). For example, in the case of PRODUCE and the industry sub 
sector that it is in charge of, decentralization mainly implies that regional governments 
become responsible for supervising, within each region, compliance with technical norms 
in private industry (regarding the use of chemicals, some environmental standards, etc.). 
Unlike the case of deconcentrated entities, regional governments may be formally 
autonomous but are subject to fines if they do not adequately report these activities. It is 
evident that adequately supervising a relatively high number of businesses within each 
                                                 
27 Betty Contreras interview, 2004; Manuel Álvarez interview, 2004 
28 This was mentioned in several interviews, including those with Javier Abugattás, Eduardo Sáenz and 
Luis Thais. 
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region requires dedicated resources that are different from those responsible for 
formulating a regional industrial policy, which is also now a responsibility of regional 
governments that previously did not exist at a deconcentrated CTAR. In any case, 
regional policymakers are not authorized to truly regulate industries or to formulate 
technical standards; these activities are to remain at the central level.  
 
Of course, the BLD does mention that the resources necessary to effectively carry out 
new responsibilities should be included with transfers (not just financial resources but 
also any necessary additional human resources and official documentation). However, 
there are no details in the framework regarding how this is to be achieved, even though 
ministries are ultimately responsible for formulating transfers that effectively increase the 
policymaking authority of subnational governments.  
 
Even in larger ministries, there is a prevalent view that implementing the transfer of 
functions does not require them to ensure that the necessary budgetary resources to 
execute these functions are transferred to regions.29 In the Ministry of Transportation 
(MTC), the view among policymakers is that subnational governments that are 
responsible for policies regarding roads within their jurisdiction should not expect 
additional budget resources but, rather, should be willing to devote resources that they 
receive through other mechanisms like the natural resource shared revenues (canon).30 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, these resources are not channeled to regions by 
                                                 
29 Luis García-Corrochano interview, 2006. 
30 García-Corrochano interview. 
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criteria of need in any specific policy sector, and they are quite inequitably distributed, 
with some resource-rich regions receiving the bulk of transfers: 71% of the largest such 
transfers, mining revenue transfers (canon), went to just five regions in 2008 (MEF, 
2008). This is illustrated in Table 4-B, which excludes three regions that received no 
resources from this shared revenue source. Moreover, the surge in these revenues is not 
sustainable in the medium or long term, as it is dependent on international commodity 
prices. Real fiscal decentralization, on the other hand, would be a more reasonable 
substitute if additional resources from central government budgets are truly not available 
or if what is available insufficient for subnational objectives, but the capacity of regional 
governments to introduce new taxes does not exist currently. 
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Table 4-B: Shared mining revenues transferred to regional governments in 2008 (nuevos 
soles) 
 
Regional government Nuevos soles 
transferred 
% of total % pop. 
under 
poverty 
line 
GR CALLAO 471.68 0.00004% n/a 
GR PIURA 2,401.82 0.00022% 63 
GR AMAZONAS 4,488.40 0.00040% 75 
GR MADRE DE DIOS 11,949.38 0.00108% 37 
GR SAN MARTIN 119,552.88 0.01078% 67 
GR HUANUCO 1,932,144.25 0.17424% 66 
METRO. LIMA 3,207,877.66 0.28928% n/a 
GR APURIMAC 5,636,224.40 0.50826% 78 
GR AYACUCHO 10,640,734.69 0.95956% 72 
GR HUANCAVELICA 11,697,472.96 1.05485% 88 
GR ICA 17,163,035.44 1.54773% 41 
GR JUNIN 30,807,468.85 2.77815% 58 
GR LIMA 41,606,663.88 3.75200% 36 
GR PUNO 43,023,170.18 3.87974% 78 
GR CAJAMARCA 45,837,206.77 4.13350% 77 
GR MOQUEGUA 52,961,183.74 4.77593% 29 
GR CUSCO 60,601,615.13 5.46493% 75 
GR LA LIBERTAD 66,199,758.05 5.96976% 52 
GR PASCO 95,326,935.08 8.59639% 66 
GR AREQUIPA 114,365,104.64 10.31321% 39 
GR TACNA 177,899,102.31 16.04257% 32 
GR ANCASH 329,874,076.36 29.74737% 58 
Total 1,108,918,638.55 1.00  
 
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas database at: www.mef.gob.pe, and Participa Peru at: 
http://www.participaperu.org.pe.  
 
The new transfers of authority have not only come without new funds, but also without 
new human or technical resources, with the exception of some cases of limited, general 
capacity building that have been implemented by CND, MIMDES or MEF. The general 
justification for this lack of additional non-financial resources is that the autonomous 
regional governments received the resources of the CTAR agencies that already held 
deconcentrated functions. Indeed, in the case of the promotional ministries, personnel and 
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physical infrastructure were already deconcentrated in the 1980s, and this is seen as a 
relevant development for the current transfers. In both the MINCETUR and PRODUCE 
ministries, officials readily acknowledge that decentralization has largely consisted of 
formalizing activities that were already being carried out at the regional level, albeit in a 
deconcentrated manner within their ministerial hierarchy.31 There is no clear recognition 
that regional governments, as agencies leading regional development, require additional 
resources than those of deconcentrated agencies with little policymaking autonomy. In 
some ministries, the only tangible things formally transferred have been stocks of official 
documents.32  
 
In contrast to this relative lack of interest in ensuring additional resources for effectively 
carrying out new responsibilities, the ministries, through CND, often set unreasonable 
accreditation standards for regional governments. Where regional governments only have 
four gerencias regionales that should handle more than twice as many policy sectors, 
each ministry can (and often does) require proof of human and technical resources 
dedicated exclusively to its activities as a requisite for accreditation. This can be 
unviable: For example, even for a well-run government in a relatively prosperous region 
like Lambayeque, it was impossible to fulfill the health sector’s initial requirement of a 
vehicle, independent telephone system, and computers for health activities; the entire 
social policy department, inherited from the CTAR era, barely had these resources for all 
of its activities, and the entire regional government installations were served by a single 
                                                 
31 Betty Contreras interview, 2005, and Carlos Ferraro interview, 2005 
32 Interview with MINCETUR official Betty Contreras, 2005. 
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central telephone system. In the case of the industry sector, one of the original 
requirements for supervision activities—which was eventually changed—called for 
regional governments to have night-vision equipment that even the central office in Lima 
cannot afford.33 
 
Accreditation requirements have been a significant obstacle to more rapid administrative 
decentralization. In addition to the particular standards set by ministries, CND has a list 
of requirements that regional governments must fulfill in order to be eligible for transfers. 
As previously mentioned, only one regional government was certified for all the transfers 
that were offered up to 2006. Of the functions included in the 2004 plan, regional 
governments did not fulfill requirements for over one fourth (27%), and in the 2005 plan 
this figure rose to 37%. 
 
Demanding accreditation requirements, however, should not be seen necessarily as a 
gratuitous obstacle to decentralization. Within central government agencies they are 
justified by a widespread perception, shared by many civil society observers, of a 
significant lack of policymaking capacity and experience in subnational institutions. In 
most ministries the perception, which from their perspective justifies holding back on 
certain transfers, is that regional governments are simply not ready to assume certain new 
responsibilities without negatively affecting overall performance of national systems. In 
PRODUCE, for instance, the national director of the industry sub sector saw himself as 
                                                 
33 Eduardo Sáenz interview, 2006. 
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being responsible for ultimately deciding what functions could be transferred, and found 
that, while regional governments could assume supervision, data gathering and 
enforcement of technical standards for industry (which were set in the capital), they could 
not be trusted to appropriately analyze the information gathered on regional industries, so 
this would have to continue at the central level for the foreseeable future.34 In education, 
as well, the view from academia and civil society often coincided with the Ministry of 
Education perspective that regional government staff still lack the technical expertise to 
assume greater responsibilities in such a complex sector.35 
 
However, even if ministry officials have some basis to assume that subnational actors 
must first be properly qualified to receive greater responsibilities and resources, their 
overall policies do not seem to reflect a preoccupation with ensuring the performance of 
policymaking systems. Requirements for accreditation may have often been stringent, but 
there have been no complementary initiatives from ministries (Health has been cited as 
the exception) for providing or even assessing needs for capacity building, additional 
human and technical resources or, especially, financial resources to help overcome 
limitations.  
 
Even though officials involved in administrative decentralization do not directly describe 
their organization’s policies as the result of unwillingness to give up valued resources and 
authority, resistance to decentralization is not always a hidden or implied factor behind 
                                                 
34 Carlos Ferraro interview, 2005. 
35 Jorge Capella interview, 2005. 
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unsatisfactory progress. In fact, several interviewees have identified particular areas 
within their own ministries, or in other agencies, that generally resist decentralization 
simply for fear of losing jobs, funding or political clout. Some examples are listed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
As mentioned, there often are units within ministries that have enjoyed considerable 
autonomy. A good case is in the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), which even other 
ministries consider an example of particular organizational complexity. In addition to the 
regular ministry hierarchy and regional offices, this ministry must oversee the 
decentralization of four autonomous agencies (Organismos Publicos Descentralizados, 
OPD) and six national programs and projects, all of which are have their own budgets 
and most of which have separate regional offices throughout the country. According to an 
official at the MINAG unit that coordinates decentralization, in all these agencies there is 
resistance because of fear of being transformed by the process and thus losing jobs, 
influence and resources that they have enjoyed for many years.36 
 
Another example is within PRODUCE, which had formally completed most of its 
transfers by 2006: there is a perception internally that officials in the fishing vice-
ministry (one of two in PRODUCE) tend to be inherently reluctant to give up control, 
despite being a sector where supervision of relevant activities is more straightforward 
                                                 
36 Carlos Izaguirre interview, 2006. 
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than in the industry sector (the other sector under this ministry). They were described as 
traditionally being “controlistas.”37 
 
In the Ministry of Housing (VIVIENDA), meanwhile, resistance to give up authority and 
money in some areas was of a slightly different nature. Former minister Rudecindo Vega 
recognized that it was understood that, because of their potential political value to the 
presidency, several programs under his ministry’s authority simply were not to be 
decentralized, including INFES, which had been a large program in charge of educational 
infrastructure at the Ministry of the Presidency during the Fujimori years, and INADE, in 
charge of several infrastructure projects, some of which were transferred individually in 
2003.38 
 
The powerful position of ministries vis-à-vis the key agency in charge of conducting and 
supervising administrative decentralization (CND) has determined that ministerial 
policymakers have been able to effectively implement several mechanisms in order to 
resist decentralization. For the cases of transfers that were determined in the initial 
framework for reform, these have included unfunded mandates (like transferring 
responsibilities for planning or supervising certain activities without providing necessary 
resources to regions that do not enjoy national economies of scale) and simply 
formalizing what had already been taking place in regions, albeit within a logic of 
deconcentration rather than delegation. For the case of transfers not contemplated in the 
                                                 
37 Manuel Álvarez interview, 2006; Carlos Ferraro interview, 2006. 
38 Rudecindo Vega interview, 2006. 
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initial framework, ministries have been able to simply exclude certain functions or 
programs form annual transfer plans; this can effective as beneficiaries are not able to 
effectively challenge such proposals. 
 
Does bureaucratic politics tell the whole story? 
The first part of this chapter told the story of how ministries came to be the predominant 
actors in implementing administrative decentralization in Peru. Key factors behind this 
predominance of bureaucratic actors in shaping decentralization at this stage include the 
lack of detailed guidelines for sectoral reform in the initial framework (as the literature on 
implementation would have predicted), as well as the effective weakness of the 
institutional framework for supervising reform that was put into place. 
 
At an aggregate level, the key results of administrative decentralization between 2003-
2006 (principally: a third of planned transfers were not carried out, no evidence of 
significant additional resources being assigned for each region to fulfill new duties at 
least as effectively as central government) can be accounted for quite well through the 
political lenses of bureaucratic politics, and knowing the leading role of bureaucratic 
actors in charge of decentralizing policy sectors under their control. Unwilling to give up 
authority or resources currently enjoyed at the central level, ministries have had the 
power to initiate meaningful reforms but actual transfers have been slow and incomplete, 
while no consistent efforts have been made to ensure appropriate resources for carrying 
out new subnational functions; the accreditation system is readily seen as an instrument 
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that can be used to impose unreasonable conditions and delay reforms. Entire programs 
and projects may have been transferred, but no financial or other resources have come 
that would facilitate the roles of regional policymakers so that they may be better able to 
incorporate those new resources into regional development strategies. 
 
Does an approach inspired by bureaucratic politics (BP), then, tell the whole story? It 
certainly can provide a quick account of the main, aggregated outcomes of administrative 
decentralization. However, as we have seen, Peruvian ministries are heterogeneous in 
terms of their general role in public policymaking and the economy, their sheer size in 
human and financial terms, and the characteristics of their service delivery systems. 
Would calculated self-interest produce similar transfer policies and approaches across the 
board? While it is clear that general reaction to reform efforts will vary in different 
scenarios and some models of these have been described (for example, in Thomas and 
Grindle, 1990), a careful review of the decentralization and institutional reform literatures 
yielded no readily applicable model of how bureaucratic politics, or resistance in general, 
can vary in its magnitude or consequences across different agencies in the context of 
implementation, in the particular context of decentralization. However, the factors that 
are crucial to an agency’s power and status (budgets, discretion over the use of funds, 
control over non-financial resources) do vary significantly in different types of ministries, 
and this suggests that, despite the apparent overall success in resisting reform, the 
effectiveness of instruments to resist reform should vary by ministry. Moreover, while 
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accountability mechanisms aimed at ministries are weak overall, ministries could 
conceivably have varying degrees of capacity to escape such mechanisms.  
 
The size and the nature of the authorities and resources at stake in decentralization, as 
well as the level of discretion over the use of such resources, appear as the best available 
factors that could conceivably predict variation in the approaches to the transfer of 
functions. Some conditions for administrative decentralization, of course, are similar in 
all cases: for example, initiating changes in budget allocation, to the benefit of 
subnational agencies, would similarly involve negotiations with the powerful MEF, 
which ministries in general tend to avoid when possible. In all cases, too, transferring 
personnel or other resources would involve administrative paperwork that may be time-
consuming and unattractive, although this would be a far more forbidding task for a large, 
intricate bureaucracy. 
 
In any case, decentralization directly challenges the position of power of decision-makers 
in national ministries, even if their situations and what is at stake will vary. In light of 
this, resistance would be expected in all ministries, even among decision-makers in 
promotional ministries that control small, deconcentrated bureaucracies as well as 
budgets that were reduced to near-minimal proportions years ago. Moreover, although 
they can make important decisions affecting businesses and other actors, they do not 
make many decisions directly involving the use of large sums of money or over coveted 
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investment projects; their positions are not quite the most visible or most politically 
attractive, either for policymakers themselves or for political actors outside the ministry. 
 
While few signs of a real will to decentralize should be expected in promotional 
ministries, a BP-type perspective would lead us to consider any concession to 
decentralization even less likely in other types of ministries, infrastructure and social, 
where there is control over larger resources and influence that could be coveted by other 
political actors; after all, BP focuses on inter-agency conflict and negotiation as 
determining policy outcomes. In infrastructure ministries, budgets are large and many 
decisions are made about the use of large sums of money and about characteristics of 
infrastructure and other investment projects. Bureaucracies are relatively small, yet these 
positions are arguably more politically attractive than those in promotional ministries; 
because of this, we would expect them to be even more carefully guarded. Still, it should 
be remembered that most decisions regarding budgets and investments face tight control 
by MEF officials and guidelines, so discretion is limited. 
 
Finally, the ministries in charge of social sectors control very large payrolls and complex 
service delivery systems. These ministries have had centralized bureaucracies for many 
decades and decision-makers here have authority over services that reach a large part of 
the population, and their regional and local offices can be relatively powerful 
bureaucratic actors. Because of the size and complexity of such delivery systems, there 
are many vested interests and stakeholders in any changes in these ministries, from 
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teachers’ unions to deconcentrated agencies throughout the country. With many actors 
with potentially conflicting interests, any changes by top policymakers could alter 
delicate balances of power in unpredictable ways. Indeed, international experience has 
shown that attempting any structural changes in these sectors of government is 
particularly challenging because “of formidable political obstacles as well as technical 
and financial reasons” (Nelson, 1999, p. 92). 
 
Thus, even though we propose that a BP-type approach leads us to expect resistance in 
any sector facing decentralization, if bureaucratic self-interest should translate into 
different decentralization policies by sectors, it would be reasonable to expect 
decentralization initiatives to make the least headway in social ministries, followed 
closely by infrastructure ministries and, finally, in promotional ministries.  
 
Does a closer look at individual ministries reveal differences between types of ministries 
that can be accounted for by the differences in the resources and authorities at stake? The 
next chapter features sections that will each briefly describe, from a bureaucratic politics 
perspective, the transfer policies of three ministries, each one belonging to one of the 
three distinct categories, to determine how well this approach accounts for observed 
policies. In contrast to the apparently intuitive BP-type account of the overall results of 
administrative decentralization, when looking at individual cases self-interest appears to 
have more limited potential to explain variation in sectoral decentralization policies. 
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Chapter 5 - Bureaucratic politics and sectoral implementation: A look 
at individual ministries 
 
This chapter builds on the main insights of the previous one by examining policymaking 
in individual ministries, thus continuing to address the question of whether the challenges 
to administrative decentralization were uniquely the result of expected resistance to 
reform at the ministry level—as the bureaucratic politics literature would suggest—or if 
other factors were also significant. It seeks to understand to what extent such an approach 
can provide a robust understanding of the dynamics of reform in Peru, and it does so by 
succinctly examining, from a bureaucratic politics perspective, the transfer policies of 
three ministries—each one belonging to one of the three distinct categories of 
ministries—to determine how well this approach accounts for observed policies. 
  
Bureaucratic politics and decentralization in a promotional ministry: MINCETUR 
The ministry of foreign trade and tourism (MINCETUR) is a small agency—the smallest 
within the group we have defined as promotional ministries—that was the first (and only) 
ministry to formally complete all planned transfers of functions by 2006. The policy 
sectors it has national authority over are international commerce and tourism, where the 
latter includes artesanía, a sub sector in charge of traditional cottage industries, seen as 
intimately linked with tourism, for which several specific functions are defined.  
 
In its current form, MINCETUR only began to exist in 2002 during the Toledo 
administration, when its two vice-ministries were removed from a larger ministry 
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(MITINCI) that also included the industry sector and fused into its current organization. 
Among its responsibilities in the commerce and international trade policy area are export 
promotion and international trade negotiations (in coordination with MEF and the 
Ministry of International Relations), and regulation of foreign trade. In the tourism side, it 
promotes and regulates activities related to tourism, including the promotion and 
regulation of cottage industries related to traditional production and tourism (artesanía). 
 
According to the legal framework, MINCETUR has exclusive and shared functions in the 
areas outlined above (CND, 2006a).  The LRG lists 35 specific functions that regional 
governments should carry out, in accordance to national policies, in the sectors under 
MINCETUR authority. These include functions in commerce, tourism, and artesanía, the 
latter basically referring to cottage industries in the small-scale production of traditional 
items that include jewelry, pottery and similar goods. In commerce, the number of 
responsibilities mapped out is the smallest and yet these are quite broad-ranging, 
including: regional trade policies, policies for enhancing competitiveness through 
capacity-building and technology transfer, development of export capacities and 
promoting regional exports, identification of trade opportunities and opportunities for 
private investment in regional projects, and providing a number of services for businesses 
oriented towards commercial and export activities.  
 
In tourism and artesanía, regional planning and policymaking functions analogous to 
those mapped out for commerce are described, although supervisory and regulatory 
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activities are also laid out and many other, even more specific ones are added. For 
example, in tourism there are specific mandates to coordinate policies with local 
governments, to keep an updated regional directory of tourist service providers, to protect 
and assist tourists, and to look after environmental compliance in tourist areas. Regional 
governments may also enter into cooperation agreements with international private and 
public institutions. In artesanía, the regional functions include several that are in essence 
policies for supporting and strengthening small enterprises: promoting formalization, 
private investment, technology transfer and capacity building among artisans (CND, 
2006a). 
 
All 35 specific functions identified in the LRG were formally transferred to all but one 
regional government beginning in 2004 and all transfers initiated then were concluded by 
2006. What did this apparently impressive achievement really imply in practice? First, it 
should be understood during this period it was CND that coordinated directly with 
regional governments, not MINCETUR.39 Each vice-ministry independently determined 
what transfers of functions it would offer regional governments and, as of mid 2005, 
there were no short or medium-term plans to make transfers to local governments or 
establish coordination mechanisms with them (even though tourism functions are also 
shared by local governments, according to the BLD).  
 
                                                 
39 Contreras interview, 2005. 
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Regional governments had a very brief time period to fulfill the accreditation 
requirements set by MINCETUR. Because of delays in implementing the accreditation 
system, transfers were only begun effectively in May 2005, even though the 2004 transfer 
plan was supposed to be concluded by late July 2005. Despite the start of sectoral 
transfers, by mid-2005 several regions had not yet been generally accredited for 
beginning any transfers by central government (CND) so they were not even considered 
for specific sectoral accreditation when transfer began. At first, then, 19 regions were 
considered for sectoral accreditation and the remaining six were considered slightly later. 
Even though all regions eventually complied with requirements, by June 2005 only one 
regional government, Cajamarca, had been accredited for all sectoral functions, which 
basically consisted of verifying that regional governments had the “necessary logistics 
and space.”40 In other words, the actual accreditation process was completed in a rushed 
manner and within a very short time period in mid 2005 for 25 regional agencies, yet 
even in this context MINCETUR’s requirements presented some significant challenges 
for the accreditation of regional governments. 
 
In light of the delays—mentioned in the paragraphs above—in implementing the 
accreditation system and difficulties in the actual accreditation of regional governments, 
MINCETUR officials were “anxious” to finish the transfer process but were not able to 
complete it as rapidly as they wished. Indeed, a careful inventory had been made of all 
things to be transferred before the beginning of the process. However, even as 
                                                 
40 Contreras interview, 2005. 
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accreditation began, in the case of commerce functions, their content and implications 
were “still not clear,” as they were last to be proposed.41 This is not surprising, since the 
commerce functions laid out in the LRG not only relate to MINCETUR’s international 
trade policy authority but also to the promotion, supervision and regulation of 
commercial activities, which involve other agencies like MEF, the Ministry of 
Production, the tax authority, and others. 
 
In general, these transfers effectively implied that regulatory authority and normative 
aspects would remain at the central level, as was confirmed by an official in charge of 
coordinating decentralization activities. More crucially, the transfer of personnel and 
other physical assets from Lima to the regions was ruled out because, in their view, in the 
late 1980s regional governments (and later CTAR) had received human resources and 
physical assets from Lima, and thus the necessary deconcentration had already taken 
place.  
 
Therefore, what was left for transfer was basically just a formalization of regional 
governments taking over formally deconcentrated activities, and the additional physical 
transfer of stocks of official documents related to these “new” functions. The exception to 
these criteria was the case of the Lima metropolitan government and the Callao regional 
government, which were “more complicated,” because there it was still necessary to 
                                                 
41 Contreras interview, 2005. 
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transfer personnel, budgets and documents from central offices (Contreras interview, 
2006). As late as 2008, this had not been implemented. 
 
There is one apparent exception to these unfunded mandates in the sectors under 
MINCETUR authority and it is part of the COPESCO national program that is in charge 
of renovating and maintaining some important tourist sites. According to CND 
documents and MINCETUR officials, the authority and funds for the department of 
Cuzco were transferred to the Cuzco regional government and implied some 7 million 
soles in budget resources in the years 2004 and 2005. However, this is not a real 
delegation of policymaking authority, as even in 2007 all COPESCO activities continued 
to be coordinated from Lima. 
 
If regional governments were to ask MINCETUR for additional resources for carrying 
out the functions transferred, the decentralization officer considered that there was is not 
much that could be done, as “MINCETUR tries to collaborate in what it can do despite 
the budget rigidities.”42 
 
MINCETUR appears as a case where there is little evidence of a will to work towards 
decentralized governance of the sectors under its authority. Its publicly available plans 
and strategies (most notably its 2007-2011 Strategic Plan, MINCETUR, 2006) still make 
little or no mention of regional policies, regional capacity building, or necessary 
                                                 
42 Contreras interview, 2005. 
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coordination with regional governments (let alone local governments) in tourism, cottage 
industry or foreign trade policy and promotion. With the exception of promoting the 
design of regional export plans (16 were completed by 2006), the focus of MINCETUR’s 
efforts aimed at regional governments has been on rapidly fulfilling the formalities of 
administrative decentralization, without a real assessment of regional capacities and 
needs, and, thus, without proposing any transfer of financial resources or capacity 
building activities. Moreover, it set accreditation standards that were not insignificant for 
transferring functions that were already carried out at a regional level by dependent 
agencies since the early 1990s and which, if they had been consistent with their reasoning 
about the lack of need for additional human resources and funds, should not have 
required verification by a third party. 
 
This focus on fulfilling formalities and avoiding the transfer of human or financial 
resources is not unique to MINCETUR. PRODUCE, another small promotional ministry, 
also shows some of these features, as will be later discussed. In general, then, 
MINCETUR’s approach to decentralization can be quite readily understood through 
bureaucratic politics lenses: it has shown a will to implement administrative 
decentralization in name only, rushing through formal steps without taking measures to 
truly empower subnational actors. 
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Bureaucratic politics and decentralization in an infrastructure ministry: VIVIENDA 
The Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation (VIVIENDA) is one of the 
infrastructure ministries, and, like MINCETUR, also assumed its current structure in 
2002, as a new ministry was created on the basis of two vice-ministries from the Ministry 
of Transportation. These two vice-ministries (Housing and Urban Policy, Construction 
and Sanitation) brought with them, in addition to their regular structure of national 
offices, a number of special autonomous programs and projects. Moreover, VIVIENDA 
received significant projects from the Ministry of the Presidency, including large 
infrastructure projects under the previously described INADE program and educational 
and health infrastructure under INFES (CND, 2006b). 
 
Because of the number of autonomous agencies and funds, VIVIENDA is a ministry with 
a complex organizational structure and which carries out very different types of activities. 
Among other responsibilities, it regulates and promotes housing, urban policy, sanitation 
and construction; oversees or directly executes infrastructure projects; and administrates 
public funds for financing housing and construction for low-income sectors. Thus, the 
ministry’s policymaking outputs are heterogeneous, including sectoral norms, plans and 
programs; the formulation of legal agreements with public and private actors; promotion 
and dissemination of housing, urban policy, construction and environmental programs; 
the production of water for Lima through the autonomous agency SEDAPAL; the 
appraisal of real estate; and construction technology research (VIVIENDA, 2007).  
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The LRG lists eight specific functions of regional governments in the housing and 
sanitation sectors, and these are quite general as well as comprising aspects of urban 
policy and construction. What is most striking is that these seem to suggest a role for 
regional agencies as supporting rather than coordinating or supervising local 
governments. For instance, regional governments are to “support local governments 
technically and financially in the provision of sanitation services” and to “assume the 
execution of housing and sanitation programs at the request of local governments.” Not 
surprisingly, then, the LMG outlines shared and exclusive functions of municipal 
governments in housing, urban development, sanitation and construction policies that do 
not seem to require a strong regional coordinating component (CND, 2006a). 
 
These eight functions of regional governments in sectors under VIVIENDA were among 
the 185 functions that were to be formally transferred during the Toledo administration. 
By 2006, none was transferred or in the process of being transferred. As has been 
mentioned, sectoral transfers to local governments were not considered for this period. 
 
In contrast, several projects and programs that were briefly under VIVIENDA were 
transferred early on, including nine large irrigation infrastructure projects in INADE that 
went to regional governments (2003-2005) and 29 smaller, post-earthquake 
reconstruction projects under ORDESUR that went to provincial municipalities in the 
south of the country as the agency itself was dissolved (2003). Many other projects in 
INADE, however, were not transferred, including several large projects that were 
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physically located in more than one region. INADE itself would later be transferred to the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Another unit that was formerly in the Ministry of the Presidency, 
the INFES agency for social infrastructure, was eventually transferred to the Ministry of 
Education rather than to subnational governments. 
 
Of course, even the projects that were effectively transferred were not part of a strategy 
designed by the ministry or vice-ministry policymakers but, rather, were already being 
conceived as the agency was being created in 2002. This lack of even formal progress in 
sectoral transfers and the partial progress in transferring programs and projects seem, at 
first glance, evidence of great bureaucratic resistance to decentralization. 
 
On the other hand, VIVIENDA’s medium term national housing strategy for 2003-2007 
(VIVIENDA, 2003) was much more explicit than MINCETUR’s plans in presenting the 
strengthening of its sectors’ decentralized governance as an important objective. In 
describing actions in each of the four areas under its vice-ministries, there are mentions 
of the need to have a well-articulated national system that incorporates regional and local 
actors, while it recognizes the current predominance of local government in these 
activities. 
 
How much of VIVIENDA’s actual decentralization policy outcomes in 2003-2006 are 
clearly a result of political or bureaucratic resistance to restructuring? Rudecindo Vega, 
who was minister in the last years of the Toledo administration, admits that there were 
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some projects and agencies within his sector that were politically sensitive and it was 
understood that they were not to be transferred. In some cases, the terms of transfer could 
not be agreed upon: the agency SEDAPAL, which provides water to Lima (and thus to 
almost one third of the country’s population), had been requested by the Lima 
Metropolitan government; however, an attempt to reach a deal on its transfer could not be 
reached because Lima wanted complete control and not a partial transfer.43 In the case of 
the valuable remaining INADE infrastructure projects, there was, on one hand, pressure 
from above (from the presidency) not to give out the entire agency but only some 
individual projects.44 On the other hand, there was potential inter-regional conflict in 
defining how to transfer relatively large projects that were located in more than one 
region, and this was purposefully avoided. 
 
However, Vega offers a coherent account of why sectoral transfers to regional 
governments were not carried out, as they were in other ministries, and it is not related to 
power politics. Unlike other ministries, VIVIENDA did not have an established network 
of deconcentrated regional offices when it was created. Its two vice-ministries had 
previously been part of a larger ministry that retained its regional offices and 
infrastructure. Thus, when VIVIENDA was created, the ministry had to create a national 
system that could involve regional and local levels, so a national coordination agency was 
                                                 
43 Rudecindo Vega interview, 2006. 
44 Vega interview. 
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formed which, in turn, implemented 24 regional offices. These, in practice, generally 
only consisted of “one or two people and were barely equipped.”45 
 
Why was the presence of national housing, sanitation, urban policy and construction 
authorities virtually non-existent at the regional level up to 2002? The decentralization 
framework highlights the role of local governments in these fields because, to a large 
extent, it reflects how these policy sectors had evolved throughout the country. In fact, in 
the case of water and sanitation, the entire national provision system (SENAPA) was 
decentralized to local public providers in 1990, as part of the decentralization policies of 
the first Garcia administration. In construction and housing, also, in the 1990s the state 
had gone from centrally providing infrastructure to largely adopting a free-market 
approach where it mostly plays a regulatory and promotional role. In all these fields, local 
governments have, in the law and in practice, been the key actors in recent times (Vega 
interview, 2006). 
 
Thus, unlike the case of MINCETUR and PRODUCE, there was virtually nothing in 
terms of existing authorities or resources to formally transfer from deconcentrated 
instances to regional agencies. Former minister Vega, who has been known as an 
advocate of decentralization before and after his tenure at VIVIENDA, argues that there 
was not much he could do in this period aimed at strengthening regional governments 
because most sectoral functions were to fall under the authority of municipal 
                                                 
45 Vega interview, 2006. 
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governments and, more importantly, it would take time to develop a regional level of 
policymaking before there was anything that could be formally recognized or transferred. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that VIVIENDA controls several visible, relatively 
autonomous housing and construction financing programs that local authorities have 
often sought to control. Why were these not decentralized? According to Vega, there are 
some technical issues that need to be considered. MIVIVIENDA, for instance, is a fund 
that helps to subsidize and finance housing and construction at favorable rates. However, 
programs like MIVIVIENDA are significantly funded by international cooperation (for 
example, from the IDB) and also involve directly private sector actors who receive 
incentives from central government. Unlike administrative programs, transferring such 
public-private programs would, according to Vega, require that local governments 
assume loans or match large amounts of money; when ministry officials had to explain 
this to local officials, they generally lost interest in requesting the transfer of such 
programs. In many cases, international cooperation or private investors would likely not 
be willing to negotiate individually with hundreds of local actors. In other cases, like 
BANMAT (Banco de Materiales, which finances construction materials for low-income 
sectors), it would be impossible to establish effective local-level “mini-banks” without 
losing considerable economies of scale.  
 
Therefore, what at first might seem like a clear-cut case of unwillingness to give up 
power involves a more complex set of issues. When the framework for decentralization 
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was implemented, the policy sectors under VIVIENDA were functioning in ways that 
were not amenable to the relatively quick formalization of existing deconcentrated 
activities that was presented as decentralization in other sectors. A minister with 
relatively solid pro-decentralization credentials has provided reasonable arguments to the 
effect that it was beyond his or his predecessor’s possibilities to promptly start a 
decentralization of functions to the regional level, given the circumstances under which 
the ministry began its activities. Bureaucratic resistance to giving up power, however, is 
clearly a consideration in some other aspects, as we have seen. Nevertheless, ignoring the 
particular non-political dilemmas outlined in this section by seeing the unimpressive 
results of 2003-2006 only through a bureaucratic politics account would evidently lead us 
to ignore many valid and practical technical considerations that are necessary when 
reforming a relatively complex ministry. 
 
Bureaucratic politics and decentralization in a social ministry: MINEDU 
The Ministry of Education (MINEDU) is the largest, and one of the oldest, agencies in 
the Peruvian state. It is arguably the largest service provider in the country, as it provides 
85% of educational services in Peru and has over 320,000 workers in its payroll 
(MINEDU, 2007). While education at the primary and secondary levels is its primary 
policy field, MINEDU also has authority over national policies in higher education, 
scientific and technological research, culture, and sports and recreation. The latter, 
however, should be seen as rather marginal in practice to its key policy responsibilities 
considering the enormous scale of administrating public education services at the primary 
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and secondary levels; moreover, culture, sports and science and technology policies are 
more directly handled by small, autonomous agencies that are themselves under 
MINEDU authority. 
 
Some gradual reforms aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of public education 
in Peru (one of the worst in quality in Latin America according to several international 
evaluations) started in 1994, yet the education sector was also the subject of a failed 
attempt at institutional reform “from above” in 1993 that sought to more fully involve the 
private sector in all levels of educational services, among other objectives (Ortiz de 
Zevallos et al., 1999). Not long after this, however, MINEDU organization underwent 
some structural changes. As a result of policy reforms from within the ministry in the 
1990s, MINEDU activities were reorganized into its two current vice-ministries, one of 
which focuses on administrative matters (Viceministerio de Gestión Institucional) and 
another that handles matters related to educational practices and contents (Viceministerio 
de Gestión Pedagógica). 
  
The original state decentralization model, as reflected in the BLD, contemplated reforms 
in the education as part of a fourth and last stage of administrative transfers. However, in 
practice, political pressure in late 2002 to begin transfers as soon as possible led to the 
LRG establishing that all sectoral transfers should begin concurrently. In the LRG, 
regional governments are assigned 21 specific functions within the policy sectors under 
MINEDU authority, which, as in other cases, describe competences and functions with 
 171
rather unequal levels of specificity. These include all stages of policymaking regarding 
regional policies in the areas outlined above, supervising and evaluating education 
services provided by local governments, and participating directly in the execution of 
some education programs, such as literacy programs. In addition, these functions include 
roles in higher education at a regional level and in capacity building of local educational 
agencies. An extensive involvement of regional governments in providing, supervising 
and coordinating education services is thus established in the LRG (CND, 2006a). 
 
On the other hand, the LMG states that local governments are to become responsible for 
providing local services in education, culture, sports and recreation, while 20 specific 
competences and functions (shared with central and regional government) are listed. 
These include not only the supervision and coordination of education services within 
their jurisdiction but also the formulation of local education plans and the inclusion of 
locally relevant contents in education services. While several of these provisions do 
imply instances where coordination with regional and central government would be 
necessary, in others one can see a fundamentally local dimension of policymaking, such 
as the construction of playgrounds and other public paces, as well as promoting citizen 
participation in a local educational council (CND, 2006a). 
 
Therefore, although leaving much to interpretation of implementers, the decentralization 
framework lays out intensive, and coordinated, roles of autonomous regional and local 
governments in providing and supervising education and related services that are 
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regulated by MINEDU. On the basis of the decentralization framework, CND considered 
that, beginning in 2004, there were a total of 21 sectoral transfers to be made to regional 
governments, and 19 each to province and district level municipalities.  
 
However, MINEDU did not propose to begin even formal transfers of deconcentrated 
regional activities until 2005, and none of these transfers were underway until mid-2006 
(the end of the Toledo administration), when the 2006 annual transfer plan began to be 
implemented; it included only five transfers to regional governments and none to local 
ones (Participa Perú, 2006; CND, 2006). In contrast, the Ministry of Health had already 
completed a number of transfers by 2005. 
 
According to the leading decentralization watchdog organization, by the end of 2005, 
advances in education decentralization had been “practically nil.” (Grupo Propuesta 
Ciudadana, 2007) Why was the beginning of transfers held back in MINEDU? Political 
resistance to change is a factor that is often discussed in education reform, and this has 
certainly been the case in many situations in Peru. A former education vice-minister 
considers that there is inherent resistance in the Executive to both “nominal” transfers 
and real transfers of power and capacity building strategies in education (Iguíñiz, 2007). 
One factor explaining reluctance to implement changes in education is a well-organized 
and strongly politicized workers union (SUTEP), which has actively opposed reforms 
that give greater power to local governments and, as in the derailed 1993 education 
reform under Fujimori, has framed such efforts as threats to the employment stability of 
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education workers (Ortiz de Zevallos et al, 1999). Moreover, this union is still considered 
to be well organized at the regional level and ready to challenge initiatives by relatively 
weak regional policymakers.46 Thus, there is a fear that regional policymakers, with only 
incipient social sector policymaking capacities, would not be in a situation to deal with 
pressure from well-organized regional level unions and other political interest groups. 
 
Interest in maintaining the status quo is also evident within the ministerial hierarchy that 
is organized around the delivery of basic educational services. In practice MINEDU has 
maintained a network of intermediate level agencies, such as regional and sub-regional 
offices (Dirección Regional and Dirección Sub Regional) that have often wielded their 
administrative discretion to resist the empowerment of local level actors (such as the 
principals of individual schools) since the late 1990s (Vásquez and Oliart, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, independent education experts find that central level policymakers in 
MINEDU are reluctant to transfer functions to regional governments in large measure 
because there is a fear of “atomizing” the education system by giving more power to 
regional officers, and thus having national policies lose coherence.47 There had been 
some dialogue between MINEDU officials and regions before the end of the Toledo 
administration, but still transfer plans presented to CND were essentially designed in a 
top-down manner. At the same time however, a former consultant at MINEDU finds that 
                                                 
46 Jorge Capella interview, 2005. 
47 Capella interview. 
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there was not a single model or a single unifying vision of decentralization at 
MINEDU.48 
 
While formal administrative transfers were not made effective during the Toledo years, in 
budget terms, regional governments have managed large sectoral payrolls since 2003. 
However, this is not a reflection of decision-making power; according to an education 
expert, who was head of the influential civil society institution Foro Educativo, at the 
outset of decentralization reforms, regional offices only carried out the most mechanical 
activities relating to these regional payrolls of MINEDU employees, and were neither 
allowed nor trained to carry out more sophisticated programming or budgeting 
activities.49 
 
Despite all the apparent reasons for framing developments in education from a BP 
perspective, when trying to account for the lack of progress in administrative transfers in 
education it is necessary to look for potential sources of resistance to change and, in 
doing so, one will notice a peculiar nationwide system of deconcentrated decision-
making and administrative structures that is still under implementation, and it is 
organized around the basic, community-level service providers in this sector. This 
complex system is not present in other types of ministries and, moreover, it has a 
relatively recent history.  
 
                                                 
48 Karima Wanuz interview, 2005. 
49 Capella interview. 
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This complex architecture can be traced back to MINEDU laws in 1996 and 2001, and it 
has been undergoing changes in the last decade. According to current legislation 
approved after the beginning of reforms in 2003 (Ley General de Educación, LGE), the 
decentralized education sector agencies at the subnational level are to be of three types: 
regional offices (Direcciones Regionales), local offices (Unidades de Gestión Educativa 
Local, UGEL) that are dependencies of regional governments, and, finally but playing a 
fundamental role, the educational unit providing services (institución educativa), such as 
a primary school (MINEDU, 2007). In this context, local government plays a rather 
ambiguously defined coordinating role and is not in charge of local services. For each 
level of policymaking, planning instruments are defined, such as Plan Educativo 
Nacional (PEN) at the central level and, at the lowest level, Plan Educativo Institucional 
(PEI). Finally, there are corresponding participatory instances for consultation and 
planning at different levels, including regional and local participatory councils (COPARE 
and COPALE), with an autonomous national council, Consejo Educativo Nacional, at the 
top of this system (MINEDU, 2007). 
 
Therefore there is, at least ideally, a recently formalized national decentralized structure 
for governance of the educations sector, established in the 2003 LGE. Moreover, some 
progress has been achieved in implementing participatory processes and planning 
instruments in most regions in recent years, as participatory regional education policies 
began to be implemented by late 2006 (Participa Peru, 2006). What is the relation of the 
evolution of this model of the education sector and the mandates of the decentralization 
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framework? In light of the delay in formalizing deconcentrated activities as transfers to 
regional government, one could argue that this was simply a manner of non-compliance 
with the new decentralization mandate, where MINEDU did not even formalize 
deconcentrated activities and chose to keep decision-making within its defined 
parameters.  
 
The political difficulties in executing changes in education are well known in Peru, and it 
is possible that top authorities would purposefully avoid even the most formal changes in 
order to avoid conflict with powerful stakeholders within the sector. The complexity of 
the administrative structure of the sector itself is, at the same time, a factor that could 
discourage reforms since new ministers and other authorities that come in tend to be 
“overwhelmed even by the volume of daily tasks to be dealt with.”50  
  
However, the existence of the complex education system laid out in the LGE is really the 
result of an evolving system and not of a static structure that is shielded from any types of 
reforms. The processes leading to the sectoral governance system laid out in the LGE, 
which has been only partially implemented so far, had their roots in reforms going back 
to at least 1994, and which were influenced by international trends towards the 
decentralization of education in order to improve quality and efficiency, among other 
factors (Vásquez and Oliart, 2007). In 1996, education minister Dante Córdova began 
low-profile reforms that were meant to enhance the autonomy of schools at the district 
                                                 
50 Capella interview, 2005. 
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level and, in particular, to foster the decision-making capacities of school principals 
(directores) and community organizations, such as parent-teacher associations (APAFA), 
somewhat to the detriment of intermediate organizations at the regional and sub-regional 
levels. In 2001, in the context of the democratic transition government, another MINEDU 
law oriented reforms in this direction, although with greater specificity.  These measures, 
which have slowly and only partially been implemented, are generally considered 
decentralizing norms (Vásquez and Oliart, 2007), and they preceded the decentralization 
model implemented since 2003.  
 
Thus, the LGE approved in 2003 can be seen as a MINEDU attempt to make compatible 
the decision-making structures in the education sector with the mandates of the BLD, 
LRG and LMG. Still, some incompatibilities persist, as the role of local governments is 
much more restricted in the MINEDU model. 
 
Intermediate (regional and sub-regional) level organizations in the education sector have 
not had extensive policymaking autonomy, yet there had been some significant 
deconcentration of decision-making that was not necessarily taken into account by the 
initial CND-approved transfer plans. Although regional governments’ social sector 
offices are relatively small and did not have much real say in education policymaking by 
mid-2006 (as their authority over MINEDU deconcentrated agencies was still not 
formalized), MINEDU’s direcciones regionales and their dependencies have in practice 
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been able to significantly decide such things as naming school principals and hiring 
teachers. 
 
Thus, in the education sector we find that, in addition to potential and actual resistance to 
those changes established within the overarching state decentralization program from 
many stakeholders seeking to maintain their decision-making power and from higher–us 
wishing to avoid conflict, there is another, older “decentralization” process going on. 
This slow, gradual and only partially implemented system is not fully compatible in its 
objectives with the guidelines of the broader framework, and it has generated its own 
conflicts and resistances from those within MINEDU and outside that feel threatened by 
increased local autonomy in hiring teachers and in other administrative practices.  
 
The relative delay in beginning even the most formal administrative transfers can be 
therefore, on one hand, be interpreted as providing further proof of the salience of 
bureaucratic politics lenses in the sense that it certainly would have avoided further 
conflicts or tensions in a sector where different groups of administrative and decision-
making actors were slowly, and not entirely successfully, being realigned. On the other 
hand, however, the fact that such a process was indeed underway undermines an 
argument for delays as a result of an inherent resistance of top policymakers to 
decentralization. In fact, such a delay, viewed in light of MINEDU’s reformulated 
decentralization model in the LGE in 2003, which sought to make compatible sectoral 
processes with the new state decentralization program, could also be seen as evidence of 
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genuine commitment to meaningful change on the part of some policymakers who were 
more accustomed to working in terms of more arduous, gradual change.  
 
In any case, MINEDU is not in any way an example of success in administrative 
decentralization during the period under study, and so it could finally be said that 
different types of resistance to change (including CND presumably acting under 
Executive orders to hold back some initial formal transfers) ultimately prevailed in the 
sectoral decentralization outcomes. However, the existence of a parallel, sector-specific 
decentralization process that was started by reform oriented policymakers—and that 
considerably weakens the coherence of a BP account of MINEDU’s decentralization 
policies—leads us to explore some other ways to account for the outcomes of 
administrative decentralization in 2003-2006, a task that is undertaken in the following 
chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
Administrative decentralization directly challenges the position of power of decision-
makers in the national ministries that are in charge of sectoral reforms. As we have seen 
in the three cases described in this chapter, these agencies have all formulated 
decentralization policies that, to a different extent in each case, have reflected a degree of 
resistance to giving up valued authorities and resources to subnational actors. 
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A bureaucratic politics approach to this stage of reform leads one to expect resistance in 
all ministries, even among decision-makers in promotional ministries like MINCETUR 
that control small, deconcentrated bureaucracies as well as budgets that were reduced to 
near-minimal proportions years ago. Moreover, they do not make many decisions directly 
involving the use of large sums of money or over coveted investment projects; their 
positions are not quite the most visible or most politically attractive, either for 
policymakers themselves or for political actors outside the ministry. In spite of this, 
MINCETUR emerged as the agency with the approach to decentralization that was most 
clearly guided by resistance to change. 
 
A BP perspective would lead us to consider any concession to decentralization even less 
likely in other types of ministries, infrastructure and social, where there is control over 
larger resources and influence that could be coveted by other political actors; after all, BP 
focuses on inter-agency conflict and negotiation as determining policy outcomes. In 
infrastructure ministries like VIVIENDA, budgets are large and many decisions are made 
about the use of large sums of money and about characteristics of infrastructure and other 
investment projects. However, while political interests from within and from higher 
levels were influential in this agency’s decentralization policy, many technical issues 
directly related to the nature of programs under VIVIENDA’s control were just as 
influential. Thus, VIVIENDA was less unequivocally vulnerable to bureaucratic politics 
as a determinant of decentralization policy than MINCETUR, even though the programs 
and resources at stake were much larger in the former agency. 
 181
 
Finally, ministries in charge of social sectors like MINEDU control very large payrolls 
and complex service delivery systems, and there are many vested interests and 
stakeholders in any changes in these ministries. However, the slowness or lack of 
progress in Education cannot be solely, or even predominantly, attributed to bureaucratic 
politics. Unlike the other two agencies examined in this chapter, previous to the 
beginning of decentralization this ministry had ongoing, even if problematic, progress in 
a previously determined path towards reform, which included deconcentrating several 
functions. Beginning changes in the terms established by the national decentralization 
framework meant, for a complex sector like education, not only considering the 
enormous delivery system and the many interest groups within the sector, but also 
considering how to adapt ongoing reforms to new rules and objectives. Resistance to 
reform by policymakers at different points in this service delivery system is considered to 
be virtually inevitable, yet even in their absence it would be difficult to imagine anything 
but slow progress in such a complex agency serving an enormous policy sector. 
 
Thus, a BP approach led us to expect resistance in any sector facing decentralization. The 
degree of resistance, however, appears to vary in each agency and not as a function of 
factors that could be considered pertinent to BP. In effect, if bureaucratic self-interest 
should translate into different decentralization policies by sectors, it would be reasonable 
to expect decentralization initiatives to make the least headway in the larger social 
ministries, followed closely by infrastructure ministries and, finally, in promotional 
 182
ministries. A closer look at distinct individual ministries, however, revealed different 
approaches between ministries of different types that could not be accounted for by the 
differences in the resources and authorities at stake; particular conditions and processes in 
each agency appeared to be significant in determining sectoral policies.  
 
In contrast to the apparently intuitive BP account of the overall results of administrative 
decentralization (Chapter 4), when looking at individual cases self-interest appears to 
have more limited potential to explain variation in sectoral decentralization policies. The 
next chapter will therefore test two other explanations for the policies formulated by 
Peruvian ministries, as we search for a more robust explanation of administrative 
decentralization policies.  
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Chapter 6 - Beyond bureaucratic resistance: Institutional paths, 
individual reformers and modest advances 
 
When one analyzes administrative decentralization for the period 2003-2006 and focuses upon 
the overall formal transfers between ministries and subnational governments, as in chapter three, 
a bureaucratic politics perspective on policymaking provides a compelling account of self-interest 
factors driving policymaking in Peruvian ministries. The predicted resistance of central 
policymakers to give up authority and resources tends to be confirmed by an observed reluctance 
and slowness of all actors in power in following the mandate for decentralization such that a 
significant number of scheduled transfers have not been executed. And even where there has been 
a significant decentralization to benefit regional governments these efforts have rarely increased 
decision-making power or provided new financial and human resources to those governments.  
 
Moreover, at least in one specific case examined in chapter four (that of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Tourism, MINCETUR), looking closely at determinants of policy in an individual 
agency reveals how bureaucratic politics can provide a coherent account of the motivations 
behind decentralization policymaking (or lack thereof). However, when one looks closer at 
policies in other ministries there is evidence to suggest that power politics is not the only factor 
driving particular approaches to sectoral decentralization, as two cases in chapter four illustrated. 
Indeed, chapter four described how even decentralization policies that show no signs of a 
profound reform orientation or that show a clear preference for slow progress, as in the Ministry 
of Education, appear to reflect more than just a lack of will to distribute precious resources and 
authority. We saw how different organizations take distinct positions regarding decentralization 
and sometimes appear willing to make some progress; there is no blanket resistance to change 
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across the board.  In other words, the only readily available indicator of administrative 
decentralization is the amount of formal transfers of resources, but it is not a particularly useful 
indicator or tool to explain distinct policymaking processes and attitudes towards 
decentralization. 
 
Thus, if bureaucratic politics-type explanations are insufficient for many cases, we need to look at 
other factors that are more sector-specific and institutional, as well as examining the preferences 
of individual reformers. Looking at how the mandate for administrative decentralization has been 
translated into policies in some ministries and not others, this chapter sets out to find if the impact 
of two other sets of explanatory factors—institutional factors and individual reformers—on 
sectoral decentralization paths can complement bureaucratic politics-type explanations so as to 
provide a fuller account of the variation in sectoral policies. That is the purpose of this chapter. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, an institutionalist perspective on decentralization reforms allows us to 
view recent sectoral policies as the result of particular institutional processes and rules that have 
evolved over time and not just as an outcome of negotiations or conflict in a given conjuncture. In 
the context of this study, ministries are formal organizations that have distinct objectives and 
internal rules, evolve over time and follow certain observable paths that are often not easy to 
modify. The case of the Ministry of Education (MINEDU), with its history of deconcentration 
prior to and independent of current reforms, already hinted at the importance of these factors. 
From this perspective, the implementation of decentralization guidelines imposed from above 
clearly cannot be understood as an automatic, mechanical process; even if ministerial 
policymakers were willing to comply with the spirit of a mandate for decentralization, sectoral 
authorities have to adapt such guidelines to the context in which they operate. 
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Thus, as in the case of MINEDU, rapid change may not be a feasible choice for decision-makers 
if one understands ministries as distinct institutional actors in charge of decentralization, instead 
of groups of self-interested bureaucrats with a short-term perspective. Rather, progress towards 
the transfer of authority and resources can be expected to occur in each ministry’s terms, and to 
the extent that each system can accommodate such changes. Some indicators of progress in 
decentralization within institutional constraints would include the modification or expansion of 
previously existing sectoral processes of dispersion of power, and decentralization-like processes 
integrated into long-term plans or programs. 
 
On the other hand, while patterns of decision-making and processes may persist over time in 
institutions, individual policymakers tend to rotate in and out of public agencies. As cited and 
reviewed in chapter one, some academic and technocratic literature has highlighted the 
importance of reform-minded individuals in bringing about difficult, structural changes such as 
those implied by a process of state decentralization. A focus on the role of individual reformers in 
administrative decentralization would highlight evidence of reform that unfolds according to 
conscious, purposeful strategies of pro-decentralization reformers. It assesses the impact of 
decisions by individuals that are driven by technical, reform-oriented criteria, rather than 
calculated self-interest, organizational paths or pressure within an institution. At the same time, a 
focus on individual reformers cannot discard the importance of bureaucratic politics and 
institutional factors: In real organizations, reform leaders must deal with the complexity of 
changing institutions and must formulate strategies to overcome resistance to reform; they must 
often look for slow, gradual success. In addition to concrete transfers of authority and resources, 
indicators of an audacious reform unfolding as a response to a broader decentralization mandate 
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would include changes in sectoral decentralization-related strategies introduced after 2002 
(whether or not they are spelled out in published or internal documents) and the identification of 
an active pro-decentralization reform leader or team. 
 
Resistance to significant reform in PRODUCE: Bureaucratic politics or appropriate 
technical considerations? 
The Ministry of Production (PRODUCE) oversees fishing and industrial manufacturing activities, 
and consists of two vice-ministries that are respectively in charge of each of these policy sectors, 
in addition to some independent agencies within the ministry. PRODUCE formulates, executes 
and monitors national policies regarding extractive, productive and transformation activities in 
the industrial and fishing sectors, “promoting their competitiveness and the increase in 
production, as well as the rational use of resources and environmental protection.” (PRODUCE, 
2007). 
 
Like MINCETUR, discussed in the previous chapter, PRODUCE is a relatively small 
organization that only recently assumed its current form. Before the reshuffling of vice-ministries 
at the beginning of the Toledo administration (2001), there had been a fishing ministry for many 
years, while the industry sub-sector had been part of the same ministry as MINCETUR’s two 
current vice-ministries. Like the activities overseen at MINCETUR, public agencies in charge of 
industry and fishing had been significantly deconcentrated in the 1980’s, and the role of the state 
in these sectors diminished considerably after neoliberal reform in the early 1990s. 
 
Also like MINCETUR, all administrative decentralization transfers in PRODUCE were to be 
finalized early on in the current process, and (at least on paper) significant progress was made in a 
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relatively short time. A total of 17 functions, as described in the Basic Law of Decentralization, 
were scheduled for transfer in the period 2004-2006, seven of these in Industry and ten in Fishing. 
By the end of the Toledo administration in mid-2006, Industry had fulfilled necessary procedures 
and paperwork for all seven functions that it was in charge of, while Fishing had two still to 
transfer (CND, 2006b). Moreover, in the regional dimension, by 2006 all but four regional 
governments had been accredited by CND for receiving the functions offered by PRODUCE. 
 
Despite many similarities with another small “promotional” ministry like MINCETUR, 
PRODUCE has some particularities as an organization that have evolved over time and which 
appear to have had an impact on its decentralization policy. In the first place, as acknowledged by 
a key policymaker in the vice-ministry of Industry,51 each vice-ministry within PRODUCE is 
basically independent of the other in formulating and executing its transfer plans. In other words, 
the vice-ministerial level commissions that propose transfers each year did not necessarily 
coordinate their actions and, thus, their sectoral policies. 
 
Therefore, within PRODUCE, and unlike the cases observed elsewhere in this chapter and the 
previous one, the fishing and industry vice-ministries are in effect (although not in theory) 
independent policymaking actors. Interviewees in Industry considered that each vice-ministry has 
brought with it to PRODUCE a different “culture,” where Fishing, now as a vice-ministry and for 
many years previously as a ministry overseeing what was once Peru’s flagship economic sector, 
has been characterized by greater reluctance to even minimally deconcentrate its regulatory 
functions. They were, above all, perceived by policymakers in Industry as “controlistas.”52 In 
                                                 
51 Carlos Ferraro interview, 2005 
52 The term was used by PRODUCE officials Carlos Ferraro and Manuel Alvarez in their respective 
interviews, 2005. 
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fact, Industry officials consider that the supervisory duties in the fishing sector do not really 
warrant this reluctance to deconcentrate as they are less complex than those in industry: indeed, a 
far smaller number of firms is involved, in a smaller number of regions (mostly those along the 
coast). It should be noted that Industry interviewees warned the author that Fishing officials 
would likely be unwilling to discuss their decentralization activities with this researcher, and this 
was followed by difficulty in making contact with pertinent officials at the Viceminister’s office, 
as several calls would not be returned and thus it was not possible to get past assistants to 
decision-makers. 
 
Despite any different attitudes towards decentralization that may have evolved over time, it is true 
to say that Fishing and Industry share several basic challenges in formulating sectoral transfer 
policies and in implementing the delegation of functions, and these particular challenges may 
help explain reluctance or delays in transfers.  
 
For instance, officials in both agencies must coordinate some of their supervisory activities in 
politically sensitive areas with actors that are not only outside PRODUCE but also even outside 
the normal range of actors involved in administrative decentralization. The resistance of outside 
actors (here including the military) to be willing to give up their authority in certain areas can be 
understood through a bureaucratic politics-type of analysis, especially if these actors are not 
formally part of the administrative decentralization process.  
 
However, we argue that the particular circumstances that lead to such a situation of shared 
responsibilities—together with reluctance to propose reform in certain areas (on the part of 
PRODUCE)—are only found because of the nature of the policy sectors that are involved and the 
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institutional design of policymaking for these sectors in the Peruvian state. Industry, for its part, 
must oversee the use of industrial chemical inputs, including those used for producing illegal 
drugs, which means it must work closely with a number of agencies involved in drug 
enforcement. It must also control the use of explosives and potential weapons, and this implies 
very close coordination with the military and with the Interior Ministry that is in charge of police 
forces. According to Carlos Ferraro, head of Industry´s Dirección General de Industrias, it is 
likely that some of these functions will “never be decentralized.” 
 
Fishing, on the other hand, must coordinate supervisory activities in ocean waters with the 
Peruvian navy. Moreover, the authority of coastal regional governments over these waters, vis-à-
vis different ministries in central government and the navy, is not clearly defined in the 
decentralization framework, as PRODUCE officials stated. 
 
As a largely independent policymaking actor in decentralization within the established legal 
framework, the case of Industry bears resemblance to that of MINCETUR, another promotional 
ministry that also fulfilled all of its scheduled transfers by 2006. While formally under the 
authority of the vice-ministry of Industry, administrative decentralization here was effectively 
formulated by the aforementioned Dirección General de Industrias (DGI), an agency that is 
directly under the vice-minister’s office. DGI is a technical, normative and promotional 
organization that is in charge of “proposing, executing and supervising” objectives, policies and 
strategies at the national level that are oriented towards “the development and growth of industry 
and firms in the industry sub-sector that carry out industrialization, processing and manufacturing 
activities.” (PRODUCE, 2007) In other words, DGI is responsible for the day-to-day operation of 
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many PRODUCE activities, as it heads four agencies that oversee the range of PRODUCE 
functions in industry: 
• Dirección de Insumos y Productos Químicos Fiscalizados, overseeing controlled 
chemical products and inputs (including those activities that must be coordinated with 
drug-enforcement and defense authorities) 
• Dirección de Asuntos Ambientales de Industria, supervising environmental matters 
related to industrial activities. 
• Dirección de Competitividad, in charge of promoting competitiveness at different levels 
and carrying out mostly promotional and advisory activities. 
• Dirección de Normas Técnicas y Supervisión Industrial, in charge of technical regulation 
and norms for different levels of government. 
 
According to its head in 2005, the year in which transfers were formalized, for practical purposes 
DGI decided what was to be transferred in the vice-ministry.  
 
Although all transfers were finalized by 2005, what did this progress mean in practice for 
subnational policymakers? As in the case of MINCETUR, the transferred functions generally did 
little more than formalize what was already being done at (or was ostensibly a responsibility of) 
the regional level for many years, and the officials that were interviewed readily admitted this. 
One transferred function was, for example, to “identify investment opportunities and promote 
private initiatives in industrial projects.” (CND, 2006a) In other cases, transfers could imply a 
need for new resources, such as the rather general mandate to “develop, implement and make 
available to the population useful and relevant information systems for regional firms and 
organizations, and also for the regional and national levels (of government).” (CND, 2006a) 
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However, with an attitude that could be well explained by a BP argument, the head of DGI and 
another senior DGI official discarded, as in the case of MINCETUR, any need for transfers of 
additional financial resources to regional governments.53 According to Ferraro, there was to be no 
transfer of resources in the current process, since “the ministry does not handle such issues.” The 
transfer of relevant resources was, according to these DGI officials, completed in the 1980s, and 
regional governments were ostensibly in charge of these by 2006. Moreover, interviewees seemed 
worried that regional government officials were not ready to understand that decentralization is 
principally about new responsibilities and not just new resources. 
 
There is considerable lack of clarity regarding the type of intergovernmental relations in 
policymaking for the industry sector that was being pursued at DGI. At a general level, 
PRODUCE officials consider that, as a result of previous and recent transfers, each regional 
government is now responsible for formulating and implementing its industrial policy, while the 
ministry is there to provide assistance in regional policymaking. However, when asked more 
specifically about the objectives of the transfers achieved in the current administrative 
decentralization process, officials stated that the overall goal is to formally transfer responsibility 
for monitoring industrial activities and gathering information, and not, in any case, policymaking. 
In the case of activities under the Dirección de Normas Técnicas y Supervisión Industrial, for 
example, monitoring of compliance with technical norms and control at the regional level is 
deconcentrated, but there are no plans to transfer decision-making in any aspect of the 
formulation of technical standards. In sensitive areas like those of chemicals that may be used as 
explosives, not even supervision is to be deconcentrated in the foreseeable future. 
                                                 
53 Alvarez interview, 2005. 
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In these respects, there are significant similarities between MINCETUR and the industry vice-
ministry at PRODUCE’s administrative decentralization policies, which may point to similar 
motivations behind observed policies. First, in both there has been no effort to even determine if 
additional resources are needed by regional governments in order to properly fulfill their new 
responsibilities; it has been assumed that resources transferred from Lima decades ago are still 
relevant to current reforms. Second, in both cases formal transfers in the 2003-2006 period have 
been, by and large, a formalization of existing arrangements, which had previously involved 
deconcentrated regional authorities (CTAR) rather than the politically decentralized regional 
governments of today. To this extent, a bureaucratic resistance to giving away authority and 
resources appears to provide some explanation of the attitudes towards decentralization at the 
industry vice-ministry. Moreover, there was an explicit distrust of interviewed officials regarding 
the capacities of regional governments to undertake more demanding tasks in supervision and 
regulation. However, given the lack of hard evidence to support these perceptions of regional 
incapacity, such attitudes can also be interpreted as a pretext to resist more meaningful transfers 
in the context of decentralization. 
 
Yet there are also significant differences that need to be addressed and which suggest that 
organizational particularities, at least as much as pure self-interest, shaped policies. Unlike the 
case of MINCETUR, where there was no evidence of a pro-decentralization orientation 
anywhere, in the industry vice-ministry there are signs of a preoccupation with promoting 
progress towards objectives that are in the spirit of the decentralization framework, such as better 
regional policymaking and performance, as well as economic decentralization in the broader 
sense. In fact, such orientation in Industry appears to have been evident before the current 
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decentralization process began in 2002. Ministry plans and operational strategies at PRODUCE 
mention decentralization efforts as part of their long-term vision and objectives.54 Interviewees, 
moreover, saw their agency as continuing to be involved in decentralization in long run, even if 
the formal transfers were almost concluded at that time. 
 
According to the head of DGI, in its relation with subnational governments Industry sees itself as 
a “forum for dialogue” in strengthening regional industrial policymaking, but is also conscious 
that it must play its role as the agency in administrative control of sensitive issues like chemicals 
and explosives, where there is little space for dialogue. As a promotional or advisory agency, the 
vice-ministry actively advocates the coordination of regional industrial policies in such a way that 
regional clusters may contribute to a national “productive linkages” (cadenas productivas) 
perspective that is managed by PRODUCE. In this regard, courses and workshops are conducted 
at the central level for capacity building among regional policymakers. Moreover, PRODUCE has 
moved to strengthen industry and small enterprises outside the capital by establishing a network 
of thirteen technology innovation and transfer centers (CITE) throughout the country since 2002, 
most devoted to specific productive areas including the wine industry, shoes, and software.  
 
Thus, while at PRODUCE there appears to be resistance to more significant decentralizing 
reforms in favor of regional policymakers, evidence suggests that this is not merely the result of 
conjunctural calculations based on bureaucratic self- interest. First, while there is resistance to 
actively ensuring that regional policymakers have all necessary resources to fulfill their new 
functions, as in the case of MINCETUR, there are also real obstacles to transferring other aspects 
                                                 
54 These official statements and planning documents are found online at the PRODUCE website, 
http://www.produce.gob.pe. 
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of decision-making outside the center that are peculiar to the organization and to the policy 
sectors that it is responsible for.  
 
Second, while in the previous case there was no evidence of a will to integrate decentralization 
into the institution’s long-term plans, at PRODUCE there is a modest deconcentrating tendency 
and actual evidence of some work with subnational policymakers, particularly aiming at capacity 
building. 
 
Agencies overseeing the industrial sector have evolved in a way that reflects both the 
particularities of some activities within this sector and the realities of Peru in recent decades: the 
industrial dimension of explosives (in a country that still faces some subversive movements and 
armed drug-traffickers) and certain chemicals involved in the production of illegal drugs (in one 
of the top producers of cocaine in the world) has determined that a number of actors not normally 
involved in decentralization would become powerful stakeholders in any reform effort in this 
particular vice-ministry. On the other hand, policymakers here share a common distrust of 
subnational policymaking capacities (and are especially reluctant to transfer responsibilities for 
supervision or analysis of sensitive data), and an unwillingness to work to obtain additional 
resources for subnational governments 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture: A case of slow implementation of the mandate for 
decentralization 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) is one of the agencies that were characterized as an 
“infrastructure” ministry in previous chapters, as it has a relatively small bureaucracy and 
relatively large investment spending. It has been the leading agricultural policy agency in the 
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Peruvian public sector since the 1960s and has existed as a ministry since 1943. Although most 
projects and special programs under this ministry are related to physical infrastructure for 
irrigation and other uses, the importance of agriculture to large sectors of the Peruvian 
population—especially many of the poorest Peruvians in rural areas in the Andes—effectively 
determines that there be close ties between social policies on the one hand, and the activities 
specifically under the remit of this ministry. In other words, beneficiaries of MINAG programs 
often overlap with groups targeted by major social programs like the social fund FONCODES. 
 
In the period 2003-2006, MINAG was scheduled by CND to transfer 17 functions to regional 
governments, but ultimately only four (included in the 2004 transfer plan) were transferred during 
this period, to a total of 23 accredited governments (CND, 2006b). In this sense, MINAG could 
be said to be moving at an even slower pace than all the ministries that were previously 
examined: it has not even completed the bureaucratic formalities that, in most other cases, have to 
do with functions that were already carried out outside the capital. Thus, on the basis of these 
formal indicators it could be seen as an institution that is especially resistant to administrative 
decentralization. However, a closer look at the particularities of MINAG as a ministry and the 
way its officials have handled the decentralization mandate reveals a far less straightforward 
reality in terms of MINAG’s decentralization efforts. 
 
MINAG’s organizational structure is one of the most complex among Peruvian ministries. It has 
only one vice-ministry, which is in charge of four national offices or direcciones generales. 
However, there are 13 other offices within MINAG that are not clearly under the authority of the 
vice-ministry’s national offices, with different degrees of autonomy and often with 
representatives at the regional and local levels that were not yet under the authority of regional 
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governments in 2006. Five of these are OPD (Organismos Publicos Descentralizados) and eight 
are projects and programs. At the same time, MINAG ostensibly coordinates its work with 
subnational governments through 24 direcciones regionales de agricultura (DRA) and 191 local 
level offices (agencias agrarias).55 
 
Thus, numerous agencies within MINAG have had significant autonomy over their budgeting and 
staff policies and, as officials at MINAG and some official documents acknowledge (including 
the internal 2007 capacity building guide “Plan de Desarrollo de Capacidades del Ministerio de 
Agricultura”), this has created numerous sources of resistance to reforms that might be seen as 
jeopardizing jobs or financial resources. MINAG’s capacity building plan for 2007, for instance, 
explicitly acknowledges that with decentralization central offices in Lima will necessarily 
downsize and most new demands for human resources will come from outside the capital, a 
situation that has created “disquiet and unrest” among public servants in Lima offices. (MINAG, 
2007) Meanwhile, a senior official at UCAD, MINAG’s office for decentralization, finds that 
there is “much fear” of losing jobs and funds among officials at the various autonomous agencies 
within the ministry (Izaguirre interview, 2006). An official at the office of agricultural planning, 
for his part, also finds that the existence of many agencies with significant control over their 
budgets, such as OPD’s, means that there is much work left to be done even if the ministry’s 
regular regional offices (direcciones regionales) are already under the authority of regional 
governments.  
 
                                                 
55 MINAG’s complex organizational structure is described and illustrated online at 
http://www.minag.gob.pe/organizacion.shtml 
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While MINAG is a particularly complex institution with a structure that poses great challenges to 
decentralization, it is also one of few ministries with a permanent office that is dedicated to 
coordinating decentralization and subnational capacity building. The Unidad de Coordinacion y 
Apoyo a la Descentralizacion (UCAD) has an office in the main ministry building in Lima and 
exists independently of the more transitory vice-ministerial commission for transfers that by law 
must exist in every ministry involved in the administrative decentralization process.  
 
According to a senior UCAD official, even in 2006 there was still “no way” to accelerate the 
process (Izaguirre interview, 2006). However, these difficulties are not only related to resistance 
from the many autonomous units within the ministry. Just as significantly, officials at MINAG 
attribute much of the slow and somewhat uneven pace of reforms so far to the need to carefully 
“shape decentralization along the way,” since the process only began with broad guidelines from 
CND and no details or suggested methodology for designing, evaluating or monitoring transfers. 
Indeed, “decentralization is constructed in each sector.” (Izaguirre interview, 2006) 
 
What has “constructing decentralization in each sector” meant for MINAG? It was decided by 
officials involved in the process at the central level that the functions outlined in the 
decentralization framework, which was the basis for annual transfer plans, needed to be carefully 
disaggregated into more specific sub-functions or “facultades” because the functions were too 
broad and were not thought of in terms of the actual functions carried out in the ministry. To 
illustrate this level of generality in the description of functions to be transferred, one can refer to 
the only four functions transferred as of 2007, which were functions a, d, h, and j of the original 
plan: 
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“a. To administrate and supervise the management of agricultural activities and 
services… 
d. To develop vigilance and control actions in order to guarantee the sustainable use of 
natural resources under its jurisdiction. 
h. To plan, promote and coordinate, with the private sector, agricultural and agro-
industrial development plans and projects. 
i. To plan, supervise and control… the improvement of agricultural commercialization 
services, and crops and farming development” (CND, 2006, translation by author) 
 
In the case of a complex organization like MINAG, transferring such functions is not 
straightforward. In practice, most such functions include the activities of several different offices 
within the ministry (including projects with significant autonomy), and this can be both a political 
challenge, because of the autonomy and relative lack of coordination between such actors, and a 
more technical one for those planning decentralization because different offices were at different 
levels of deconcentration when the process began. Thus, following broad guidelines of the 
decentralization framework has meant undertaking some time-consuming tasks: on one hand, 
defining strategies for dealing with reform in “special cases” and, second, mapping out more 
specific functions (seen as both rights and responsibilities) that can be effectively transferred. As 
officials at MINAG hold, “from the outside, everything looks much more simple.” Inside, 
however, translating these guidelines into actual changes requires time-consuming consideration 
of various internal factors of technical and political nature that were not well known by those 
involved in designing the original decentralization framework. 
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At the onset of administrative decentralization in the current process, different agencies within 
MINAG showed very different levels of deconcentration, and by 2006 some changes had 
occurred in these ministerial offices. However, progress in dealing with this heterogeneity could 
not be reflected in the broad functions that have already been transferred. For example, in 
activities related to technical and other assistance to agricultural producers, at the onset of 
reforms all decisions were made “vertically and centrally” from Lima (Izaguirre interview 2006), 
and by 2006 these decisions had been deconcentrated to regional-level agencies within the 
ministerial structure, including the regional offices that are now formally under the authority of 
regional governments. Other important policy decisions, however, were still centralized in Lima 
even in 2007, including those related to decisions in agricultural and animal sanitation and natural 
resources, even if the latter were formally transferred.  
 
Unlike other cases previously illustrated in this study, MINAG shows an example of mid-level 
ministry officials attempting (albeit, at a slow pace) to systematically improve on the 
arrangements initially set forth in the legal framework for reform, in order to make reform viable 
(in terms of the guidelines stated in the overarching legal framework) in a complex organization. 
Interestingly, these officials were part of a permanent decentralization office, whose goals are 
almost exclusively related to the decentralization process begun in 2002. Such offices do not exist 
in the majority of ministries, and in this case this characteristic appears to strongly shape the 
attitudes of these officials. 
 
The case of MINAG also shows some very modest progress in establishing dialogue between 
those directly responsible for sectoral decentralization (UCAD) and ministry agencies that appear 
reluctant to participate in the decentralization process. Indeed, each agency, including OPD’s and 
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projects, requires a particular strategy. Finally, unlike the ministry cases described so far, there 
are attempts to foster regional government capacities in order to make transfers sustainable, rather 
than a focus on simply fulfilling requirements established outside the sector (MINAG, 2007).  
 
The senior UCAD official interviewed appeared concerned that the certificate of transfer issued 
by CND may only fulfill bureaucratic formalities. It might represent for many an accomplishment 
of administrative decentralization, but many details, including legal aspects, still needed to be 
adjusted in subnational governments even after formal transfers so that regional policymakers are 
truly able to assume their new responsibilities. This includes adapting legal norms regarding 
planning, human resources and other regulations at the regional level. However, given the 
weakness of CND in terms of resources and of its standing relative to ministries, there is no 
central government agency effectively monitoring the successful adaptation of regional 
governments to new responsibilities. At the same time, in 2006 MINAG still did not have 
evaluation methods or indicators ready for monitoring the process after formal transfers were 
fulfilled. 
 
Bureaucratic politics is, again, an undeniable element explaining the slow pace of changes in 
MINAG. However, this case illustrates how BP is not necessarily pervasive or the most important 
element explaining transfer policies. One key argument for this is that a permanent office 
dedicated to coordinating administrative decentralization (UCAD) was put into place during the 
most important period for transfers (2004-2006) under the Toledo administration even if, as 
acknowledged by MINAG officials, during these years there was very little or no pressure “from 
above” to push decentralization forward. In fact, the legal framework for administrative 
decentralization does not require establishing such an office. Moreover, this office, in conjunction 
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with other actors within the ministry, has taken concrete steps to support significant 
decentralization, including formulating capacity-building strategies and establishing channels for 
dialogue between ministry agencies. 
 
While it is true that the advances have not been spectacular, the care and seriousness often taken 
in seeking to translate the mandate for decentralization into specific guidelines that are pertinent 
to the public agencies involved in agriculture policy shows a number of elements. First, it shows 
that fairly important decision-makers within a Peruvian ministry have been seriously considering 
decentralization as something more than a simple threat to the bureaucratic status quo. Second, it 
shows that slow progress towards real decentralization should not only be seen as a symptom of 
resistance to change overall, but in some cases may be the result of purposeful strategies to deal 
carefully with complex challenges, including resistance from particular agencies within a sector 
or lack of political support from above. 
 
The Ministry of Health: a case of reformist leadership shaping decentralization 
With an annual budget of nearly US$ 1 billion, the Ministry of Health (MINSA) is second in size 
only to the Ministry of Education among the Peruvian agencies undergoing administrative 
decentralization. It is responsible for a complex service delivery system that includes networks of 
hospitals and health service posts serving the regional, provincial and district levels.  
 
As in the case of MINEDU, many of the activities under MINSA authority were deconcentrated 
long before current reforms started, reflecting reforms in the 1980s and earlier. To a greater 
degree than that of Education, MINSA also underwent some institutional reform in the 1990s that 
included the creation of public-civil society health management partnerships (CLAS) at the 
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community level throughout the country (Ewig, 2001). Although hundreds of CLAS throughout 
Peru have represented a degree of decentralization of decision-making to the local and 
community level in health, these were not conceived in a context of state decentralization and 
have not been an integral part of broader sectoral decentralization efforts.56 Because of its success 
in achieving some objectives set by top technocrats in the 1990s—where similar reforms failed in 
education—MINSA has been considered by some literature as a case of successful institutional 
reform that was led by technocrats within the ministry (Ortiz de Zevallos, 1999). 
 
However, there were other changes in the health sector in the 1990s, and the legal framework for 
such changes basically reflected a centralist state. The General Law of Health was introduced in 
1997 and was considered as reflecting the “re-centralizing” trends of the Fujimori regime, 
particularly after 1992 (MINSA, 2005). This framework outlined a national government that 
concentrates key competences in the health sector, together with the lack of autonomous regional 
authorities and a weak role for local governments. 
 
After the end of the Fujimori regime, during the transitional Paniagua government and the earlier 
part of the Toledo administration, different laws and regulation established a new drive towards 
deconcentration within the ministry’s organizational hierarchy, particularly benefiting regional 
offices. Thus many tasks began to be carried out at the regional (CTAR) level in the years 
immediately preceding the current reforms, even if authority was not formally transferred to these 
deconcentrated regional entities (MINSA, 2005). 
 
                                                 
56 Sandra Vallenas interview, 2005. 
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In more recent years, MINSA has achieved some progress in concluding the transfer of functions 
that were set in the current legal framework and programmed for administrative decentralization 
in the period 2004-2006. While social sectors like health were initially set to carry out 
decentralization only after reform in other sectors was culminated, in effect the Law of Regional 
Governments opened the way for transfers to begin as early as the beginning of 2004. Indeed, in 
this context MINSA has continued to show more rapid change than MINEDU, which did not 
complete any formal transfers during the Toledo administration. The 13 functions that MINSA 
transferred to regional governments by mid 2006 were, however, less than the 16 that had been 
programmed in transfer plans during this period (CND, 2006b). Moreover, as in other sectors 
examined, these transfers related to functions that were already deconcentrated and, therefore, 
were basically just formalities. Most noticeably, deconcentrated regional sectoral offices handled 
the payroll and some labor issues of health employees in each region and, in the current process, 
politically autonomous regional governments carry out these duties without having greater 
policymaking authority (Somocurcio interview, 2005). 
 
While the progress in transferring these functions does not appear extraordinary in comparison to 
other ministries previously examined, MINSA is, nevertheless, widely hailed as the best (and 
perhaps only) example of a ministry where there has been a clear will to transfer decision-making 
power to subnational actors, at the same time that it has designed reforms in close coordination 
with their intended beneficiaries (Participa Peru 2006, Saenz interview, 2006). Is MINSA indeed 
a unique case in Peruvian administrative decentralization? And, if so, what factors have shaped a 
distinct path in reforms?  
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First, not very much has changed in terms of subnational decision-making as a result of what has 
been formally transferred. According to an official at MINSA’s decentralization office, the most 
important concrete change in recent years with respect to what the previous deconcentrated 
regional authorities (CTAR) could do is that regional governments can now designate senior 
health officials at the regional health office (DIRESA) level without needing MINSA approval.57 
 
Thus, regional governments are not yet substantially in charge of regional health policy, while 
work with local governments only began after the end of the Toledo regime. However, the 
different observers of Peruvian decentralization who have lauded the way MINSA has managed 
administrative decentralization have not focused on this partial, measurable progress. Rather, the 
focus has been more on the process by which plans and objectives were reached, which in turn 
have served as the basis for some of the initial transfers and the foundation for future progress. 
 
While the overall transfer process began in early 2003 and two different ministers (Dr. Fernando 
Carbone and Dr. Alvaro Vidal) held office during that year, it was in February 2004, with the 
entry of physician and public health specialist Dr. Pilar Mazetti as minister of health that several 
characteristics of decentralization policymaking emerged in MINSA that distinguished it from all 
other cases. First, beginning in early 2004 she drafted a team of technocrats under economist Eva 
Guerrero—who was an advisor to Minister Mazzetti—to work, beginning in April of that year, on 
the sector’s decentralization long-term plan, or Hoja de Ruta. This plan underwent several 
changes and had two versions, December 2004 and March 2005, which reflected an 
understanding of the various factors at play in a decentralization process. According to the final 
version of this document, 
                                                 
57 Ana Vicente interview, 2007. 
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In Peru and in light of international experience, planning decentralization in health will 
require: i) understanding the characteristics of the political process in which it is 
inscribed,  ii) understanding in particular the factors that drive decentralization –political 
factors, social demands, technocratic visions, pressure from international organizations – 
iii) knowing the specific interests of relevant social actors, within and outside MINSA 
and iv) establishing the stages and sequence of decentralization in a planned manner, 
considering both political variables and capacities at the subnational level. (MINSA, 
2005, p. 13, translation by the author) 
 
Like officials at MINAG, this team was also well aware of the need to elaborate on the broad 
guidelines for reform that could be found in the Basic Law of Decentralization and the Law of 
Regional Governments. According to the 2004 Hoja de Ruta, the laws in the national 
decentralization framework “do not describe the current operations of MINSA.” (MINSA, 2004, 
p. 21) During six months they mapped out a structure of functions and competences under 
MINSA authority, and pending tasks were established for each level. At the same time, they 
reported to both the minister and the sectoral transfer commission. Finally, the finished 
documents established the broad guidelines for decentralizing the health sector, identifying blocks 
of specific competences to be transferred and a planned, participative process to involve 
subnational officials.58  
 
In general, MINSA technocrats carried out an “extensive interpretation” of decentralization 
norms (MINSA, 2004, p. 25), and defined reforms thematically in terms of the 14 processes, 66 
sub processes and 234 tasks mapped out for the health sector. For these categories, specific 
competences of different levels of government were defined, so that MINSA’s classification—
based on current and future processes and sub processes—could be translated into the shared, 
delegated and exclusive competences defined by the 2002 decentralization framework (discussed 
in Chapter 3).  
                                                 
58 Vicente interview, 2006. 
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Three blocks of transfers of competences were sequenced in such a way that the first would 
include those that were already deconcentrated (i.e., already in the hands of subnational 
authorities) and thus would not require implementing strict requirements for accreditation 
because regional actors had already been in charge for some time. The two subsequent blocks of 
transfers included many that were not already deconcentrated and were to progressively increase 
in complexity, in terms of the need for subnational capacity building and other difficulties. These 
processes are illustrated in Table 6-A. 
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Table 6-A 
Overall structure of transfers in Health, as planned by MINSA technocrats (2004) 
 
Phases (bloques) of reform (to 
be implemented consecutively, 
2005-2011) 
Description Example from MINSA’s 
“Organization” process 
Phase 1 • Functions that are already 
being carried out in a 
deconcentrated or delegated 
manner at the subnational 
level of government.  
• Functions with budgets that 
are executed at the 
subnational level. Functions 
that do not require greater 
normative or human 
capacities. 
Regional governments conduct, 
execute and supervise the 
analysis of organizational and 
management processes, as well as 
organizational systems and 
processes. 
Phase 2 • Functions that require 
capacities that are developed 
partially at a subnational 
level, and which may be 
developed with programs 
implemented at a low cost by 
some level of government. 
Provincial and district 
governments formulate directives 
and norms for their respective 
fields of action, in accordance 
with national and regional norms. 
Phase 3 • Functions that require 
capacities that have scarcely 
or not at all developed at 
decentralized levels and 
which require important 
capacity building processes 
or normative developments 
at a subnational level.  
• Transfers that cannot qualify 
as funded mandates, or, in 
the language of the 
decentralization framework, 
cannot be considered 
“fiscally neutral.” 
Provincial governments look after 
the analysis of organizational and 
management processes, as well as 
organizational systems and 
processes. 
Adapted and translated by the author from MINSA’s Hoja de Ruta (MINSA, 2004) 
 
However, it was evident early on that it would not possible to implement this schedule of 
transfers within the initial timeframe, because CND regulations established that even those 
functions that were already being carried out by regions would require undergoing the 
accreditation process. In practice, then, CND regulations assumed that all sectors were starting 
reforms from a similar baseline; this was seen as an obstacle in MINSA, where deconcentration 
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began in the 1980s and again was active since the transitional Paniagua government. Another 
difficulty for translating requirements of the legal framework (LBD) actual sectoral reforms was 
presented by the varying nature of the functions outlined in the legal framework. There was a 
notoriously heterogeneous level of specificity of such functions, where some referred to very 
specific tasks while others referred to broad responsibilities of regional authorities, such as 
designing regional health plans.59 
 
Thus, in the face of a legal framework that only provided very broad guidelines for reform, during 
2004 these were disaggregated into much more specific functions or “facultades.” These were 
eventually defined in terms of twelve sectoral processes, some administrative and some more 
strictly health-policy related (sanitarios).  Thus, the team in charge of the Hoja de Ruta mapped 
out the disaggregated sectoral functions but kept them under the uneven functional headings 
established by the legal framework. Moreover, for each process there was an assignment of 
responsibilities to the national, regional or provincial level. 
 
By late 2004, MINSA began to organize regular meetings with regional government officials in 
order to discuss the Hoja de Ruta. This was unprecedented both in MINSA and in other 
ministries. Between December 2004 and July 2006, there were nine national, MINSA-organized 
meetings in which regional presidents, regional social development managers and regional health 
directors were invited to participate and discuss issues with MINSA officials. The meetings’ 
proceedings were made public and are still available through MINSA’s website. These national 
meetings were not just devoted to technical aspects of transferring health functions; broader 
                                                 
59 Vicente interview, 2006. 
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aspects of health policy were also being discussed. The 2005 annual health transfer plan is 
considered to be one of the first tangible results of these meetings.60  
 
Interestingly, as a result of this systematic dialogue between MINSA and regional governments, 
in 2005 there was an initial MINSA proposal to begin reforms by transferring a total of 78 sub-
functions (facultades) in that year, most of which were already being carried out as 
deconcentrated activities and thus required no real changes.  
 
Also unlike any other case, CND rejected the initial proposal for the health sector on the grounds 
(according to an official at MINSA’s decentralization office) that they did not want MINSA to 
“get too far ahead” in relation to other sectors.61 When this was translated into the multi-annual 
transfer plan for 2005-2009, only seven functions (and 21 corresponding sub-functions) were 
considered by CND for the health sector in 2005. Finally, by the time the annual 2005 transfer 
plan was approved, negotiations between MINSA and CND led to a total of 13 functions and 37 
sub-functions for 2005 (Participa Peru, 2006; Vicente interview, 2006). This was not only an 
exceptional case because of CND’s restrictive attitude towards a ministry, but also because of 
MINSA´s evident drive towards decentralization, which led it to actively negotiate for more 
significant progress even after CND’s initial denial (Participa Peru, 2005).  
 
The accreditation of regional governments to receive these functions in the 2005 plan was 
successful in most cases, although six regional governments were not certified for all sub-
functions. As in other sectors, Lima and Callao represented significant challenges, as these 
metropolitan areas were slow to adapt their processes and organizations to the demands of 
                                                 
60 Ana Vicente interview, 2006. 
61 Vicente interview. 
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regional policymaking. Moreover, one of the important lines of work in decentralization for 
MINSA during this time was to redefine territorial boundaries of health districts within Lima and 
Callao in order to facilitate the future transfer of functions to corresponding regional governments 
and avoid overlaps. 
 
Another distinctive characteristic of MINSA´s decentralization policy was how these activities 
were actively disseminated in the media by the ministry. Minister Mazzetti employed some media 
advisors and consistently published press releases that informed about their pro-decentralization 
activities. Indeed, the image of MINSA, and Mazzetti in particular, as exceptional reformers was 
well disseminated. The able use of media to promote MINSA’s image was not always seen in a 
positive light, however. For example, two senior advisors of previous minister Álvaro Vidal saw 
the Mazzetti administration’s much promoted pro-decentralization efforts as primarily a media 
creation in the sense that, as previously mentioned, little actually changed in terms of new 
authorities and resources for subnational governments during this period. Mazzetti´s chief virtue 
in this regard was, according to them. “to have good press advisors,” rather than a real 
commitment to significant change.62 Many others, however, saw the minister’s active use of 
media dissemination as an integral part of a decentralization strategy.63 In any case, there was a 
conscious effort to have the general public and policymakers relating changes in the health sector 
with a reform-minded individual and her team of technocrats. 
 
Minister Mazzetti remained in office until the end of the Toledo administration, in July 2006. 
While seen positively by most subnational actors, as confirmed in interviews with subnational 
officials and other ministry officials, as well as by many in international cooperation and 
                                                 
62 Somocurcio interview, 2005; Valcárcel interview, 2005. 
63 Vallenas interview, 2005. 
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technocratic circles, Mazzetti was also a polarizing figure in the health policy community. 
Conservatives within the sector and beyond angrily and publicly resisted her policies because of 
her advocacy of certain birth control methods, especially aiming at lower-income groups. It 
should be noted that, at the beginning of the Toledo administration, the first two health ministers 
(Luis Solari, who was later Prime Minister, and Fernando Carbone) had close ties to the Catholic 
church and conservative groups in Peru. Mazzetti, thus, not only challenged the status quo in 
terms of setting the stage for substantial decentralization (although presiding over little actual 
change) but also challenged a conservative health policy orientation that was originally 
established by influential members of the ruling party. 
 
By the time Mazzetti left MINSA, the legacy of her administration in the ministry included a 
permanent Decentralization Office, located in Lima yet outside the main, massive MINSA 
building. This office replaced, in many ways, the initial team of technocrats working on 
decentralization with Mazzetti and it continued to coordinate decentralization efforts into 2006 
and 2007. Most ministries do not have such permanent offices for decentralization; even the large 
and complex Ministry of Education did not have a single office that could be identified as 
responsible for leading decentralization efforts during this period.64 On the other hand, while 
decentralization efforts certainly did not end in MINSA after Mazzetti left, the series of national-
level did end, and gave way to smaller, regional and local-level meetings after 2006. 
 
The general perception of Mazetti—among subnational actors, academics and even other fellow 
central government officials—was that of an apolitical, technocratic reformist who actively 
favored decentralization and close coordination with subnational governments, which also 
                                                 
64 Wanuz interview, 2005. 
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participated in the discussion of public health objectives. That this had an actual impact on 
MINSA decentralization policy is strongly supported by the fact that the activities that most 
distinguished MINSA from other ministries undergoing administrative decentralization—such as 
regular national meetings with regional officials and the direct and public involvement of the 
minister in decentralization matters—were not present before or after Mazzetti’s tenure as 
minister. Even Mazzetti’s detractors believe that she sought to make decentralization a key issue 
and become directly associated with progress in this field. (Somocurcio interview, 2005)  
 
However, the MINSA case was not entirely an exceptional one. As in other large institutions with 
a complex organizational structure, bureaucratic politics was manifest in the reluctance of many 
agencies in the central offices to participate in decentralization efforts.65 This resistance or “fear” 
of decentralization was addressed directly by the decentralization office, which sought to 
decrease the reluctance to discuss decentralization in the central building in Lima. According to 
an official who was at the decentralization office since its inception, there was especially much 
fear of losing jobs if health services were decentralized to the local level. From the 
decentralization office there were efforts to engage several agencies in dialogue in order to 
explain to them that rather than losing their jobs, their responsibilities were going to change, as 
“instead of supervising what regions do, they would begin to work on national guidelines, 
technical documents and capacity building,” among other issues.66 
 
Institutional factors also shaped and constrained the range of options open to reformist 
technocrats under Mazzetti; as in Education, some institutional reform processes were in place 
from previous years that were not entirely compatible with the decentralization process that began 
                                                 
65 Vicente interview, 2006. 
66 Vicente interview, 2006. 
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in 2002. Many changes that were started in the 1990s were conceived in a context of 
centralization under Fujimori, including those that sought achieve some degree of 
decentralization of decision-making. As mentioned earlier, the legal framework in the health 
sector up to 2002 did consider programs such as CLAS that promoted local participation and 
decision-making but they conceived such programs in a context of dependent regional 
governments and weak local governments, where this and other types of deconcentration or 
delegation would not necessarily involve the levels of politically autonomous, subnational 
government that have been in place since 2002. 
 
In any case, ministerial leadership was crucial in beginning to overcome many of such obstacles, 
as one of the key tasks of the advisory group that worked with Mazzetti since early 2004 was to 
make compatible the existing legal framework and health process with the objectives put forward 
in the then-recent decentralization framework. Moving forward with actual transfers of authority 
and resources, however, has not been a rapid process in a complex sector. However, progress 
towards significant decentralization has continued in this sector after Mazetti (MINSA, 2007). 
 
In short, this chapter has shown how translating the mandates of the decentralization framework 
into sectoral realities is, therefore, difficult even when there is political will at the very top of the 
sector and there is systematic coordination with the beneficiaries of reform, that is, regional 
governments. Without such leadership, when the process is mostly in the hands of lower-level 
officials, progress is even slower and less decisive, as in the cases of MINAG and MINCETUR, 
where institutional constraints and bureaucratic resistance must still be addressed, while there is 
no central figure to push for intergovernmental dialogue that can set the stage for more assured 
steps towards the transfers of authority and resources that subnational actors in fact demand. 
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Chapter 7 - Overview and Conclusions about Decentralization “in 
Name Only” in Peru 
 
In the period 2003-2006, a heterogeneous set of ministries led the process of 
administrative decentralization in Peru. Did this process amount to decentralization in 
name only? Two important facts suggest that this was the case. First, the legislative 
framework does not contemplate a full decentralization (devolution) of public 
policymaking, so that all efforts would at best amount to limited autonomy in subnational 
decision-making. Second, the implementation stage of this policy process yielded 
disappointing aggregate results in terms of the amount of official transfers fulfilled by 
2006, and in terms of what these transfers brought to subnational policymakers eager for 
greater decision-making power. 
 
As for the first point, there are, indeed, unquestionable limits to the degree of autonomy 
that Peruvian subnational governments can aspire to have. On the other hand, the 
shortcomings of official transfers to subnational governments during this period did not 
necessarily indicate a uniform lack of significant efforts towards delegating policymaking 
authority and resources. Rather, the study has confirmed the existence of distinct sectoral 
paths to decentralization, and it has elucidated the factors behind sectoral policymaking, 
given the undeniable heterogeneity in ministries, policy sectors and their particular 
political and institutional processes. In some cases, policies were shaped primarily by 
resistance and aimed at achieving decentralization in name only, while in others 
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significant steps were taken to set the stage for meaningful delegation of sectoral 
authority and resources. 
 
Ministries have acted under a similar, overarching legal framework but also have had 
significant discretion in shaping the process in the policy sectors under their authority; 
thus, they did not act as neutral implementers of orders from above. What factors were 
behind the results of administrative decentralization during this period? Despite 
similarities in the measurable results of implementation in different ministries (which can 
suggest a common pattern of self-interested resistance determining policymaking), initial 
research found evidence of variation in decentralization policymaking at the ministerial 
level that needed to be explained.  
 
Three distinct conceptual lenses (based on literature on bureaucratic politics, 
institutionalism and individual reformers) were used to analyze and explain such 
differences in sectoral transfer policies. Together, these different lenses have provided a 
more coherent account of policymaking during implementation than would have been 
possible only through a focus on the self-interested resistance of ministerial 
policymakers. The comparative analysis of various ministries has shown that these are 
complex organizations where political, institutional and technocratic considerations often 
interact, influencing the decisions taken regarding the policy sectors under each 
ministry’s authority. 
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This concluding chapter reviews the main findings of this study and the implications of 
such findings for a number of important issues in administrative decentralization and for 
the pertinent scholarly literature—including the distinctive nature of the implementation 
stage, the critical importance of administrative decentralization, bodies of work on 
bureaucratic politics, institutionalism, and the role of individual reformers. Finally, it 
outlines the lessons learned regarding the use of the alternative analytical lenses 
employed in this dissertation, proposes some topics for further research in this area, and 
then explains the study’s key strengths and shortcomings. 
 
Key findings 
Two closely linked research questions were formulated in order to examine the dynamics 
of this stage of decentralization in Peru, emerging from a literature review that considered 
work on decentralization in Latin America, implementation studies, bureaucratic politics, 
institutionalism and technocratic reform. First, this study sought to explain why Peruvian 
ministries—rather than other national and subnational stakeholders—were able to 
become the predominant actors shaping the implementation of administrative 
decentralization between 2003 and 2006.  Second, it explored whether the challenges to 
administrative decentralization were uniquely the result of expected resistance to reform 
at the ministry level (as the bureaucratic politics literature would suggest), or if other 
explanations of policy outcomes drawn from political science and policy analysis 
literatures provided a more robust understanding of the dynamics of reform. 
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Ministries leading reform. In Chapter 3, this study explained why Peruvian ministries—
rather than other national and subnational stakeholders—were able to become the 
predominant actors shaping the implementation of administrative decentralization 
between 2003 and 2006. Two factors were crucial: first, a legal framework that severely 
limited the role of subnational governments in shaping decentralization and determined a 
relatively weak central decentralization agency that ostensibly led the reform process. 
Second, the President and ruling party quickly lost interest and leadership in 
decentralization after the key opposition party was the big winner in early regional 
elections (November 2002) that marked the beginning of the process.  
 
The review of significant political and social trends since the early 1980s and of the 
failed regionalization experiment of 1988-1992 illustrated how previous events provided 
significant parameters for decision-makers in the shaping of a framework for 
decentralization in the early 21st century Peru. These included a focus on strengthening 
regional government and a tendency to accept the need for gradual process of change. 
This was followed by a more detailed analysis of the democratic transition of 2000-2001, 
a particular context of rapid change and generalized rejection of authoritarian, centralist 
attitudes that—in conjunction with the realities of Peru’s critically weakened party 
system—made possible the introduction of decentralization to the very top of the policy 
agenda. The presidential decision to rapidly initiate reform in large part was aided by a 
cross-party contingent of new legislators in the Congress that pushed for decentralization 
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reform policies to be immediately formulated and implemented by the Toledo 
government (2002-2006). 
 
However, the pro-decentralization consensus was quite short-lived.  As implementation 
studies would have suggested, after top elected officials in the Executive and Legislative 
defined the broad guidelines for state decentralization, they had few incentives to become 
involved in defining the details of implementation or supervising the process, so that 
ministries and other bureaucratic agencies (but not weaker, subnational stakeholders) 
were able to assume a leading role in shaping administrative transfers. This became clear 
by the time regional elections were imminent, towards the end of 2002, and electoral 
calculations and party allegiance became priorities behind decision-making.  
 
The leading role in administrative transfers was assigned to those holding power in 
various policy sectors. This largely confirmed the first hypothesis established in Chapter 
2, which was based on the findings of implementation literature namely that once top 
elected officials in the Executive and Legislative had defined the broad guidelines for 
state decentralization, they had few incentives to become involved in defining the details 
of implementation or supervising the process, such that ministries and other bureaucratic 
agencies (rather than weaker stakeholders) were able to assume a leading role in shaping 
administrative transfers. 
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However there was also the influence of technocrats that participated in the formulation 
of the legal framework for decentralization, as they clearly favored a slow, gradual 
process that was carefully controlled from Lima. In any case, a scenario that seemed to 
determine a slower pace of reform right after new subnational authorities took office 
(January 2003) was immediately configured, first, by the disappearance of the critical 
legislative pro-decentralization consensus and by aspects of a legal framework for reform 
(2002-2003) that—in large part due to technocratic criteria—left subnational actors and 
even the national decentralization authority in a subordinate position vis-à-vis central 
government agencies like ministries.  
 
With few exceptions, ministries were able to set the pace and depth of the 
implementation of administrative decentralization almost effortlessly. As literature on 
bureaucratic politics and implementation would have predicted, by the end of the Toledo 
administration measurable progress in administrative decentralization was quite small. 
Subnational authorities and independent observers most often cited lack of “political 
will” among ministerial policymakers and higher officials as the key reason for this slow 
transfer of authority and resources. Having the upper hand in determining sectoral 
transfer policies, were policymakers at ministries indeed solely guided by self-interest 
into virtually stalling the process, or were other factors and considerations also 
significant? 
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The factors shaping reform policies in ministries. Having illustrated and explained the 
leading role of ministries as sectoral policymakers that shape the outcome of overall 
reforms, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 answered the study’s  second research question. A 
comparative analysis of decentralization policies across policy areas was carried out, 
viewing policies through alternative lenses that emerge from different bodies of 
literature: bureaucratic politics, institutionalism and individual reformers. First, 
bureaucratic politics suggests looking for calculated self-interest as primary motivation 
behind policies across all sectors, where policymakers make decisions in terms of their 
position at a government agency while aiming at protecting or increasing their authority 
and resources.  An institutionalist perspective, for its part, suggests looking at ministries 
as distinct organizational actors that evolve over time along particular paths. Finally, a 
focus on policymakers as potential reformers leads us to view policies as the result of 
purposeful efforts to resolve sectoral problems or improve performance. 
 
The analysis and comparison of individual sectoral policies formulated by ministries 
revealed that, although ministries are perceived as having resisted the implementation of 
administrative decentralization due to an interest in retaining authority and resources 
(thus the overall slow progress), in most cases their reform policies could only be 
partially ascribed to such resistance to change based on self-interest. Indeed, Chapters 3 
and 4 also showed that self-interested resistance to reform is ubiquitous, yet a 
bureaucratic politics-type explanation is inadequate in providing coherent accounts of 
policymaking in just about every case. 
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Slow progress has also been determined by distinct institutional characteristics, as in the 
case of Agriculture, for instance, where a complex organizational structure and a tradition 
of autonomy among offices within the ministry determined many points of resistance to 
any significant reform rather than there being an anti-decentralization stance among those 
responsible for policymaking. Of course, institutional characteristics are not only 
determinants of slow progress; the presence of a permanent decentralization office is a 
characteristic of two of the more decentralization-oriented ministries, MINSA and 
MINAG. 
 
The preliminary “type of ministry” categories (promotional, infrastructure and social) 
describe the distinct roles that the state plays through ministries in charge of policy 
sectors, and are broadly related to what we later defined as institutional characteristics. 
Indeed, they can be understood as coarse institutional categories that are commonly used 
to classify Peruvian ministries. Moreover, the very different roles that the state must play 
in types policy areas have indeed determined particular considerations that become 
relevant when each institution ponders a decentralization policy: from housing programs 
that could not be financially sustainable if delegated to politically-sensitive productive 
activities which require central supervision and the participation of actors outside the 
Executive branch of government.  
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Alone, however, the type of ministry could not have helped to explain different progress 
in transfers or overall pro-decentralization orientation. Each of the two ministries within 
each category that was examined had quite distinct decentralization policies and 
orientation from the other (Table 7A). If anything, the fact that the least pro-
decentralization pair was that of promotional ministries, where less authority and 
resources are at stake in decentralization, indicates that large bureaucracies and large 
budgets do not necessarily determine greater resistance to reform. Health, a social sector 
led by the second largest ministry and featuring one of the most complex policy systems, 
was indeed the acknowledge decentralization leader. 
 
The actions of individual reformers, most clearly in Health, also shaped such policies 
decisively yet still did not lead to rapid progress. Chapters 4 through 6, then, confirmed 
that there has been much variation in sectoral approaches to decentralization, even though 
there was overall very little substantial transfer of decision-making power from ministries 
of all types to subnational governments. The results of the comparative analysis related to 
research question 2 are summarized in Table 7-A.  
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Table 7-A: Summary of results of comparative analysis of ministries in charge of 
administrative decentralization, 2003-2006 
 
Ministry Sectors under 
ministryÕs 
authority 
Type of 
ministry 
% of 
available 
sectoral 
functions 
formally 
transferred 
Factors 
determining 
transfer policies 
MinistryÕs overall 
pro-
decentralization 
policy orientation 
MINCETUR Trade and 
tourism 
Promotional 100 Resistance None 
PRODUCE Industry and 
fishing 
Promotional 88 Institutional, 
resistance 
Weak 
VIVIENDA Housing, 
construction 
and sanitation  
Infrastructure 0 Institutional, 
resistance 
Weak 
MINAG Agriculture Infrastructure 59 Institutional, 
resistance 
Medium 
MINEDU Education Social 29 Institutional, 
resistance 
Weak 
MINSA Health Social 94 Individual reformer, 
institutional, 
resistance 
Strong 
  
 
These central chapters of the dissertation confirmed there is much that must be analyzed 
at the level of individual ministries—as heads of particular policy sectors—in order to 
understand the dynamics of the implementation stage and their impact on eventual 
outcomes of decentralization reform. Implementation is also a policymaking stage: in the 
case of Peru, reforms were slowed down during this stage. The fundamental reasons for 
this are therefore to be found at the level of sectoral policymakers and other stakeholders 
during implementation. Looking at the political actors and stakeholders of the initial 
stages of reform can reveal some important conditions for policymaking clues but not the 
direct determinants of sectoral policies. 
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In general terms, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 helped to confirm the second hypothesis from 
Chapter 2, that although ministries are perceived as having resisted the implementation of 
administrative decentralization, their reform policies were only partially determined by 
such resistance to change, as distinct institutional characteristics and the actions of 
individual reformers also shaped such policies decisively. However, it was not foreseen 
that different explanatory factors would interact in such distinct ways in each ministry. 
Indeed, this dissertation has showed that ministries can and do become decisive, 
policymaking actors during the implementation stage of decentralization, as well as being 
major stakeholders in reform. Thereafter, administrative decentralization for policy 
sectors is approached distinctly and plays out differently for policymakers in each 
ministry, despite overall similarities in measurable progress during the period under study 
that could suggest otherwise in the case of Peru. 
 
Main implications of findings 
The nature of the implementation stage is crucially important. By answering the main 
research questions, this study has also helped to shed light on the distinctive nature of 
implementation activities (vis-à-vis agenda setting and formulation) in a decentralization 
process. In decentralization, as illustrated by the case of Peru, it is possible to have a 
politically challenging situation where implementers themselves are expected to give up 
resources and authority to subnational actors. We have also seen that, in decentralization 
literature, implementation has a generally overlooked importance in shaping the 
outcomes of decentralization reform—especially in defining administrative 
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decentralization’s impact on subnational policymakers and their decision-making powers. 
Implementation, moreover, takes place in a different policymaking arena than the basic 
formulation of the framework for reform, where the President, Congress and high-level 
technocrats were the key actors.  
 
Implementation can be understood as a distinct stage of the decentralization policy 
process, especially in the Peruvian case, which fits quite well into the traditional “stages” 
approach to public policy analysis. In fact, Chapter 3 confirms the distinctness of earlier 
stages of reform while also confirming the findings of scholars of Latin American 
decentralization about the fundamental role of politics and higher levels of central 
government in earlier stages of the policy process. Subsequently, Chapters 4 through 6 
showed that during implementation a new set of actors at the ministry level shape the 
overall process by adopting different approaches to reform in each case. Thus, the overall 
implementation process itself becomes more of a combination of particular paths of 
reform in distinct sectors, rather than a single policy under the control of any single 
agency. While the earlier stages of agenda setting and formulation certainly have an 
impact on the final outcomes of reform, mid-level implementers in ministries are even 
more important in defining the impact that state decentralization has on empowering 
subnational decision-makers. 
 
As established in the initial literature review, studies of the implementation of public 
policies, which have largely been based on experiences in the United States, have 
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strongly suggested that implementation is also a policymaking stage. It is assumed by this 
literature that it is not a stage where bureaucrats mechanically follow guidelines from 
superiors, and therefore implementers can purposefully shape the outcome of policies. 
Some studies of institutional reforms in developing countries have also pointed towards 
such a conclusion.  
 
The case of Peru (as explored in Chapters 4 to 6) shows a process in which sectoral 
decision-makers in ministries have and exercise significant discretion in proposing what 
is to be transferred to subnational governments and how and when it is to be transferred. 
Moreover, as in the cases of many US and other implementation experiences, bureaucrats 
in charge of implementation have much discretion in translating the broad guidelines they 
receive into policies that reflect, in varying degrees, the know-how, organizational 
structure and particular processes in each sector of public policy under reform.  
 
In some cases, ministries do comply with the most formal side of reform but make no 
efforts to turn decentralization into a meaningful, longer-term policy commitment or to 
give substance to ambiguous functions that the legal framework outlines. Accreditation of 
subnational governments often makes excessive demands (designed by ministries) of 
regional and local authorities, while, on the other hand, there is no higher agency that 
makes sure that the formal transfers are supported by real capacity building or sufficient 
new resources to carry new responsibilities. 
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However, implementers are not entirely free from interference from above. The case of 
the Ministry of Health (MINSA) showed that it is possible for reluctant higher levels of 
government to hold back on the transfer of public functions in a rare case where there is a 
clear will for decisive reform at the highest level of a ministry. Moreover, the case of the 
Ministry of Housing (VIVIENDA) shows that some particular programs within certain 
sectors are in effect off-limits for reform initiatives by sectoral authorities because of 
their political importance for the Presidency. 
 
There is not one implementation process, but many. The nature of the actors involved in 
implementation, and also, to some degree, the legal framework for reform determined 
that implementation of administrative decentralization was to be not only a distinct stage 
of the reform policy process, but more accurately viewed as an aggregation of several 
decision-making processes in particular policy sectors. In this sense, it is quite distinct 
from the earlier agenda-setting and formulation stages where various actors interact at the 
highest-level political arena. 
 
During this study it became increasingly evident that, in the case of Peru, during 
implementation there has been no single logic shaping the crucially important 
administrative decentralization process across different ministries, as each is free to 
approach reform quite distinctly and decision-makers face quite different challenges and 
opportunities. Thus, analysis has concentrated on explaining sectoral implementation 
policies rather than only viewing implementation as part of one single, statewide process. 
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The initial evidence of variation in approaches to reform (particularly because of the 
exceptional case of Health) was decisive in the choice not to expect a common logic 
shaping similar policy outcomes (little or no significant reform) at a heterogeneous group 
of agencies. Sectoral policy analyses of six agencies, in contrast, have identified different 
policies and contexts for policymaking.  
 
These three sets of factors at the ministry level have, sometimes interactively, shaped 
sectoral transfer policies in particular ways during this stage of the policy process, 
relating to three conceptual approaches: 1) bureaucratic politics-type self interest, 2) 
institutional factors and 3) individual reformers.  
 
While the formal transfer process almost always moved at a slower and less decisive pace 
than regional authorities and civil society would have liked, its slowness and apparent 
“hollowness” has not been an accurate reflection of common approaches or attitudes 
towards decentralization as a medium to long-term commitment.  These approaches were 
better revealed through interviews and examination of official documents and were far 
from homogeneous. Attitudes (as confirmed by policies) ranged from blatant resistance to 
any significant empowering of subnational actors in what was a small agency with 
relatively uncomplicated tasks in decentralization (MINCETUR), to that of a careful, 
thorough planning of the long-term, with significant empowerment of such actors in a 
large, and complex agency (MINSA). 
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There is a need for alternative analytical lenses to understand the implementation process. 
Decentralization provides a scenario for reform that strongly suggests a leading role for 
bureaucratic politics-style explanations: those deciding how to execute reforms in 
particular sectors are precisely those actors that would lose resources and authority 
because of reforms, and therefore resistance to changes should play a leading role as a 
factor behind policy decisions. Indeed, it is difficult for those formulating reforms at the 
outset to delve into the details of sectoral reform, leaving major decisions to the each 
agency in charge of a particular sector. 
 
By proposing and finding complementary roles for three alternative explanations of 
policymaking—rather than just analyzing through a self-interest lens—these findings 
have helped to understand that the dynamics of decentralization policymaking in Peru are 
far more complex than might appear at first glance. These findings should also constitute 
a valuable first step towards revealing the range of objectives and motivations of central 
government bureaucratic actors during the implementation of decentralization in Latin 
America.  
 
Ministry-level actors, as mentioned, can decide the impact of reforms on subnational 
governments and yet we are only beginning to understand the factors that determine 
different sectoral decentralization paths. However, the impact of self-interested resistance 
should not be underestimated: evidence of such motivations among decision-makers was 
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present in every case examined here, but was not generally the key to understanding 
overall sectoral policies. 
 
The permanent characteristics of ministries appear to be important for decentralization 
policies. In Chapter 4, ministries were grouped according to relatively stable 
characteristics such as budget size, amount of investment and type of service delivery 
system. These are the most salient characteristics, but we have found that there are other 
important dimensions along which ministries could be fundamentally distinguished and 
can influence policymaking, like the autonomy of offices or programs within a ministry.  
 
To what extent do such long-term characteristics impact decentralization policymaking? 
While the limited number of cases makes it difficult to reach any definitive findings, the 
analyses in this study provide some clues as to what permanent characteristics of 
ministries are most relevant in implementing decentralization. In the first place, social 
and infrastructure ministries (in that order) do face greater challenges to rapid reform 
than smaller, promotional ministries. 
 
The initial categorization of ministries was helpful in gaining a partial understanding of 
the approaches adopted in different cases. For example, even where social sectors show 
some degree of willingness to reform, they have to move slowly because of a complex, 
multi-layer service delivery system, where sectoral workers are well organized. This is an 
important factor independently of the role of particular institutional paths or reform 
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leaders, including ongoing reform efforts. While one should not forget that very 
substantial differences exist in the attitudes and commitment towards decentralization 
even between the somewhat similar ministries, such as Health and Education, it has 
become evident that, where large ministries like Education and Health were slow to take 
off, the smallest and least complex organizations like MINCETUR and PRODUCE 
fulfilled formal requirements quite quickly. 
 
Just as social ministries face complex systems and organizational structures, 
infrastructure ministries analyzed here tend to have many semi-autonomous agencies (in 
charge of particular programs, projects) within their organizational structure that pose 
great difficulties in implementing reforms, as they each require individual attention and a 
dialogue process. Here, it is possible to see that the amount of investment spending has 
some relation with the structure of a ministry; it can be hypothesized that a greater 
portion of budget devoted to investment is closely tied to the emergence of semi-
autonomous entities in charge of projects and programs, and that these offices are prone 
to resist decentralization efforts. The cases of MINAG and VIVIENDA provided a basis 
for such an indirect link between type of spending and resistance to decentralization, 
although no strong conclusions can be drawn yet. 
 
Size and complexity of ministries do matter insofar as the ability to initiate reforms 
rapidly is concerned, but it does not seem to be closely related to the degree of self-
interested resistance to reform among decision-makers. A degree of self-interested 
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resistance to change is detected everywhere, even if only in subordinate offices within a 
ministry. Yet the clearest example of policy being shaped by resistance to give up power 
is that of a small, relatively simple organization (MINCETUR) in charge of a 
promotional sector. Indeed, political will for decentralization reform is not related in any 
obvious way to budget size or the complexity of the service delivery system; smaller 
organizations were only faster in fulfilling formal transfers, but their policies did not 
show a significant degree of commitment to real change. 
 
Administrative decentralization is very important in shaping reforms. Lessons from 
implementation studies and literature on institutional reform were very relevant, as they 
would have predicted the significant discretion of ministerial policymakers in shaping 
administrative decentralization. However, this is only one of the dimensions of state 
decentralization; to what degree is administrative decentralization crucial to fulfilling the 
fundamental objectives of decentralization? 
 
An exploration of the case of Peru, from the agenda setting stage onwards, has shown the 
importance of administrative decentralization—as a dimension of state reform—for 
consolidating a real empowerment of subnational policymakers, ultimately the stated goal 
of reforms in the Constitution and legal framework. In a case like Peru’s, fiscal and 
political decentralization can ring hollow if the decision-making autonomy that these 
promise for subnational governments is not translated into specific authority and 
resources in the key sectors for regional development. Sector by sector, it alone can give 
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substance to the objective of turning subnational governments into the main agents of 
development in their respective territories.  
 
However, such empowerment does not come automatically with the formulation of an 
overarching legal framework. As mentioned before, because of political reasons and 
because of a lack of specific sectoral know-how among those formulating major 
decentralization laws at the outset, giving ministerial authorities significant discretion in 
defining sectoral transfers is almost inevitable. Thus, during implementation 
decentralization is shaped at once by a number of sectoral authorities who, at least in the 
case of Peru, work in isolation from one another and (in general) with respect to 
subnational authorities. Central agencies and other actors barely participate in defining 
these multiple, concurrent paths of decentralization. 
 
Therefore, while many fundamental characteristics of fiscal and political decentralization 
were quite clearly formulated in the legal framework from the beginning, and further 
decision-making was to be made in a centralized manner, the content of administrative 
decentralization was only ambiguously outlined in key legislation. These norms left room 
for a range of outcomes in the transfer of authority and resources that went from 
substantial to virtually negligible, and these outcomes were to be decided by the relevant 
ministries and, in theory, by the central agency CND.  
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Weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework for decentralization, along with 
limited financial resources, have made it difficult—if not impossible—for central 
government agencies to monitor the impact of administrative transfers so far or to assess 
further needs of subnational governments in order to assume new functions. Obviously, if 
these weaknesses continue in the future, it will be particularly difficult to guarantee that 
any administrative transfers will really empower regional and local authorities. Thus, 
reforms will continue to lack any real content in terms of its ultimate objectives regarding 
subnational governments. 
 
Regardless of current limitations and the actual policies of particular ministries, however, 
the Peruvian case illustrates how administrative decentralization can be the only 
dimension of state decentralization that has the potential to truly empower subnational 
governments as leaders of regional and local development. In contrast, the possibilities of 
fiscal decentralization truly empowering subnational governments as decision makers in 
Peru were rather limited, in the sense that, once the general rules were defined at the 
outset, very little was left to the initiative or discretion of subnational policymakers; for 
regional governments, new sources of revenue of any kind can only be proposed by 
central authorities, while borrowing is strictly controlled. There are several types of 
intergovernmental transfers and revenue sharing arrangements that have provided 
subnational governments with significantly greater resources, but they do not yet have the 
authority to use such resources in the most important areas of development. 
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In terms of political decentralization, the initial legal framework—which defined the 
major steps in the process of political decentralization in Peru—gave regional authorities 
a new legitimacy and formal autonomy, but few concrete new decision-making 
authorities in the fields of national public policymaking, in relation to what was left to be 
decided at the ministerial level. The steps taken towards political decentralization have 
not guaranteed the capacity to lead regional development. The legal framework does, 
however, leave room for subnational actors to initiate new types of territorial associations 
and form larger units at their initiative; but (as seen in Chapter 4) in practice the 
incentives for such changes have not been effective. 
 
The outcome of administrative decentralization up to 2006: A reform in name only? 
In most interviews carried out for this study and in various articles, observers and 
stakeholders of this process in Peru—in civil society and in subnational government—see 
an overall failed policy in 2003-2006 and also a lack of political will in most ministries as 
the key explanation behind it. However, there is one exception that is often mentioned, an 
agency with apparently genuine commitment to reform: the Ministry of Health. 
The impression that many observers in civil society and subnational governments share is 
that the transfers from ministries to subnational policymakers between 2003 and 2006 
only amount to a “nominal” decentralization of authority and resources, or a 
“decentralization in name only.” Indeed, there are many common factors that all 
ministries face in formulating administrative decentralization policies—an ambiguous 
legal framework, for instance—and they all enjoy similar discretion in defining the terms 
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for such transfers, so that it is understandable that many observers and stakeholders point 
at a single, overarching determinant of policies: a similar lack of political will resulting in 
unsatisfactory progress. 
 
However, the evident heterogeneity of ministries and policy fields, the different 
individual profiles of policymakers in charge of these, and the existence of many distinct 
measures necessary to block or to truly consolidate the empowerment of subnational 
actors (from capacity building to long term planning) all give reason to doubt any claim 
about ministries being only driven by self-interest. This is why the case studies in this 
dissertation had the objective of understanding why and how ministries formulate and 
implement overall sectoral policies, looking beyond the fulfillment of formal 
requirements that does not shed light on distinct approaches to reform, if indeed they do 
exist.  
 
Slow reform can suggest purposeful actions towards stopping at purely formal or official 
transfer (as many have interpreted it), but there may also be other particular reasons for a 
different pace of progress. Indeed, some agencies have been laying the groundwork for 
more sustainable progress in the long term: Health is the clearest example, yet 
Agriculture and Industry, among others, also show evidence of a commitment to 
strengthen subnational policymakers, although within the constraints of resistance in 
offices within their organization, their institutional histories, and technical considerations 
particular to each ministry’s policy field. 
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In terms of measurable transfers empowering subnational authorities, decentralization 
does appear to be a reform in name only. In terms of actual policies aimed at substantial 
change, however, there is no simple answer to the question poised at the beginning of this 
section. Advances towards real empowerment vary from ministry to ministry and, thus, 
from sector to sector. Administrative decentralization may be subject to a single set of 
general, overarching rules, but the significant discretion of ministries in determining each 
sector’s decentralization means that administrative reform during implementation 
becomes a cumulus of distinct paths towards reform, rather than one single process.   
 
Beyond, the distinct paths taken in each ministry, one can enquire how much of this 
initial “hollowness” of reforms is beyond the responsibility of ministries. On one hand, 
many ministries have indeed made no efforts to go beyond formal transfers or to carefully 
translate ambiguous legal framework guidelines into more specific guidelines that reflect 
the characteristics of their policy fields and organizational structures. This is the case of a 
small, promotional ministry like MINCETUR.  
 
On the other hand, however, rules established in the overarching framework for reform 
and in lesser norms also constrained ministries’ discretion to some extent. Many rules and 
requirements have been considered unreasonable and unrealistic. For example, because of 
CND rules, it was inevitable that initial “reforms” transferred no new authorities or 
resources, as the agency required ministries to begin with the formalization of activities 
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that were already deconcentrated. The execution of many other transfers that did suggest 
additional sectoral policymaking responsibilities was not closely monitored and they did 
not bring with them new financial resources. Indeed, CND (CND, 2006) and budget data 
show that all new financial resources transferred to regional governments at an early 
stage were tied to transfers of infrastructure or social projects that were not initiated by 
line ministries but by central authorities.  
 
The institutional framework for reform is another very important factor that affected 
ministries on equal terms. Most notably, a weak decentralization agency—in whose 
board of directors subnational governments were unfavorably represented—was 
established that could not effectively enforce rules on ministries nor attend subnational 
demands. Yet, at the same time, in the rush to design and formulate this framework in 
time to meet he political promise to hold regional elections by late 2002, there was also 
little time for technocrats and legislators to carefully consult ministries regarding the 
details of administrative decentralization in each sector.  
 
Indeed, the functions outlined for transfer were not the result of a thorough mapping out 
of functions and actors carried out at the central level throughout the Executive. 
Functions are listed at very different levels of specificity for each sector, some being 
extremely vague, general mandates affecting many organization—not at all reflecting 
actual organizational arrangements—while others are concrete activities that are 
associated with particular entities.  
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Moreover, the legal framework established at the outset of reform, like other laws 
established shortly afterwards, did not establish different reform processes for various 
conditions of deconcentration or delegation in each function that may have been found in 
different policy areas. Some sectors had undergone or were undergoing significant 
deconcentration at the time that the framework for reform was formulated, and yet this 
was not explicitly considered in the rules for reform.  
 
Finally, while initially considered, ultimately no sequence of administrative transfers was 
established in terms of the needs of different groups of sectors. The ministries in charge 
of social sectors, like health and education, were eventually set for beginning reforms at 
the same time as much smaller agencies that had small service delivery systems and had 
already deconcentrated to the regional level in previous decades. In many ways, the legal 
framework for reform implicitly assumes that all agencies are starting reform on equal 
terms. 
 
In term of the lack of efforts to assign additional resources for regional actors to assume 
responsibilities previously at the central level, there is also a common reluctance to 
engage Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF) in talks regarding new resources. As 
explained in Chapter 4, has been an extraordinarily powerful actor in the public sector, 
especially since neo-liberal adjustment in the early 1990s, and MEF technocrats have 
managed budget matters with extreme discipline and require much time and effort on the 
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part of ministries to even ensure that they receive budgets that would be expected on the 
basis of accustomed yearly increments. As mentioned in different cases in Chapters 4 to 
6, decision makers at ministries consider that there is enough hardship in such normal 
budgeting processes and negotiations for them to assume additional tasks on behalf of the 
interests of subnational actors. This situation can also be considered a real constraint on 
ministerial policymakers if additional negotiations with such a powerful actor are truly 
beyond the reach of their resources and capacities. 
 
Finally, even in reform-oriented Health, interviewees at the central level perceive 
regional governments as lacking many fundamental capacities and as not being ready to 
assume significant new decision-making responsibilities without substantial training and 
capacity building. Often, independent observers perceive this as a valid concern, but such 
preoccupations have not always led to national capacity-building campaigns by 
ministries. Where there has been such a concern with lack of capacities and it has been 
followed by efforts to improve conditions at the subnational level, one can speak of an 
additional valid reason to move slowly towards administrative decentralization. 
 
Lessons about bureaucratic politics-type explanations 
There are common factors that could help to explain a general slowness and 
ineffectiveness of reform that is not only a result of self-interest in retaining authorities 
and resources. In effect, despite the heterogeneity of ministries in terms of policy fields, 
service delivery systems, size, and budget, there are indeed common situations that 
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ministries face in decentralizing policymaking, and which could be seen as obstacles to 
giving up authority and resources.  
   
Resistance could be found in all cases studied here. Moreover, the fact that administrative 
decentralization itself is not a single policy process but a combination of policies 
established by individual agencies reinforces a key point of the bureaucratic politics 
literature, in effect, that government policies are more the result of inter-agency conflict 
and negotiation than of single, rational processes. However, many cases of unsubstantial 
transfers cannot be explained outside a bureaucratic politics-framework. Ironically, for 
instance, it was at the apparently diligent Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism 
(MINCETUR) that decentralization was fundamentally considered an exercise in 
formalizing what was already in place at the regional level, an exercise that was finalized 
by 2005. Also, there was no place in official planning documents or vision and mission 
statements that indicated decentralization as a long-term commitment, nor was there any 
sign of any aspect of this process being considered by decision-makers as a pending task, 
including negotiations with other central government actors, monitoring, and evaluation 
of regional policymaking, or capacity-building campaigns. At the same time, of course, 
MINCETUR was the first agency to complete all scheduled transfers, having officially 
handed over all responsibilities all the way down to signed “actas de entrega” (official 
documents certifying the full delivery of functions) for the majority of regions. 
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While MINCETUR’s policy appears as the most affected by bureaucratic politics, 
evidence of self-interested resistance to change is also found in other, quite diverse 
ministries and assuming different forms. In some cases, it can be understood as part of 
the agency’s predominant approach (Industry Vice-ministry, for instance), while in 
others, particular programs, projects or other autonomous agencies within ministries, as 
in the case of the Ministry of Agriculture that has over a dozen autonomous agencies 
within its organizational structure. BP is pervasive in the bureaucratic layer but not 
equally powerful nor coming from same sources, or even assuming the same shape 
everywhere. 
 
However, the ministries examined in Chapter 5 also showed that, alongside instances of 
bureaucratic resistance, there are factors that influence policies significantly but cannot 
be accounted for through a BP lens. In VIVIENDA, which at first might seem like a 
clear-cut case of unwillingness to give up power, a more complex set of issues is 
involved. When the framework for decentralization was implemented, the policy sectors 
under VIVIENDA were functioning in ways that were not amenable to the relatively 
quick formalization of existing deconcentrated activities that was presented as 
decentralization in other sectors. A minister with relatively solid pro-decentralization 
credentials provided technical and external pressure arguments to the effect that it was 
beyond his or his predecessor’s possibilities to promptly start a decentralization of 
functions to the regional level. For example, several financing and construction funds that 
municipal governments desired could simply not be transferred without losing economies 
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of scale and the credit from international lenders that was obtained by central government 
could not be transferred to dozens or even hundreds of much smaller subnational 
governments. Bureaucratic resistance to giving up power that reflects external pressures, 
however, is clearly a consideration in some other aspects; it was understood that some 
programs that were politically important for the President should not be transferred. Thus, 
by ignoring the particular non-political dilemmas in this ministry by only seeing the 
unimpressive results of 2003-2006 through a bureaucratic politics account would 
evidently lead us to gloss over many valid and practical considerations in reforming a 
relatively complex ministry. 
 
In Education, a sector known for its difficulties pushing through reform, the relative 
delay in the ministry beginning even the most formal administrative transfers can be, on 
one hand, be interpreted as providing further proof of the salience of bureaucratic politics 
lenses in the sense that it certainly would have avoided further conflicts or tensions in a 
sector where different groups of administrative and decision-making actors were slowly, 
and not entirely successfully, being realigned. On the other hand, however, the fact that 
such a deconcentration process was indeed underway before 2003 undermines an 
argument for delays as a result of an inherent resistance of top policymakers to 
decentralization. In fact, such a delay, viewed in light of MINEDU’s reformulated 
decentralization model in 2003—which sought to make compatible sectoral processes 
with the new state decentralization program—could also be seen as evidence of genuine 
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commitment to meaningful change on the part of some policymakers who were more 
accustomed to working in terms of arduous, gradual change.  
 
In any case, VIVIENDA and MINEDU are not in any way examples of success in 
administrative decentralization during the period under study, and so it could finally be 
said that different types of resistance to change (including CND presumably acting under 
Executive orders to hold back some initial formal transfers) ultimately prevailed in these 
sectoral decentralization outcomes. However, in MINEDU the existence of a parallel, 
sector-specific decentralization process that was started by reform oriented 
policymakers—and that considerably weakens the coherence of a BP account of 
MINEDU’s decentralization policies—led us to explore some other ways to account for 
the outcomes of administrative decentralization in 2003-2006. 
 
Bureaucratic politics is widespread, yet it varies significantly in intensity and location 
within the structure of ministries in a heterogeneous group. Just as importantly, when 
trying to account for policies—i.e., what ministries are doing regarding the mandate for 
decentralization and what they plan on doing—a BP lens cannot account for many 
aspects of transfer policy that seem to be unrelated to a calculated self-interest.  
 
Moreover, because BP varies in different ministries—but not in a way that is related to 
more readily identifiable factors like size or budget—it seems like BP closely interacts or 
may be explained by other factors that also shape sectoral policies. What makes BP vary 
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from agency to agency? The evidence reviewed here does not support a claim that BP is 
greater in the largest, or more powerful ministries, or that it varies as a function of greater 
or lesser deconcentration. In fact, the classification of three groups of ministries 
introduced in Chapter 4, similar to that used in the Peruvian public sector, appears 
generally relevant to the types of challenges that each group of ministries faces in 
decentralization, but too broad to capture the precise factors that shape sectoral policies in 
each agency. For instance, it sheds light on the potential difficulties faced by social 
sectors like Health and Education, with large groups of unionized workers and powerful 
offices within each organization, but not about why one ministry would move ahead with 
far more impetus than the other in paving the way for meaningful reform. 
 
Thus, a BP perspective helps to understand some aspects of observed policies, but it 
alone cannot explain why ministries move ahead with reform at different speeds and with 
quite different approaches. And yet this does occur, and the most visible clue before 
beginning the research was the case of the Ministry of Health. Moreover, when analyzing 
the first sample of ministries it was evident in at least two cases that specific factors, like 
the particular technical requirements of key programs and external political pressures on 
politically sensitive programs in VIVIENDA, made significant reform unviable.  
 
Lessons about the role of institutional factors in each organization 
While confirming the importance of BP, although it only partially explains most observed 
policies, a look at ministries through BP lenses also helped to confirm that there indeed 
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are distinct policies and they are not directly related to basic characteristics of ministries. 
For example, there are differences in how (and if) decentralization is integrated into 
overall sectoral plans as a permanent policy, there are different interpretations of the 
mandate for decentralization in terms of adapting (or not) the ambiguous guidelines in the 
basic legal framework approved in 2002 and 2003, different attitudes towards dialogue 
and capacity building in regional and local governments, and there are variations in the 
dedication of officials or offices permanently to these issues. 
 
The literature review in  Chapter 2 proposed two other distinct explanations that represent 
alternatives to a pluralist view focused on self-interest shaping policies: first, an 
institutionalist theoretical lens focusing on decisions shaped by the paths of evolving 
organizations and their structure. On the other hand, there is a policy literature that 
focuses on the role of influential individuals as decision-makers who are reform-oriented 
and design strategies to achieve their objectives. 
 
In the cases of five of the six ministries that were analyzed closely—the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MINAG), social sector ministries, the relatively autonomous Vice-ministry 
of Industry, and VIVIENDA—the different histories of these organizations and their 
offices, previously implemented policies, and evolving organizational structures do 
matter insofar as they present challenges and opportunities to decentralization decision-
making that translate into distinct approaches to decentralization policy. For instance, 
whether or not there was an undeniable political will for reform at the top, it is clear that 
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officials in many sectors have made efforts to translate the mandate for administrative 
decentralization to their institutions. This is clear in MINAG, for example, which 
attributes some of the slowness in moving ahead with reforms to the need to avoid 
political tensions within the agency by carefully translating functions defined outside the 
ministry. These are to be translated into more specific and accurate sub-functions that are 
compatible with the organizational structure of MINAG and the agencies within it that 
are in charge of specific policy areas. 
 
Decentralization is not always well integrated into ministries’ medium or long-term 
plans. Sometimes, it is impossible to find even a mention of decentralization in their 
official planning documents (MINCETUR). In some cases, there is only some evidence 
of decentralization or deconcentration efforts that are not quite in line with the reforms 
started in 2002, as in the case of the industry sector in the Ministry of Production, where 
there as been limited progress in terms of the current guidelines for reform; the Ministry 
of Education shows some progress on both sector-specific and overall fronts, while it has 
made efforts in the legal framework to make compatible current guidelines and previous 
sectoral policies towards deconcentration. Commitment to long-term decentralization 
efforts is also evident in MINAG and, especially, MINSA, which is the only sector to 
have begun work on a comprehensive, sector-wide reform as early as the first months of 
2004. 
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Thus, besides adapting the guidelines for reform to their particular structure, several 
ministries have found it necessary to adapt ongoing deconcentration and other processes 
policies to new mandates, most clearly in the larger social sectors. Rather ironically, in 
two much smaller ministries in the promotional category (MINCETUR and PRODUCE), 
past advances in deconcentration to regional entities (in the 1980s and 1990s) are also 
used as a pretext to avoid working for more resources being transferred to regional 
governments; officials argue that necessary resources related to new functions were in 
fact already transferred in recent decades to the regional level and it is not the ministries’ 
to ensure that current governments can take care of these formal transfers. 
 
Another organizational characteristic that has an impact on distinct approaches to 
administrative decentralization in our case studies is the existence of a permanent 
decentralization office in an agency. While by law all ministries must have a Transfers 
Committee, this is not a permanent entity that is autonomous from other ministerial 
offices or devoted to planning or evaluating decentralization. Rather, it seldom meets and 
is composed of higher-level ministry officials focusing on the formal aspects of 
complying with function transfers. There are also cases of particular officials being 
(somewhat unofficially) put in charge of transfers, but they are officials of other agencies 
and thus not autonomous from key agencies within a ministry. On the other hand, a few 
ministries have had autonomous and permanent pro-decentralization offices that do work 
with a more coherent, long-term perspective. In the case of MINSA, its existence is tied 
to the efforts of a reformist minister and her top advisors, while in MINAG it has 
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continued to work, albeit slowly, despite the lack of decisive leadership from the top. 
Meanwhile, in 2003-2006 the largest and perhaps most complex ministry, MINEDU, had 
no single identifiable and permanent team or office in charge of looking after the process. 
 
Like bureaucratic politics, institutional factors are observed everywhere as factors 
shaping decentralization policy. It is also pervasive and has many different types of 
manifestations and levels of impact on policy. In some agencies, like MINCETUR, the 
institutional evolution (of deconcentration in the 80s and 90s and downsizing in a context 
of neoliberal reforms) has in effect mostly served as a pretext not to give up any 
resources or new authorities in addition to what was previously transferred in a context of 
deconcentration. Industry has many similarities to MINCETUR yet, like VIVIENDA and 
others, it has also faced sector-specific technical factors that limit the possibilities of 
carrying out certain transfers of programs outside the center. However, the complexity of 
some ministerial structures, full of autonomous offices, programs and projects, has made 
swift change virtually impossible in ministries like MINAG and the social sector 
ministries, as there are many stakeholders with different degrees of resistance to reform. 
 
As the previous paragraph suggests, not only are BP and institutional factors present 
together in many ministries but also they interact in different ways. The cases examined 
suggest that more complex ministries, with layers of relatively powerful and autonomous 
offices, have more actual sources of resistance to reform that can be understood through a 
BP lens.  
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Such is the case in the two infrastructure ministries that were analyzed: VIVIENDA and 
MINAG. In Education and Health, ongoing reform processes, which had had to deal with 
strong resistance to change within their organization, were gradually and carefully 
adapted to a new context. Interviews, and the political difficulties and slow rate of 
progress of reforms that were started previously to the current decentralization process 
and gradually adapted to the new contest, strongly suggest that it is well known that there 
is a need for careful consideration of the interests of powerful bureaucratic stakeholders 
in the social sectors. 
 
Type of sector (promotional, infrastructure and social) does relate to a significant extent 
to the interactions between BP and institutional factors. In the smaller, less complex 
promotional ministries, which have been deconcentrated for a while and which have 
smaller service delivery systems, BP resistance appears to be coming from higher levels 
of decision-making. In the infrastructure ministries, the organizational structure is far 
more complex, and many agencies have significant discretion over sizeable budgets. 
Here, BP is also easily identifiable in a layer of particular offices within a ministry, which 
is different from smaller, promotional ministries where ministers or top decision-makers 
have greater authority over the shape of decentralization policy, but no reform-oriented 
policies have emerged. 
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Lessons about sectoral reform leaders: Although all too rare, they were decisive 
While bureaucratic politics and institutional factors seem to interact everywhere in 
shaping sectoral decentralization policies, they do not quite account for the observed 
diversity of approaches to administrative decentralization in Peru. Finding a missing 
element, however, was not such a difficult task. As mentioned, there was an exceptional 
case—an “outlier” among ministerial policy outcomes—that suggested from the outset 
that there is a factor that can be decisive in steering policies at ministries towards more 
significant reform. The Ministry of Health was a relatively well-known exception and 
was mentioned especially often by interviewees in regional governments and analysts 
from civil society. 
 
Thus, individual leaders’ reform orientation is seen as an important factor that can, and 
does, shape policies, interacting with institutional factors and bureaucratic politics. As 
illustrated in the previous chapter, MINSA’s Pilar Mazzetti appears as the only minister 
during this period that actively and openly pushed for meaningful change in her sector in 
the medium to long term. This occurred even as higher levels of the Executive, including 
the President, were losing interest in supporting the reform process. However, MINSA 
under Mazzetti did not have a policy only shaped by the minister’s reform orientation: 
resistance to change within the ministry was explicitly recognized and addressed by the 
agency’s top technocrats and by the decentralization office (Chapter 6). Meanwhile, the 
legal and institutional framework for previous sectoral reforms was made compatible 
with new guidelines early on, and these tasks took precedence over swiftly fulfilling 
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formal requirements by transferring functions that were already deconcentrated. Also, 
much effort was put into translating guidelines from above into a transfer policy that 
reflects the particular conditions of the Peruvian health sector. 
 
The purposeful strategic actions of Mazzetti and her close advisors to set the stage for 
sustainable reform in the medium and long-term—including addressing political 
resistance, planning for capacity building and adapting ongoing reforms to a new 
context—fit in well with the views on reform leaders in institutional reform in the 
developing world that are described by Grindle (2001), Nelson (1999) and others. The 
minister and other officials’ willingness to engage subnational authorities in 
decentralization, as well as a number of capacity building campaigns, made possible a 
favorable view of MINSA in comparison to other agencies involved in administrative 
decentralization. While only MINSA is clearly a case of individual reformers 
significantly shaping policy in a reform orientation, it provides some insights that could 
be researched further by comparing it with other cases abroad. 
 
What difference did a reform-minded leader make? First, there was a more coherent 
approach to decentralization as an integral part of any reform process in the sector; there 
was a conscious effort to integrate different lines of reform in a participatory manner, as 
regional authorities were part of a series of national meetings where decentralization and 
specific health policy issues were treated as closely interrelated. Second, all work 
(planning, intergovernmental dialogue, careful mapping of functions and stakeholders 
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within the sector, etc.) began earlier than in other ministries and with input from 
technocrats who worked fundamentally on this issue. While an active pro-
decentralization leader could not set the pace of reform at will, the comparison with 
agencies that shared characteristics (like MINAG, with an active decentralization office, 
and more relevantly, MINEDU, sharing many aspects as a large social sector) shows a 
much more decisive and early progress towards sustainable decentralization reforms, 
with only marginal effort put into simply formalizing what was already there. 
 
While individual reformers can be a powerful factor in shaping decentralization policy, 
such actors appear only rarely. In this case it was an independent minded technocrat with 
an atypical profile within the Cabinet: one without a known political party affiliation and 
with well-established, and often controversial, policy preferences in the health sector. She 
focused on implementing meaningful change and not just on fulfilling formal 
requirements. However the complexity of the policy sector and the ministry’s 
organizational structure determined that changes could not be swift, as many preliminary 
stages for reform had the fulfilled before a significant transfer of functions could begin. 
 
Lessons for the future of decentralization in Peru and beyond 
This study has important lessons to offer to the understanding of state decentralization in 
Latin America and its impact on development. Just as several studies on Latin American 
countries have shown that national politics are fundamental to understanding the 
beginning and initial shape of state decentralization programs, the findings of this study 
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add to this that the dynamics of implementation are crucial to understanding the impact of 
such reforms on their intended direct beneficiaries: subnational governments.  
 
For decentralization to empower subnational governments as effective leaders of 
development in their respective territories, these authorities must assume new 
responsibilities in a number of sectors of policymaking. However, the Peruvian case has 
shown how, in the implementation stage of reform and in the administrative dimension of 
decentralization, transferring these functions and necessary resources does not depend on 
any single actor. Bureaucratic actors have significant freedom in determining the depth 
and timing of sectoral decentralization.  
 
Even within the scope of a single overarching legal framework for reform, ministries can 
determine distinct paths of decentralization for different policy sectors. As literature on 
implementation has shown previously, all the specific details of reform cannot be 
determined beforehand at the central level, that is, by a high-level team of technocrats or 
by legislators in Congress. In the Peruvian case, this significant degree of discretion has 
led to different approaches to reform, yet, at the same time, the measurable results of over 
3 years of sectoral transfers have not been significant. Some ministries have been 
partially favorable to reform, but still even these had not managed to achieve significant 
transfers to subnational authorities by the end of the Toledo administration. As literature 
on bureaucratic politics would lead us to expect, different sources of resistance to reform 
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have been found, some at the top levels of ministries, and others in specific areas of 
ministries accustomed to relative autonomy. 
 
These findings can be construed as reason to be skeptical about the prospects for an 
effective, substantial decentralization of decision making in countries such as Peru. 
Indeed, they provide evidence that decentralization becomes an even more complex 
endeavor during implementation, when mandates from above are carried out through 
many different sectoral channels. Challenges can be expected to multiply as the very 
organizations that are to give up power have the upper hand in deciding their paths to 
reform. 
 
However, these findings also provide reasons for some optimism. Behind apparently 
dismal results were found very different approaches to reform among ministries, and not 
just an invariable resistance to change. Despite the fact that administrative 
decentralization requires ministries to give up part of their authority over policy sectors, 
some ministries did lay the groundwork for substantial reform in the following years. In 
such cases, the fact that measurable progress was small in the period under study is also 
attributable to the attention that decision-makers had to pay to institution-specific factors: 
ongoing reforms, pre-existing deconcentration efforts, traditional autonomy of offices 
within ministries, among others. Moreover, in some cases decentralization was pushed 
forward by agencies within ministries that were exclusively devoted to sectoral 
decentralization, but which did not necessarily have the support of top decision makers.  
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In this sense, it is important to consider the dynamics of implementation in order to 
establish realistic objectives and expectations among the stakeholders of administrative 
reforms. Decentralizing administrative functions and resources within a policy sector 
presents particular challenges in each case; timelines for reform cannot be set uniformly 
for all such actors. For some ministries it was realistic to expect some significant reform 
by 2006, including the smaller promotional ministries, and yet these did not yield 
satisfactory results. Meanwhile, in other cases, even beginning reforms should have been 
expected to take time, as in Health and Education; in Health, a reform-oriented leadership 
was not enough to guarantee quick progress. 
 
Thus, the findings presented here about the dynamics of implementation in 
decentralization strongly suggest a need for much closer attention to the particular needs 
(and resistances) of ministries in charge of decentralizing policy sectors, if 
decentralization is to strengthen regional and local development. In the case of Peru, 
there was a legal and institutional framework for reform that did not serve this purpose, 
with a decentralization agency lacking authority and resources to either supervise the 
process or to assist policymakers in facing their particular challenges. It appears 
inevitable that ministries should have substantial discretion in determining their paths of 
reform, yet there is also a need for strong orientation and supervision of the 
implementation process. On the other hand, the only example of a decisive reform leader 
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at a ministry lacked support from even the decentralization agency, which blocked some 
efforts for rapid advances through the more purely formal steps of the process. 
 
Decentralization’s success as an instrument for development depends on far more than a 
successful initiation of the process and the establishment of an adequate legal and 
institutional framework for reform. During implementation, sectoral decision makers can 
significantly determine the impact of reforms, and this is not necessarily an undesirable 
scenario insofar as ministerial authorities generally have the know-how and experience to 
plan specific transfers. However, sectoral policymaking should ideally become a more 
transparent and accountable process, with dialogue between central and subnational 
authorities, and with the participation of a decentralization agency that can take action in 
cases of overt, self-interested resistance to reform. 
 
The national political context, of course, is always potentially important. National politics 
made possible early decisions in the Toledo administration and the beginning of the 
process. A lack of decisive leadership thereafter allowed ministries to decide the distinct 
paths of sectoral administrative decentralization. After 2006, the government of Alan 
García hardly lived up to his alleged decentralization credentials, introducing some 
important changes like the dissolution of CND but no clear mandate to rethink a process 
that continued to move slowly with many of the defects of the previous period. However, 
two years into this administration, national politics may have again played an 
unintendedly positive role for reform; in late 2008 a corruption scandal brought down the 
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Jorge Del Castillo-led cabinet, and the replacement as Prime Minister was none other 
than Yehude Simon, the independent president of the Lambayeque region who was 
interviewed for this study and is a respected pro-decentralization figure. 
 
The study’s general strengths and limitations 
This study has generated significant findings on an important yet relatively unexplored 
area of research in the recent literature on decentralization: namely, the dynamics of 
implementation and their impact in shaping state decentralization. In focusing on this 
area it has necessarily also studied the policymaking role of ministerial implementers 
shaping reform in their respective sectors. This area appears as decisive for the outcomes 
of state decentralization in Latin America and in state reform processes in general, and 
requires close attention from policymakers if ambitious reforms are not to result in 
“decentralization in name only.” The study has also shown the validity of three 
complementary analytical lenses that help to understand the complexity of this process, 
where motivations favoring and resisting reform interact.  
 
Moreover, these findings have been based on a distinctive cross-sectoral analysis based 
on academic literature, official documentation and, especially, on interviews on the 
ground in Peru, getting first-hand accounts of stakeholders in the process, not only in 
central government but also in regional and local governments, as well as experts in 
NGO’s and in academia who have closely studied decentralization in Peru. Thus, it has 
managed to identify particular factors shaping policies in different ministries. 
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However, the study has also faced some important limitations that must be noted. First of 
all, the international comparability (and thus, relevance) of the Peruvian case can be 
questioned given that this has been considered in many quarters as a rapidly stalled or 
failed decentralization, which initially promised to be significant. However, the process 
begun in 2002 did not end with the Toledo administration, despite sharp criticisms by the 
subsequent García administration. While the initial momentum has not been regained and 
some institutional factors have been changed, by and large the legal framework for 
decentralization was the same in 2008 as it was in 2003. From this perspective, what this 
study represents is a distinct time period of reform that is the beginning of a long-term 
process spanning several political administrations, as would be the better-known case of 
Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s (Rodriguez, 1997). The end of a political administration 
can be seen as a useful landmark in terms of framing the period under study, and while 
the study was being completed it seemed at different times that the beginning of a new 
administration could bring about a radical overhaul of the process, which ultimately did 
not happen. 
 
The context for administrative decentralization in particular did not change dramatically 
after the change of administrations in mid-2006: sectoral reforms were not definitively 
halted and then continued, as of 2008, to be in the hands of ministries. Some institutional 
changes have occurred, yet the conditions for administrative reform are still mainly in the 
hands of the actors studied in this dissertation. Thus, while at the highest level of 
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government the process apparently was first stopped and then re-formulated in some 
aspects (such as introducing a new decentralization agency, the Secretaria de 
Descentralizacion located under the Prime Minister’s office), the administrative reform 
that is the focus of this study has continued almost unaltered, confirming that this is an 
overlooked dimension of decentralization even by government officials. 
 
Precisely because of the inconsistent way the process has been handled politically, the 
focus on administrative transfers justifies not abandoning this study. In effect, 
administrative reforms have moved almost independently of the national political arena, 
continuing slowly into the following administration.  Moreover, this study covers a 
relatively short time frame, considering that decentralization is a long-term process and 
maybe it is unlikely to expect to consider impact on subnational development as a 
dependent variable of sectoral decentralization policies. Because of this, analyzing the 
territorial dimension of reform was also difficult, as sectoral transfers were not completed 
in most cases, and in some areas transfers did not reach all subnational governments 
because of certification requirements.  
 
The focus on policymaking in different agencies can be considered an important first step 
towards understanding the dynamics of implementation in decentralization, but has also 
been a necessary decision. The slowness and hollowness of the transfer process and the 
relatively short time frame have determined a lack of available hard, reliable quantitative 
data that could provide evidence of distinct advances in each policy field. Indeed, the 
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overall lack of progress made this a rather peculiar study in the sense that it looks for 
variation in policymaking despite apparent lack of variation in the impact of reform 
across policy sectors. 
 
A great deal of the findings here have been based on semi-structured interviews; their 
relative pros and cons have been considered since the outset. While the lack of structured 
design or standardized procedures also makes replication more difficult, without such 
flexibility it would have been impossible to probe deeply into relatively sensitive subjects 
in government bureaucracy, where a new interview might be difficult to obtain and where 
the openness of subjects to talk about certain issues varied significantly. 
 
Another issue that merits further explanation is that of case selection: while all twelve 
cases (see Chapters 2 and 4) were preliminarily explored, in some cases it appeared 
particularly difficult to establish contacts within the institution. However, the original 
goal of having a sample of two ministries from each of the categories established at the 
outset (social, infrastructure and promotional) was accomplished. Some cases that were 
initially considered as candidates for more in-depth analysis could not be contacted 
successfully until quite late in the research. In the case of the Ministry of Transportation, 
an interview was held with a senior consultant involved in decentralization planning, yet 
it was arranged after other cases were studied and did not show the potential to illustrate 
any additional factors to those shown on other cases.  
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On the other hand, the perspective of subnational officials in a regional and a local 
government outside Lima (the beneficiaries of reform, in theory) on ministries as a whole 
and on some individual cases did provide for a more balanced set of views on the nature 
of the administrative decentralization process than would have been possible with only 
the view of bureaucrats in the agencies in charge of reform or of experts and other 
stakeholders who view the process from Lima. 
 
Implications for further research 
This study has, as one of its main strengths, its contribution to identifying and opening 
several potential new lines of research in the field of state decentralization. First, it has 
highlighted the often-overlooked importance of implementers as policymakers shaping 
decentralization, by bringing together the insights of at least two lines of research. On one 
hand, the literature of determinants of decentralization in Latin America, which has 
recognized the importance of political and other factors at the genesis of reform but has 
not yet looked at the politics of the implementation stage of the process with the level of 
attention paid to the national actors involved in initiating and formulating reform policies 
in decentralization. On the other hand, the literature on implementation, based mostly on 
U.S. cases, and the literature on institutional or second-generation reforms in the 
developing world, both of which provided decisive clues as to what could be expected in 
the implementation of decentralization.  
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Another important contribution of this research to existing decentralization literature is 
that it has provided evidence of the validity and usefulness of framing decentralization as 
a policy process with distinct stages, and, at the same time, the implementation stage as 
important to shaping outcomes and the process’ impact on intended beneficiaries at the 
subnational level. In this sense, it points out the need to distinguish different 
policymakers and, at the same time, to integrate studies of different stages of state 
decentralization (including the identification of stakeholders and distinct impact of each 
stage) in order to provide coherent accounts of the determinants of such processes, which 
are an undeniable political reality in every region of the world. Finally, by focusing on 
administrative decentralization and its key actors, it has helped to confirm the importance 
of studying decentralization with a focus on the sectoral dimension. 
 
Besides being a comparative study of implementers as decisive sectoral policymakers 
during state decentralization in Peru, this dissertation also functions as a case study of the 
dynamics of the Peruvian decentralization process that formally began in 2002. In this 
sense, it adds a case that has not been systematically examined many times to the body of 
literature that has been studying the determinants of state decentralization in Latin 
America. At the same time, it can be seen as a contribution to the broader body of 
research on state reform in Latin America that has been growing since at least the late 
1980s. It sheds light on the role of implementers of mandates from above as 
policymakers in a country where such studies have not been abundant and, also, on the 
distinct challenges to be faced in different types of sector public policy.  
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It would be fruitful for other studies along the lines of research explored here to also look 
at the regional dimension of administrative decentralization. While the slow progress in 
the transfer process made that difficult in this case, it would be valuable to analyze 
differences in how subnational governments take different approaches to assuming new 
authorities and resources. Closely related, it would be important to understand if and how 
ministries relate in different ways to different subnational governments.  
 
Because institutional factors and some strictly technical considerations have influenced 
the distinct approaches that have been found in sectoral policies in Peru, it would be very 
relevant to continue along this line of inquiry by comparing administrative 
decentralization in particular sectors across countries. While this has been analyzed to 
some extent in the social sectors in the context of second generation institutional reforms, 
other sectors should also yield interesting findings about particular characteristics that 
can shape reform in each policy field and service delivery system. 
 
This dissertation compared different cases and utilized three analytical lenses that were 
both prominent and offered very distinct visions of what shapes policymaking. It would 
be interesting, as an alternative, to carry out this type of exploration with more nuanced 
differences between alternative lenses. This would help to resolve some issues that could 
not be analyzed in greater depth through the approach adopted here. For instance, 
distinguishing between different types of political resistance to reform: we have seen 
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evidence of internal resistance (from offices within an agency), resistance or at least lack 
of action from top policymakers in a ministry, and even resistance from outside, as when 
top levels of government made it known they did not want programs in the Housing 
sector to be touched by reform. What kinds of interaction are there between these factors? 
To what degree do they affect policymaking? Because this dissertation chose to have 
only one analytical lens that is overtly political, such questions could not be properly 
addressed here. On the other hand, types of reform leaders and types of institutional 
factors could also be considered and compared. 
 
Finally, in cases where a longer period is analyzed, researchers could look at processes 
where evaluation of final impact of reform on subnational governments is possible. As 
mentioned above, this would make possible an analysis of the different stages of reform, 
and both a sectoral and a territorial approach to decentralization’s impact. This last aspect 
would make it possible to account for the impact of sectoral policies and policymakers 
and, at the same time, incorporate the impact of regional conditions and decisions made 
by subnational policymakers once transfers have been implemented. Analyzing sectoral 
policies and finding the determinants of policymaking during implementation should still 
be a fundamental aspect of any such longer-term analysis of a decentralization process.
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Appendix: Key informant interviewees in Peru 
 
Stakeholders in decentralization process, 2001-2006: 
Interviewed in 2004 
1. Luis Pacheco, former consultant at Consejo Nacional de Descentralización 
2. Hillman Farfán, senior consultant at Viceministry of Economy and representative of 
Ministry of Economy in discussions of decentralization framework in Congress.  
3. Johnny Zas Friz Burga, consultant at decentralization office of Defensoría del Pueblo 
and former senior member of the decentralization framework design team at 
Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros. 
 
Interviewed in 2005 
4. Javier Abugattás, former Viceminister of Economy and current board member of the 
national Mesa de Concertación de Lucha contra la Pobreza. 
5. Betty Contreras, official coordinating the implementation of decentralization transfer 
process at Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo (MINCETUR) 
6. Carlos Ferraro, Director of Industry department at Ministry of Production 
(PRODUCE). 
7. Manuel Álvarez, senior officer at  PRODUCE. 
8. Karima Wanuz, Education expert and consultant in 2003-2004 at Ministry of 
Education (MINEDU). 
9. José Somocurcio, physician and advisor to Minister of Health (2003-2004). 
10. María A. Valcárcel, physician and advisor to Minister of Health (2003-2004). 
 
Interviewed in 2006 
11. Ana Vicente, Decentralization and Finance expert at the Decentralization Office of 
the Ministry of Health (MINSA). 
12. Carlos Izaguirre Jacinto, head of the decentralization office, UCAD at MINAG. 
13. Ivan Rivera Molina, officer at Oficina General de Planificación Agraria at MINAG. 
14. Rudecindo Vega, decentralization expert and Minister of Housing, Construction and 
Sanitation (VIVIENDA) during the Toledo administration. 
15. Luis García Corrochano, advisor at the Viceministry of Transportation at MTC. 
16. Luis Thais, head of CND from 2003 until July 2006. 
17. Jorge Jara, Accreditation and Transfers manager at CND. 
18. Yehude Simon, President of the Lambayeque regional government.  
19. Eduardo Sáenz, Social Development manager at the Lambayeque regional 
government. 
20. Miguel González, Planning and Budgeting manager at the Lambayeque regional 
government. 
21. Juan Sandoval, Natural Resources and Environment manager at the Lambayeque 
regional government.  
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22. Estuardo Díaz, Chief of Investments Promotion and International Cooperation at the 
Lambayeque regional government. 
23. Alfredo Vera, mayor of the Independencia district (Áncash region). 
24. Eduardo Mauricio, municipal manager at the Independencia district. 
25. Elda Maguiña, Economic Development manager at the Independencia district. 
 
Peruvian experts and advocates: 
Interviewed in 2004 
1. Carlos E. Aramburú, head of CIES, the research consortium that groups Peru’s top 
universities and research centers. 
2. Claudio Herzka, head of the business institute IPAE and former consultant on 
decentralization issues at international organizations. 
3. Francisco Sagasti, President of the research NGO FORO Nacional/Internacional and 
former head of AGENDA:Perú, a project that designed a development strategy for 
Peru based on academic research and participative processes. 
4. Martín Tanaka, Political scientist and senior researcher at Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, author of articles on decentralization 
5. Martín Valdivia, Economist and senior researcher at Grupo de Análisis para el 
Desarrollo (GRADE), currently involved in education decentralization research  
 
Interviewed in 2005 
6. Rodolfo Alva, local government expert at the Lima NGO ALTERNATIVA 
7. Jorge Capella, Dean of the Education School at Universidad Católica and former 
president of Consejo Nacional de Educación.  
8. Javier Iguíñiz, chair of the Economics department at Universidad Católica and author 
of several books and articles dealing with development and decentralization 
9. Pablo O’Brien, head of the investigative unit at the national newspaper El Comercio 
and political analyst 
10. Sandra Vallenas, Sociology professor at Universidad Católica and expert on Health 
issues. 
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